

University of Cape Town

THE RIGHT IN TRANSITION:

**An analysis of the politics and ideology of the white rightwing in
historical context**

Department of Sociology

Presented in fulfilment of the degree

Master of Arts

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|-------|--|
| ABB | Afrikaner Broederbond |
| ANC | African National Congress |
| APK | Afrikaanse Protestantse Kerk |
| AV | Afrikaner Volkswag |
| AVF | Afrikaner Volksfront |
| AVK | Afrikaner Vroue Kenkrag |
| AVU | Afrikaner Volksunie |
| AWB | Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging |
| BBB | Blanke Bevrydigingsbeweging |
| BSP | Boerestaats Party |
| BV | Blanke Veiligheid |
| BVB | Boerevryheidsbeweging |
| BWB | Boereweerstandsbeweging |
| CCB | Civil Co-operation Bureau |
| CoC | Church of the Creator |
| CoG | Committee of Generals |
| CP | Conservative Party |
| DP | Democratic Party |
| FA | Freedom Alliance |
| FAK | Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurverenigings |
| HNP | Herstigste Nasionale Party |
| Idasa | Institute for a Democratic Alternative in S.A. |
| IFP | Inkatha Freedom Party |

| | |
|--------------|---|
| KKK | Klu Klux Klan |
| MWU | Mine Workers Union |
| NF | National Front |
| NGK | Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk |
| NP | Nasionale Party |
| OB | Osséwa Brandwag |
| PAC | Pan Africanist Congress |
| PFP | Progressive Federal Party |
| RSC | Regional Services Council |
| RU | Reprisal Unit |
| RWCG | Rightwing Church Group |
| SABC | South African Broadcasting Union |
| SABRA | South African Bureau for Racial Affairs |
| SACC | South African Council of Churches |
| SACP | South African Communist Party |
| SADF | South African Defence Force |
| SF | Stallard Foundation |
| SAP | South African Police |
| TAU | Transvaal Agricultural Union |
| TEC | Transitional Executive Council |
| TG | Toekomsgesprek |
| TS | Transvaal Separatiste |
| WAM | World Apatheid Movement |

GLOSSARY

| | |
|---------------|---------------------------------------|
| apartheid | separateness |
| blanke | white |
| bittereinders | boers who fought to the last |
| boer | farmer \ inhabitant of Boer republics |
| boerestaat | boer state |
| broedertwis | conflict among Afrikaners \ brothers |
| geldmag | financial power |
| gesuiwerde | purified |
| hensoppers | boers who surrendered early |
| kerk | church |
| kultuur | culture |
| laager | protective circle |
| Oranjewerkers | Orange workers |
| platteland | rural areas |

| | |
|--------------------|-------------------------------|
| Rooi Valke | Red Falcons |
| Rooi Vrydag | Red Friday (2 February, 1990) |
| Spoorbond | Railway League |
| swart gevaar | black threat \ peril |
| vereniging | union |
| verkramp | conservative |
| verlig | enlightened |
| volk | nation \ people |
| volkseenheid | people's unity |
| volkshelpskema | people's help scheme |
| volkstaat | people's state |
| vryheidsbeweging | freedom movement |
| weerstandsbeweging | resistance movement |
| wit wolf | white wolf |
| Yster en Staal | Iron and Steel [union] |

ABSTRACT

This dissertation identifies the white right-wing in South Africa describing the various sub-groups comprising the movement which are more numerous and diverse than was commonly accepted.

The thesis assumed a positive correlation between reform and increased support for the right-wing, and that a "hardening of attitudes" took place during the 1988-1993 period, with a resurgence of nationalist, racist and right-wing sentiments.

This thesis argues that there is a propensity to fissure on the part of the right-wing which gives rise to diverse tactics and areas of concern including resorting to violence to achieve political ends. The potential strengths and weaknesses of the right-wing in the light of this tendency are highlighted.

The right-wing can only be understood in terms of the powerful ideologies underlying it, in particular Afrikaner Nationalism and European fascism, and this study explores these influences. However, it was felt that a new theoretical framework needed to be elaborated in order better to understand the motivation behind and roots of support for right-wing ideas. Such a theoretical framework needs to integrate both the objective/material and the subjective/ideological and psychological determinants in order to be all encompassing and holistic in its thrust.

The assumptions were tested using questionnaires and interviews in the field. Questionnaires were either posted to individuals and organizations, or were hand delivered either by myself or other previously established "contacts". Open-ended questionnaires were used to facilitate discussion. Among other things, questions sought to solicit opinions on the use of violence in political action, the feasibility and desirability of establishing a volkstaat or white homeland and the willingness to make economic sacrifices in order to realise goals. Further, the importance of religious ideas and the nature of the fears of respondents were probed.

This study is essentially a qualitative, descriptive one based on fieldwork in selected geographical regions. Traditionally conservative communities situated in the Northern Cape, Orange Free State and the Transvaal were chosen. Interviews were also conducted in Cape Town. The sample included respondents from a wide range of organizations, including political parties, church groups and trade unions. Both employed and unemployed people's views were obtained. The majority of the respondents were male and at least a third were under the age of twenty-five. Patterns are discernible from their answers and these are recorded in the thesis.

Most of my hunches are confirmed by the fieldwork. It emerged that the right-wing is a formidable force with a larger and more diverse membership than is commonly realized. A greater diversity of organizations exists and fascist ideas have infiltrated right-wing groups more than is generally acknowledged.

Individuals and groups within the movement have increasingly come to view violence as both necessary and justifiable, and this exacerbates the threat posed to democratization. Current socio-economic conditions are conducive to a further proliferation of right-wing activity. The possibility of an alliance of conservatives (including black conservatives) is a further cause for

concern. The problem is compounded by the powerful and emotional nature of ethnicity and the pervasiveness of white fears. The greatest threat in the long term will come from the new forms of right-wing organizations that have emerged, specifically the splinter groups with a neo-fascist and overtly violent agendas. The possibility of compromise exists, nonetheless, as the dominant component of the right-wing, which favours the establishment of a volkstaat, might be able to be accommodated within the new dispensation.

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INTRODUCTION

The aims of this dissertation are fivefold;

- (i) To describe the various sub-groups comprising the rightwing movement and the principal actors.
- (ii) To argue that **reform** and the **upsurge in support for the rightwing** are directly linked, and that the present environment in South Africa is conducive to a further proliferation in rightwing organizations.
- (iii) To suggest that present theories explaining the motivation behind membership and allegiance to extreme rightwing causes are inadequate. The study therefore posits an approach to the study of right wing communities which combines socio-psychological representations with structural concerns.
- (iv) This dissertation also demonstrates that the **propensity to fissure** on the part of extremist groups within rightwing organizations. It will be argued that this tendency increases the likelihood of violence.
- (v) Finally, the dissertation assesses the **strengths and weaknesses** of the movement in the light of this tendency described in the above paragraph. Whilst present conditions are conducive to the growth of rightwing parties, certain factors mitigate against this.

The study, more broadly, focuses on the influence of European fascism on Afrikaner nationalism.

The white ultra right in contemporary South Africa draws on two ideological sources, **Afrikaner Nationalism** and **European fascism**. Fascism penetrated the Afrikaner nationalist movement and

influenced rightwing politics in this country far more deeply than is generally recognized. This thesis sets out to establish this link.

Therefore an analysis of ideology in general and the appeal of nationalism (and related ideologies like fascism), in particular was undertaken in order to uncover the nature, extent and potential danger implicit in these fears. Evidence obtained in my research revealed that ideological factors are relatively autonomous from the material base. Economically reductionist arguments fail to explain such fears nor the tendency of rightwingers to behave contrary to their best material interests.

Twenty five (25) in-depth interviews were conducted. A further 35 questionnaires which include a demographic profile of the sample were administered. Methodological problems and the actual research design are covered separately in the Appendix A.

A closer analysis and understanding of the rightwing is of fundamental importance to the process of democratisation in South Africa. Although the strength of the rightwing should not be underestimated their propensity to undermine democratisation in South Africa has been assessed as profound by various authors.

The thesis is overall structured as follows:

CHAPTER BREAKDOWN:

Chapter One provides a profile of the rightwing. It discusses the nature and dimensions of the rightwing organizations. Existing literature is reviewed in this chapter.

Chapter Two discusses the trends, tactics and strategies adopted by the contemporary rightwing movement, with particular attention paid to the 1988-1993 period. Its propensity for violence is discussed. I focus on policy statements, pamphlets, radio announcements and the text of public speeches. This chapter draws on interview material and demonstrates that splinter groups have deviated from Afrikaner nationalist ideologies. Some of these groups mimic neo-fascist organisations which have emerged in countries like Germany. These neo-fascist groups have committed acts of violence. The major Afrikaner nationalist organisations have on the other hand pursued non-violent actions.

Chapter Three investigates both the points of convergence and divisions within the rightwing. Their strengths, the influence they exert in state circles, their easy access to arms, their influence in media organisations are described. Large numbers of civil servants, police force and defence force personnel are members of the rightwing. The rightwing is also extensively funded from overseas. Their real strength however does not lie in their numbers or their political influence, but in the strength of their beliefs and the biblical-like conviction in the goals they have set.

Their weaknesses are the extent to which they are isolated. The rightwing is unable to build alliances across social or ideological lines. The movement is also riven with internal conflict. The policies also appear to be impractical and unworkable - therefore it is unlikely that the rightwing will grow numerically unless their "cultural" beliefs are compromised.

Chapter Four traces the historical and ideological roots of the contemporary rightwing. This chapter looks at the way in which the success and the demise of Afrikaner Nationalism as a mobilizing ideology, has shaped rightwing movements today. The chapter also traces the infusion of European fascist ideas into Afrikaner political life and thought.

The theoretical framework employed is set out in **Chapter Five**. I argue that the appeal of a particular ideological form, like Afrikaner Nationalism can only be comprehended if the nature and appeal of ideology in general is understood. In the South African context, exclusivist ethnically orientated ideologies embraced by the rightwing are popular because they provide "*security*" to their adherents. White fears are widespread. Ethnicity and nationalism thrive in such circumstances.

Afrikaner leaders have highlighted these emotional concerns in order to gain support. The nature and scope of white fear is extensive and provides a fertile breeding ground for destructive impulses. Warnings of the "*swartgevaar*" and impending national disaster strike a chord with many whites, especially among those concerned with threats to their economic and ethnic survival.

In conclusion, the rightwing has undergone mutations and realignments in response to ever changing reality and these need to be properly contextualized if they are to be understood and contained. Case studies are of singular importance. More broadly we need an historical analysis in order to understand fully the rightwing. This study demonstrates that racial attitudes amongst rightwingers have hardened in response to socio-political changes. Studies which attempt to dissect the character of the rightwing need to focus on both socio-psychological processes and nationalist discourse. These factors bond the rightwing and provide the cement on which their social fears ride. The study demonstrates the currency of these views.

CHAPTER ONE

The purpose of this Chapter is to provide firstly a **profile** of the rightwing and to discover who or what constitutes the rightwing movement in South Africa. It must be noted at this stage that the particular understanding of the "*rightwing*" employed for the purpose of this thesis includes the broad ensemble of cultural and political groups whose central aim is the preservation of separate development as a prerequisite for "*white survival*" and this includes both those groups adhering to Afrikaner Nationalist principles as well as those who have deviated from this doctrine. In terms of the former political parties like the **Conservative Party** and the **Herstigte Nasionale Party** are included and the latter category includes rightwing groups comprising other than Afrikaans speaking groups and also those groups resembling neo-fascist movements like the **Church of the Creator** and the **Blanke Bevrydigingsbeweging**.

Rightwing groups are changing in character, moving away from exclusively Afrikaner concerns to broader white ones and in the process new organizations have emerged to accommodate this. These new organizations need to be included in a discussion on the white rightwing in South Africa. All these groups, despite fundamental differences in opinion and policy are agreed in fostering white interests at the expense of all other groups. Their activities can only be understood in the context of history, since many of their concerns have been historically formulated. (A historical analysis will be elaborated in Chapter Four of this thesis). If present social reality is to be understood the processes through which group interests emerged historically must be outlined. It is imperative to develop such an understanding in the light of a revival of these political ideas in the modern era. The modern condition is such that it fosters the growth of social and political ideas

which seek absolute solutions to society's dysfunctions in an increasingly relativised and morally confused world.

The "*rightwing*" has not been immune to the conflict and strife that characterized the Afrikaner Nationalist movement from the outset. The origin of this intra group conflict can be traced back to the time of the Anglo Boer War, where both the **Hensoppers** and the **Bitterenders** suffered a defeat at the hands of the British. (van Rooyen:1992) Divisions within the Afrikaner group persisted and it was this conflict known as "*broedertwis*"¹ which led to the formation of rightwing political parties and organizations.

The actions of the Afrikaner Broederbond during the 1930's and 1940's were largely aimed at reconciling the two factions within Afrikanerdom in order to establish a measure of unity within the volk. According to O'Meara (1983) "*the Afrikaner Broederbond was born into, and self-consciously as a result of these divisions.*" The Bond, despite its concerted efforts, was unsuccessful in preventing splits within the National Party and both rightwing parties, the **Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP)** and the **Conservative Party (CP)** eventually broke away in 1969 and 1982 respectively, in order to establish their own political agendas. The CP in particular, came to challenge the National Party's position of sole mouthpiece for Afrikaner Nationalism in the 1980's. (Welsh,1988)

The existence of the rightwing is intrinsically linked to Afrikaner Nationalism and cannot be viewed separately from it, even as aims and intentions differ. For this reason it is crucial to assess the forms of organization and struggle taken on by the "*rightwing*" in contemporary South Africa in the context of previous organizational and ideological forms and the processes giving rise to

them. The contemporary rightwing movement in South Africa has been shaped by another ideology, **fascism**, which was harnessed to the Nationalist cause during the 1930's and the 1940's.

Chapter One will, in addition to defining who or what constitutes the white rightwing, provide a literature review.

1.1 WHAT IS THE "RIGHTWING" ?

Broadly speaking, the "*rightwing*" constitutes a significant sector of the white electorate who have decided to resist the inevitability of a non-racial society. This numerically small group of people (in terms of the total South African population), have taken it upon themselves to ensure that the transition to a non-racial society doesn't take place and to hamper its efficacy if it does.

Whilst defining the rightwing is problematic, it seems safe to conclude that a significant portion of white opinion falls within this broad category. Individuals and groups supporting the rightwing collectively have a vested interest in the maintenance and reinstitution of apartheid. The white rightwing has made known its intention to reconstruct and implement partition "*often in a form more radical than envisaged by apartheid's original architects*". (Zille, 1987:55)²

One usage of the term "*rightwing*" implies that the white Democratic Party is to be situated to the left of the government, which is awarded the centre position, and the Conservative Party and the Herstigte Nasionale Party are on the right. (Indicator SA: Issue Focus) This simplistic definition is adequate if it is applied to the narrow platform of white politics in South Africa, but if all significant political parties and movements are included, then the term "*rightwing*" is no longer adequate to describe the groups under investigation, since organizations like Inkatha could be

labelled rightwing. Welsh (1988) makes the point that, by any standards "the National Party in many ways, resembles a rightwing party: thus this definition is too broad and remains inadequate.

According to Indicator SA (1985:5)

"in May 1987, three in ten South Africans voted for one of the two rightwing parties...this represents a large portion of white opinion in the country".

During July 1990, it was estimated that 70 rightwing organizations existed, most of which were launched during the previous five years. These include political parties, extra parliamentary political organizations, cultural, academic, women's, youth and military groups, churches and Trade Unions. In a recent publication, *Back to the Laager*, (1991) the authors speculate that approximately 85 000 whites are actively involved in rightwing organizations and activities, whilst support for the rightwing is ten times that. In 1989 the CP won 31% of the votes, concentrated in the Transvaal and OFS constituencies.

Approximately 50% of Afrikaners voted for the white rightwing. Geographically most of these voters resided in either the Transvaal or the Orange Free State. Divisions based on language and/or cultural orientation and territorial location are evident. Within this provincial location, the rightwing in the Transvaal can be broken down further, since the majority of the rightwing's support in this region is concentrated in rural areas. (van Rooyen, 1992:293) This concentration of rightwing support in certain regions, within particular communities has implications in terms of secessionist policies and the drawing up of volkstaat boundaries. It is within these areas, where the rightwing enjoys the support of the white inhabitants that proposed policies will be put into effect.

Rightwing control over Regional Services Councils will facilitate the re-introduction of racial segregation within communities under the auspices of the RSC's. The CP, like many other

rightwing groups believes that a large percentage of the whites in the security forces, especially the police, support the rightwing. This commonly held perception was challenged during the "*Battle of Ventersdorp*".³ Back to the Laager (1991:7) claims that the "rightwing" obtains most of its support from white farmers, civil servants, workers, policemen and soldiers - the groups that historically benefited from Afrikaner Nationalism.

Despite the fact that these groups and individuals are deeply divided on policy issues, aims and strategies, common threads can be detected in terms of ideology. van Rooyen, (1992:72) suggests that:

"the rightwing should be viewed as a segment of the white racial group with a distinct ideological and strategical approach to the question of how Afrikaner identity and status should be preserved, viz through self-determination and racial exclusiveness".

A strong *Afrikaner* thrust can be identified within the various political parties. Although most of these groups have actively tried to canvass English and other white language group support, Afrikaner interests remain paramount. The **New Right** appears to be a white rather than a strictly Afrikaner movement, it appeals to both Afrikaner Nationalist sentiments and to white racist values. (du Toit, BM, 1991:657) Not all Afrikaners support the rightwing while a considerable number of English conservatives have aligned themselves with rightwing groups. Even within the top echelons of rightwing parties, one finds a few non - Afrikaner individuals and some, most notably Clive Derby-Lewis of the Conservative Party, hold prominent leadership positions.

The **Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB)** has made its intention clear, in that it wants to draw "*the cream of the white people of Europe*" into its ranks. Terre Blanche told a crowd of supporters in Turfontein's Portuguese hall that the creation of a new "*volk*" of whites with different origins was in the offing. (Weekly Mail, August, 1992).

The **Blanke Bevrydigingsbeweging (BBB)** has always stated that they desire unity between white rightwingers both nationally and on an international scale. BBB leader Schabert claims that the BBB is affiliated to five English rightwing groups in South Africa and to others abroad. (The Cape Rebel, August, 1988).

The white rightwing enjoys a significant measure of support from the youth. An Idasa sponsored survey of white university students countrywide found that 90% of Afrikaans students and 58% of English speakers were unsympathetic to the ANC. Only 8% of Afrikaners would accept an ANC government, 32% would emigrate for political reasons and 44% said they "*would resist physically*". The corresponding figures for English students are: 28% ; 38% ; 10% ; (Giliomee 1991:79). This unwillingness to accept the ANC whether it is voted into power or not is indicative of the intolerance toward that organization on the part of white South Africans. Even young, educated whites, generally thought to be more liberal in outlook, are fairly hostile towards the ANC.

A similar pessimistic view is presented by the results of a poll conducted in October 1990 by the firm Market and Opinion surveys. According to these findings, 70% of Afrikaners and 58% of all whites were in favour of stricter government action against the ANC and its allies. Animosity towards the ANC is indicative of the fear felt by many whites on the inevitability of black majority rule. These fears are more intense amongst the politically conservative sectors of the white population. The Institute for Future Studies at Potchefstroom University claims that, "*a growing group of young white people do not believe that racial harmony is necessary and that violence can be justified on Christian grounds as a method of achieving goals.*"(quoted in Welsh, 1988:14)

My own interviews reinforce this notion of the white youth being extremely conservative and militant. The most extreme views were definitely expressed by the younger respondents.

Although my sample was far more limited and less representative than the above findings, similar anxieties and ideals were evident. Whilst acknowledging fear and anxiety regarding a future ANC government, respondents also indicated that the ANC should not think that they (rightwing whites) were afraid of them.

"If Mandela and the ANC think we are afraid of them, they are mistaken...If they dare to take over our farms and properties, we'll show them who's boss."
(Kimberley, July 1991)

Research findings of the South African Institute of International Affairs from a survey on white opinion indicate that the white youth, (16-24) appear to be more conservative than their elders on key issues. This is especially so among Afrikaners. The factors that influence this apparent conservatism are low income, geographical location etc. Anxiety and defiance are extremely high amongst young whites. In South Africa, the white youth seem to be poorly informed. Their attitudes are shaped early (through various socialization structures) and apartheid rule has prevented their interaction with black youth. As a result the latter are viewed with fear and suspicion. International isolation and the experience of militarization amongst South Africa's white youth all contribute to the development of extremely conservative attitudes on their part. Barend Strydom is very young and if he represents the *"generation of the future"* this poses serious problems for this country. White youth are often schooled not to internalize and consider issues for themselves, but simply react. It is not surprising that reactionary, conservative views prevail amongst many of the white youth. (Weekly Mail July 1990)

Another ideological strain, present in rightwing organizations, is *fascism*. Groups influenced by this ideological form include the **Blanke Bevrydigingsbeweging (BBB)**, the **Church of the Creator**, the **Israel Vision Church**, better known as the **Israelites**. These groups reject Christianity and favour an amalgam of Teutonic myth and pseudo-scientific social Darwinist inspired beliefs about racial superiority. The "*Aryan soul*" is believed to possess an "*inherent love of nature*", which is not shared by blacks who are essentially anti-nature, and through their barbarism and savagery are out to destroy the planet! (Schabert, BBB meeting, Parow, 1988). BBB leader, Johan Schabert, a bio-chemist is clearly obsessed with matters pertaining to genetic purity and superiority and has outlined a "**master-race**" theory in terms of the BBB's blueprint for a new white dominated and racially pure South Africa. (Sunday Star, November 20, 1988) In an official document printed before the banning of the BBB in 1988, it is claimed that,

"the BBB sees the coming racial struggle as a holy struggle, which we will never end, but will continue until we have triumphed and the non-whites, with their genetically proven negative properties, have been removed from White South Africa". (Schabert, August, 1988:5).

Pseudo-scientific racism is evident, and the BBB states,

"We believe in the genetic superiority of the white race, and (that) it is the duty of the white race to stop the natural increase and the decadence of the black races from destroying this planet." (Zille, 1988:61).

After examining much of the existing literature dealing with the so-called "*rightwing*", one is left with the impression that most authors retain broad based definitions. Zille (1988) uses the term "*rightwing*" as a blanket term to refer to a wide range of organizations, strategies and policies. The term "*ultra right*" is in many ways more fitting, since it refers specifically to that section of the white population who belongs to one or more rightwing organizations. (ibid)

In terms of this definition, the CP is right, whilst the AWB and other splinter groups, like the Israelites and the BBB are ultra right. Both the right and the ultra right are determined to reserve membership for the white population group and whose ultimate aim is the fostering of white interests as opposed to broader South African interests. Another author, Griffin (1991) uses the term **ultra nationalist** to describe groups like the National Front in England and the AWB in South Africa. Ultra nationalist will, for the purpose of this thesis be used interchangeably with ultra right.

1.1.1. The nature of rightwing organizations:

It is necessary to provide a brief overview of the types of rightwing organizations that exist in order to gauge what types of activities the movement as a whole may become engaged in. A broad spectrum of rightwing organizations exist, each with their own agenda and strategy. Over and above its party political dimension, the rightwing comprises several other elements,

- i) **religious**-incorporating those dissidents from the **Ned-Geref Kerk (NGK)** who have joined the three established **Afrikaner Protestant Churches** particularly the **APK**.
(Religious groups like the Church of the Creator and the Israelites will also be included into the discussion.)
- ii) the **extra-parliamentary** and **para-military** element represented by the **Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB)**.
- iii) the **intellectual** element located in institutions such as the **Afrikaner Volkswag**.
- iv) the wide range of **civic bodies** and organizations (Indicator SA 6 (1/2), 1989) [These include Trade Unions, women's groups and youth organizations.]

In terms of **political parties**, there are two categories of organization, those who favour the *parliamentary option*, like the **Conservative Party (CP)** and the **Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP)**, and those who choose to operate outside of parliament. The Conservative Party is the most significant of the two parliamentary parties and has a broader support base than the HNP. The

latter lost much of its support with the formation of the CP in 1981. The CP is described as the political “*torch-bearer*” of Afrikaner Nationalism. van Rooyen claims that;

“the CP, stands out as the pivotal axis and also the parliamentary representative of the rightwing...” (1992:72).

In terms of party policy, the Conservative Party in contemporary South Africa from 1987 onwards, has been compared to the National Party in the early 1980’s. Mark Swilling (Sunday Star 10/9/89) claims that this comparison can be made since the NP previously aimed to exclude blacks from the central political institutions, promoted influx control, the independence of homelands etc. In 1987 the NP embarked on a new course of action and the CP took up where it left off.

Membership of one rightwing organization does not preclude membership of another, and “*these membership bonds often cut across and mutually support one another: a follower typically belongs simultaneously to a rightwing town council, a rightwing church and a rightwing political party*”. (Indicator SA: Issue Focus).

Individuals belonging to one of the extra-parliamentary groups can choose to vote for either the CP or the HNP in an election. From the election results it is apparent that the CP has attracted the majority of conservative white support. The Conservative Party emerged as the official opposition in 1987 with 32% of the total white vote, as opposed to just 19.2% in 1981 for the combined CP/HNP vote. (BM du Toit, 1991:641). According to Kaaplander, the 10% swing to the CP away from the NP 1989 parliamentary by-election was the second biggest since its inception. The growth in support indicated by the Umlazi by-election that took place earlier that year was the biggest ever. (December, 1990).

There is little dispute that the CP has grown in electoral support, but the implementation of political policies will determine the future strength of the CP. According to Bekker and Grobbelaar, the control of certain local authorities by the CP will allow whites in those towns *"to test CP policies against reality"*. (Indicator SA 6(1/2), 1989). Whether the workability of the CP's policies will stand up to tests or not, the CP will be able to maintain control over local churches, school committees, regional services councils and trade unions and agricultural co-operatives.⁵

In terms of the latter it seems reasonable to say that the rightwing has been successful, and the governments Agricultural Departments have lost credibility and come under fire from the rightwing. If the crowd reaction toward the Deputy Minister of Agriculture, Tobie Meyer at the farmers march and meeting in Potchefstroom during May 1993 is anything to go by, the government has lost legitimacy in the eyes of the farmers it purports to represent. van Rooyen, (1992:107) argues that;

"at local government level and in other civic fields, the CP's position was more powerful, as it controlled the majority of local authorities in the Transvaal, and its rightwing policies could be implemented without too much central government interference".

He claims that the rightwing is at its most powerful position at municipal level. This view is echoed by Bekker et al, 1989. The CP has at this level attempted to reintroduce petty apartheid measures such as Separate Amenities.⁶ The CP resorted to a number of tactics ranging from the charging of high membership fees to cutting off power supplies to simply closing down public amenities like swimming-pools to direct violent attacks to secure these ends. Links and networks established by the CP, will play a central role in the political activities of the rightwing in the future. An Indicator SA Issue Focus on the rightwing, claims that these *"grassroots links form the organizational foundations of the new white right."* A proper understanding of the CP is only possible if its links with other rightwing groupings are identified and contextualised. Even if the

CP is unable to seize control at national level, its control over local affairs through local councils cannot be disputed. For this reason alone the white rightwing needs to be taken very seriously.

On an *extra-parliamentary* level, various parties can be identified, including the **Boerestaat Party (BSP)**, and the **Blanke Party** (previously the Blanke Bevrydigings Party). These are not particularly significant, and in van Rooyen's opinion; *"they have little political relevance and do not merit serious consideration, except to add that they exemplify the propensity of extreme radical organizations to fission, and that their very existence testifies to the vigorous underbrush of rightwing organizations"* (1992:90)

These parties are numerically small, the BSP for instance has approximately 200 members. They are unlikely to attract widespread support because of their "*boere*" emphasis. The BSP advocates the establishment of a smaller, culturally homogeneous volkstaat. Both the BSP and the **Blanke Volkstaat Party (BVP)**, promote this version of an Afrikaner volkstaat amongst the rightwing.

Although factions within the rightwing movement as a whole are extremely marginalised and numerically insignificant, the nature of their activities and their ideological make-up is such that it warrants careful consideration. These organizations range from **para-military units**, to essential **non-Christian religious sects** and **individual hit-squads**. The upsurge of anti-Semitism must be viewed in the light of this sectionalism within the rightwing. Strong **anti-Semitic** propaganda and sentiment is promulgated in official literature and is clearly visible at rallies and meetings. Not all right-wing groupings share the same feelings about the Jewish people, in fact few have formulated a definite policy regarding the role of the Jewish population in a future South Africa.

The rightwing has shown a propensity for resorting to **paramilitary** options over the past few years in order to realize their goals. According to Wim Booyse (1990:7) to date there exist more than 20 para-military groups with a membership of over 18 000, and a further 30 fundamentalist organizations. The commonly held belief is that of *white supremacy*, hence any attempt to dismantle the apartheid system is resisted. Their methods range from rallies and marches to the disruption of meetings, to random acts of violence against blacks to carefully planned acts of terrorism and murder. Several authors and observers, Fordred (1988); Hyslop, (1987); Giliomee, (1990); Indicator SA, (1989); Project for the study of Violence (1988/9) are convinced that the white ultra rightwing will employ **violence** as a means to an end.

Some of the para-military units are extremely small, comprising a few individuals. (Zille,1989:59) It is exceptionally difficult keep an accurate record of their membership and activities since new groups spring up overnight and others simply disappear. Booyse lists the most important as; the **Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB); the Boereweerstandsbeweging (BWB); Kommandoleer; Brandwag; Volksleer; White Front; Aquila Defence Unit; Stormvalke; Magsaksie; White Security; National Manpower Action; Action Self-defence; Wit Wolwe; Flamingoes; Order of Death; Cape Rebels; White National Movement; White Resistance Movement; Patriotic Front; Boer Army; White Commando; Orde Boerevolk; Purified Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging; Transvaal Separatists and the Blanke Bevrydigingsbeweging.** (disbanded in 1990)

In his opinion, the most important of these are the AWB; the BWB; the BBB; the World Apartheid Movement; the Order of Death and the Orde Boerevolk. The World Apartheid Movement (WAM) exemplifies the desire on the part of the white ultra right in South Africa to collaborate with

international movements with a similar agenda, the ensuring of white supremacy.⁷ (The international link will be discussed later on in this chapter).

The assassination of former SACP leader Chris Hani, in 1993 illustrates the tendency to employ violent means to realize political objectives on the part of the rightwing. Prominent rightwinger Clive Derby-Lewis was convicted alongside Polish immigrant Janus Walus for the murder of Chris Hani. Hani's murder allegedly formed part of a plan to assassinate various leftwing leaders by the white ultra right.

The activities of the recently launched **Afrikaner Volksfront** and in particular the so-called "Plan C" component of their strategy, which emphasizes direct confrontation and violent action, need to be considered in terms of assessing rightwing potential. The rightwing invasion of the World Trade Centre was apparently just a "*curtain-raiser*" to this national resistance campaign known as "Plan C" or the "**Ten Plagues**" (Weekly Mail, July, 1993). The campaign was formulated by **Afrikaner Volksfront (AVF)** strategists to force negotiators into agreeing to the establishment of a **Afrikaner** homeland. Part and parcel of Plan C is the formation of a "*government within a government*", which demonstrates the rightwing's determination to establish a *volkstaat*, even if it is obtained through **secession**. Plan C was developed in response to the failure of Plan A, the parliamentary path and Plan B, the negotiations. Plan C incorporates a variety of strategies including "*industrial sabotage*" and the refusal to pay taxes. Civil disobedience and passive resistance are integral to this strategy. The rightwing has also threatened to slow down the State bureaucracy even further. The announcement of Plan C is indicative of the rightwing's determination to forge a measure of unity and execute a centrally controlled and co-ordinated programme of action to safeguard white privileges and foster the establishment of a *volkstaat*.

The Afrikaner Volksfront was formed on 19 May, 1993 to forge a measure of unity among rightwing groups in order to create some kind of political authority to ensure that proposed plans, including secession can occur relatively smoothly. A secret "**Committee of Generals**" (CoG), determined to realize the goal of establishing a volkstaat, assumed control of the rightwing and provides the leadership for the AVF. Among the groups involved in the Volksfront are the **Transvaal Agricultural Union (TAU)**; the **Herstigde Nasionale Party (HNP)**; the **Afrikanerweerstandsbeweging (AWB)**; **Boerestaatparty**; the **Afrikaner Volksunie**; the **Conservative Party (CP)**; sections of the ultra right **Church of the Creator**; **Volkseenheid kommittee (Vekom)**; **Oranjewerkers**; **Mine Workers Union (MWU)**; the **Pretoria Boerekommando**; and English speaking rightwing groups. (Weekly Mail; July, 1993). The previously unknown organization known as **EK 25** which campaigns for a volkstaat is also involved.

No discussion of Afrikaner Nationalism or its rightwing heirs can take place without an understanding of the role played by the **Church** in effecting policy. Historically the Church provided the moral fibre and justification for Apartheid and separate development. The belief in the divine purpose of Afrikanerdom and the necessity of developing separate racial and ethnic identities was justified by the church (specifically the Dutch Reformed churches) in South Africa. These churches have historically played a pivotal role in shaping and forging Afrikaner identity. Religion has from the outset been entwined with the Afrikaner Nationalist movement and Calvinist Christianity helped shape the overall ideology. (Moodie, 1975; de Klerk, 1975)

The Afrikaans Reformed Churches were actively involved in providing the biblical justification for the apartheid system of government. Unity within these churches was weakened due to changes in political opinion. The NGK itself experienced tension between its verligte and verkrampste

elements.⁸ Dissidents within the church reacted on the one hand by forming the NG Bond, aimed at opposing the liberalism from within. Treurnicht followed this path. On the otherhand, others broke away and formed their own church, the **Afrikaanse Protestantse Kerk**, (APK) in 1987. The APK is needless to say an all-white church grouping and insists that racially exclusive worship is both biblically defensible and socially necessary. (APK Jaarboek, 1990). The formation of the APK indicated that;

"the floodgates are breaking. The Afrikaner wants a church of his own- and not one which he is coerced into sharing with blacks." (Lubbe, Rapport, August, 1987).

"The APK was founded with a particular purpose in mind... to counteract the liberalization of the NGK and to ensure that Christian values continue to dominate political thinking in this country. These values include the distinct nature and autonomy of nations. Our membership has grown considerably as people become increasingly dissatisfied with both the NP and the NGK. We anticipate that membership and congregations will continue to grow in the future". (Interview, Kimberley December, 1990).

The APK has undoubtedly made an impact and certain rightwing organizations such as the AWB require all their members to belong to the APK. Most of the people interviewed seemed to belong to the APK whilst the rest remained loyal to the NGK. Only two respondents claimed religious affiliation to neither and deviated from generally accepted Christian teachings.

Fundamentalist religious organizations in general, have become increasingly prominent, and the activities of the **Israel Vision Church** (the Israelites) are significant. The Israelites like the so called **Church of the Creator**, and the **Gemeente van die Verbondsvolk** claim that only whites go to heaven since they are descendants of the "*chosen people*". Blacks are animals and were made by Satan. (Sunday Times 17.03.91). Blacks and Jews are referred to as "*the crownless animals of the field*".⁹

The growth of fundamentalist religious movements is not unique to South Africa and is in line with developments globally. Some of these church groups are extremely militant and vociferously campaign against communism and progressive church groups, which have been branded together. An example of such a magazine is the Aida Parker Newsletter. **The Church Alliance of South Africa** launched in December 1988, aimed to provide an alternative to the South African Council of Churches.¹⁰ Anglican and Protestant groups opposing the progressive tendencies within the SACC have formed their own groups, like the **Catholic Defence League** and **Young South Africans for a Christian civilization**. Rightwing splinter groups are also emerging in the Methodist and Pentecostal churches. Although not all the affiliated churches are rightwing as such; they all represent an attempt to counter the inherent liberalism of the SACC and they formed the Church Alliance of South Africa to aid them in this endeavor. (New Nation, 12/01/1989).

Certain rightwing church groups have decided to include like minded blacks, although most are racially exclusive. It is alleged the state has helped to infiltrate and support some groups, such as the Reformed Independent Churches Association, the United Christian Conciliation Party, the Western Cape Council of Churches and Jesus Christ for Peace which says it aims to "*avoid blacks suffering under a black government*". (Back to the Laager, 1991:158)

In recent years there has undoubtedly been a proliferation of rightwing Christian groups. (RWCG's). A particular interpretation of the Christian Bible was historically used to provide the religious means to maintain the status quo in this country. (Laubser, 1987) Clearly these tactics will be re-employed to achieve a similar aim. RWCG's have publicly attacked progressive leaders such as Bishop Tutu and the SACP in general.

"The zeal of their propaganda sounds similar to Nazi fascism in the 1930/40's, which rallied Christians to support Nazism in order to save Europe from a communist menace". (Crisis News. November, 1988).

Traditionally "*church ideology*" has promoted obedience to authority and has adopted a strong anti-communist stance. RWCG's have exploited this theology in an attempt to persuade Christians to support the government and/or other anti-communist political groups. RWCG's in south Africa have links with the international religious right which has been instrumental in bolstering conservative governments globally. Rightwing Christians have been dubbed "*wolves in sheep's clothing*". (New Nation, 01.09.88).

"This practice of destabilizing the church by the rightwing can be compared to the CIA's tactics of using fundamentalist Christian groupings to further the political interests of their masters". (ibid)

RWCG's share certain broad objectives including their anti-communist stance with other rightwing political movements. An intolerance for non-Christian systems of belief such as Judaism and Islam exists. RWCG's are essentially anti individual freedoms such as the right to abortion and homosexuality. Many of their campaigns are waged against individuals and movements attempts to forge a measure of acceptability in society for groups like the Pro-Life movement. They have aligned themselves with such groups in order to coordinate legislative battles and to air political issues from a conservative perspective. (Liebman and Wuthnow, 1983:2).

If the proliferation of rightwing church groups are in some way indicative of social trends and developments as a whole, then it appears that a conservative backlash is taking place. South Africa is not immune to global developments and processes, and in a society historically prone to both reactionary political thought and church involvement in the political affairs of the country, the growth of RWCG's can be expected to continue. Similarly the spread of rightwing ideas in general can be expected to increase, as this society moves into a new, uncertain era. There is clear evidence that the rightwing is making significant inroads into white, and specifically Afrikaner civil society.

The white right has come to exert considerable influence in the Afrikaner churches and within Afrikaner culture as a whole.

The rightwing is comprised of various **intellectually** based organizations including **SABRA (The South African Bureau of Racial Affairs)** formed in 1948 in an attempt to counter the liberal **SAIRR (South African Institute of Race Relations)**. (Zille, 1987:58). Along with the Broederbond, this organization took on the task of developing the philosophical and intellectual components of Afrikaner Nationalism and the corresponding apartheid system of government. (Leach, 1989:168) claims that it became the perfect *"ideological assembly line for the Nationalist government"*.

In the contemporary context, intellectuals within organizations like SABRA, serve the purpose of initially identifying new rightwing ideas and strategies, which are later promoted for mobilization purposes. SABRA continued the conservative tradition and came to provide the rightwing movement with ideological input. This organization conducted considerable research on racial issues within the context of separate development. (Zille, 1987:58) labels it the **"rightwing think-tank"** and claims that it is *"primarily engaged in examining alternative models of partition"*.

SABRA distanced itself increasingly from the NP and rejected the 1983 tricameral parliament. Instead it offered a solution of a volkstaat for each volk in 1985. (van Rooyen, 1992:92). Relations between SABRA and the CP became increasingly strained since the former favoured the institution of a smaller Afrikaner state than envisaged by the latter. Carel Boshoff, chairman of SABRA founded the **Stigting Afrikanervryheid** in 1988 and increasingly distanced himself from the CP. His grand plan culminated in the purchase of **Orania** in the North Western Cape. Boshoff's demands were not excessive and most of the land he requested was sparsely inhabited. The **Vereniging van Oranjewerkers**, founded in 1980 and led by Verwoerd's son, was born out of

research conducted by SABRA. There were 17 members originally but it is alleged that by 1986 membership had increased to approximately 2500. (Bekker et al, 1989:42). The Oranjewerkers are intent on establishing a volkstaat for whites. Self-sufficiency is emphasized and **Morgenzon** in the Eastern Transvaal was established as the first growth-point.

Another key rightwing organization is the so-called **Toekomsgesprek (TG)** founded in 1983 which was to provide an alternative to the Bond for the CP. (Zille, 1988:59). Its aim is to infiltrate all spheres of South African society and to establish a strong and coordinated rightwing presence in this society. Zille states that at this stage it is difficult to assess to what extent it has coordinated its strategy aimed at infiltrating a variety of bodies including civic associations, school committees, agricultural co-operatives and the like. Professor Hennie Kotze, a political scientist, claims that the TG is the force behind the CP's influence in cultural and agricultural institutions in rural and semi-urban areas. It consists of many ex-Broederbonders and has close links with the CP and the rightwing as a whole. According to Kotze,

"the aim of the TG is to propagate conservative Afrikaner ideology on the broadest possible level by infiltrating cultural organizations, school committees, church councils and agricultural boards". (Cape Times 13.10.91)

Cultural organizations such as the **Afrikaner Volkswag (AV)** formed in 1984 by Carel Boshoff once he had resigned from the Broederbond, comprise another dimension of the rightwing movement. The AV aims to engage in rightwing struggle at a cultural level and the basic unit of membership is the family. An estimated 7000 families are members (Zille, 1987:56). According to Bekker et al (1989) this figure is closer to 50 000. The AV was particularly concerned about countering the activities of FAK. The AV's biggest success to date was illustrated at the 150 yr celebration of the Great Trek in 1988 where they totally upstaged the official FAK activities. The organization aims to facilitate and promote Afrikaner unity; most key rightwing leaders including

the late Andries Treurnicht, Jaap Marais and Eugene Terre'Blanche are AV members. (Welsh, 1988:4).

The rightwing has tried to consolidate its support base in traditionally conservative **Trade Unions**. Part and parcel of this process was the proposed creation of a rightwing super union to combine the forces of all white workers. This ambition has failed to materialize, because of factors like the *"territorial anxieties of union leaders and the history of acrimony, said to have its roots in personal animosities.."* (Weekly Mail, February, 1991) Despite the lack of success in terms of forging union unity, as social and economic conditions worsen, rank and file may pressurize leaders to reconcile personal differences in order to promote this. However, the white working-class has repeatedly shown its reluctance to unite on the basis of class, and has historically been mobilized in terms of ethnicity. This reflects the primacy of ideology over material interest in white working-class politics in particular and white politics in general. Material interests are only advanced in so far as they coincide with ideological ones. During the apartheid era, this did occur, and in the wake of its demise, ideology is once again accorded primacy over economics and material concerns. The reluctance on the part of white workers to align with black labour in Cosatu affiliated unions, which would ultimately work towards the realization of their class interests, illustrates the tenacity of ideology in white working-class politics.

Various women's groups exist, like the **Afrikanervroue Kenkrag (AVK)**, which means (Afrikaner women strength in knowledge). This group was formed in 1983 by a group of women who were determined to counter the governments attempts at integration. The rightwing has also played an active role in providing white women with military and self-defence training. This culminated in the formation of an all female security group, the **Rooi Valke**.

The rightwing recently launched its own radio-station, **Radio Pretoria** to counteract the "*liberal*" SABC. It is hoped that control of their own media will assist them in their campaign and will allow them to reach many whites alienated by the NP and its propagation machine, the SABC. (Patriot, September, 1993). The rightwing have various publications and newsletters which help them disseminate information central to their political campaigns. In this way the rightwing is able to counteract what it believes to be unfairly biased news coverage. Rightwing access to media is crucial in terms of disseminating information and mobilizing support. Mobilization is thus advanced by the broadcasting of new rightwing ideas and programmes of action. The ownership of its own radio station goes a long way toward furthering this objective. The potential of the media to influence public opinion cannot be under estimated, and the launch of Radio Pretoria is significant in that it forms the foundation for alternative rightwing media. Although the new radio station battled to attract advertisers during the first week of broadcasting, this may pick-up as it becomes more established.

The white rightwing movement in contemporary South Africa comprises a myriad of organizations and, any investigation of these organizations needs to encompass more than the narrow limiting categories based purely on either objective or subjective considerations if they are to illuminate the complexity of the issue. Objective / material and subjective / ideological and psychological considerations need to be fused together if the analysis is to be holistic and all encompassing. For this reason a new framework needs to be elaborated (see Chapter Five) so that it integrates both these considerations in an attempt to uncover the roots of and the motivation behind membership and allegiance of such extreme rightwing-causes. Such sentiments have a diversity of origins and are fuelled by several concerns. thus only an explanation which is equally complex and total in its thrust will suffice to shed any light on the issue. A discussion of both the strengths and weaknesses of existing literature dealing with the subject follows.

1.2 PERSPECTIVES IN LITERATURE:

At this stage, it is imperative to review critically, the available literature. Vast lacunae exist within available literature which prompted me to conduct this research and formulate my theoretical perspective so as to encapsulate more than the traditional theoretical concerns. Existing literature dealing with the contemporary rightwing movement specifically and even its Afrikaner Nationalist predecessor seems to neglect neo-fascist type groupings. Existing literature also fails to provide a holistic explanation which effectively fuses several approaches in an attempt to explain and understand the origins of and the underlying dynamics motivating the members of such ultra right groups to take action.

My own preferred reading centres on texts which emphasize **ethnic/cultural** and **ideological** considerations as opposed to economic categories. I have used key texts within the various theoretical frameworks dealing with Afrikaner Nationalism, including authors such as T.D. Moodie, Dan O'Meara, Adam and Giliomee, W.A. de Klerk, David Welsh and Jonathan Hyslop. The works of Patrick Furlong and Roger Griffin have been used as the basis for understanding the fascist element in rightwing discourse.

In terms of elaborating a theoretical paradigm the work of social psychologists Erich Fromm (1942\56\64) and Wilhelm Reich (1977) have been used. Theorists incorporating an international dimension to the discussion on fascism and fundamentalism have been selected and these include authors Glock,C and Stark,R (1966); Hadden,JK and Shupe,A (eds) (1989) and Paul Wilkinson (1981).

Some common elements or trends within the existing literature can be identified. A large portion of the literature dealing with Afrikaner Nationalism has been written from a **pro-Nationalist** perspective and one recurrent theme seems to emphasize the Calvinist background of the Afrikaner people. Nationalist mythology attempts to present a case for the intervention of "*divine will*" forging Afrikanerdom into a united edifice with a unique historical purpose. O'Meara (1983:4) states, "*much of it self-consciously seeks to construct a political or cultural mythology.*" He refers to Scholtz, (1964), who goes so far as to claim divine appointment for this task. Afrikaner Nationalism has been extensively analyzed from a perspective which focuses on the history, language and religion peculiar to this group of people. A wide range of authors emphasize these aspects; W. H. Vatcher, (1965); W.A. de Klerk, (1975); Adam and Giliomee, (1979); T.D. Moodie, (1975); van Jaarsveld, (1964) and generally tend to ignore or at least downplay considerations of a material nature.

Accounts of Afrikaner Nationalism in English have generally been unsympathetic to the Afrikaner cause. **Pro-British**, neo-colonial sentiment is often disparaging in its view of the Afrikaners and seeks to condemn rather than understand Afrikaner interests. One author, who attempts to provide a socio-psychological analysis of the Afrikaner people, refers to them as "*immature psychopaths in a sociopathic culture.*" (Lambley, 1980) Vincent Crapanzano in his book "*Waiting-The whites of South Africa*", 1987, has been criticized for being unethical in his treatment of his respondents, white conservative Afrikaner communities. Crapanzano's attitude exemplifies this tendency to write them off as fringe lunatics with no real political legitimacy. Attitudes like his do little to assist in uncovering the underlying dynamics behind the Afrikaner Nationalist movement and of the Afrikaner psyche, since the starting premise is essentially ethno-centric and assumes superiority. O'Meara notes that "*accounts of Afrikaner Nationalism in English have generally been written by people opposed to the National Party.*" (1983:5)

He goes on to say that;

"the liberal analysis of Afrikaner Nationalism remains at the level of counter-ideological history. It presents but a pale, negative, mirror-image of the assumptions of Afrikaner Nationalist analysis." (ibid)

Furlong (1991:xii) supports this and identifies a tendency prevalent within a historical period which was essentially liberal and anti-Nationalist in its thrust. The tendency was to view Afrikaner Nationalists as Nazis. Vatcher, (1965) and Bunting, (1969) have been identified by Furlong as constituting a sector of this camp.

Although a fairly large amount of literature dealing with Afrikaner Nationalism exists, most of it tends to emanate from sources with the above mentioned assumptions. Marxist authors tend to conflate race relations with class relations and in so doing have generally not dealt effectively with the role played by the ideology of Afrikaner Nationalism in creating identities.

F.A. Johnstone, (1976); Wolpe, (1973) and Davies, (1979) deal with the issue of white workers in South Africa, but have little to say about Afrikaner Nationalism and the role it played in shaping consciousness. In other words they pay insufficient attention to the subjective realm of human experience in their analyses.

Despite the fact that O'Meara fails to elevate his discussion from the level of economic reductionism, it is extremely valuable in terms of providing the historical context and also the economic conditions in which this ideological form developed. O'Meara's work is invaluable and of utmost importance in terms of illuminating the class interests behind an apparently ethnic revolution. O'Meara (1983) argues that Afrikaner Nationalism; *"is a historical specific, flexible and differentiated response of various identifiable and changing class forces-in alliance to the*

contradictions and struggles generated by the development of capitalism." He makes it his mission to analyze;

"the historical contradictions and processes of struggle around the development of capitalism through which the relations of production came to take form through racial categories." (Adam and Giliomee, 1979:6)

Why specific collectives of social agents came to be collectively mobilized in a particular conjuncture in terms of an ethnic ideology of Afrikaner Nationalism rather than other ideologies of the period is the question O'Meara tries to answer. Class based theories like this, tend to downplay the influence of factors such as race and ethnicity which cannot simply be reduced to class. O'Meara is critical of those who elaborate theoretical explanations which are devoid of historical content. It is his aim to move beyond this *"uncritical, a-historical approach"* (O'Meara, 1983:8). O'Meara is extremely wary of relegating phenomena such as the emergence of Afrikanerdom and the entrenchment of Afrikaner power to the realm of ideas.

"Whilst cultural values, belief systems, ideologies etc. are crucial aspects of social reality, in no sense do such ideational phenomena constitute sufficient explanations of reality or of themselves." (O'Meara, 1983:9)

In my opinion, O'Meara's criticisms are not unwarranted, but he does tend to ignore the fact that certain authors within the *"idealist"* camp do in fact acknowledge the role played by economic factors in the formation of the Afrikaner Nationalist alliance. Granted, Moodie places less importance on the role of socio-economic factors in the realm of ideology and belief than does O'Meara, but the former does acknowledge the existence of such determinants. It is thus a mistaken assumption on the part of O'Meara that,

"idealist writers attribute Afrikaner Nationalism only to its ideology, a number have recognized the social causes of changing views." (Goldberg, 1985:125)

O'Meara also underplays the cultural dimension of Afrikaner Nationalist thought and ideology.

At this stage it is necessary to examine the work of theorists who emphasize the importance of ideological, cultural and psychological issues in the formation of Afrikaner Nationalist ideology. T. D. Moodie (1975) is one of the key authors who accords due credit to ideological considerations. In his earliest writings he tends to concentrate on the ways in which Afrikaner Nationalist ideologues were able to interpret the world for themselves and the volk so as to provide the framework for a powerful social and political movement. He provides a lengthy description of the key beliefs which came to constitute Afrikaner policies and his concept "*civil religion*" assists one in understanding the appeal of this particular ideology. "*Civil religion*" relates to the constellation of symbols which united Afrikanerdom for a period of history extending from 1934-48. An understanding of the nature of these is crucial to the overall understanding of the appeal of this ideological form, since symbols are often deliberately manipulated for the purpose of ensuring allegiance to a particular ideological form.

Moodie attempts to analyze the symbolic manifestations of the Afrikaner psyche which comprised the civil religion. These symbols are invoked by ideologues at various stages to elicit a desired response on the part of the audience to which it is addressed. He argues that beliefs and rituals constitute an important dimension of reality for individuals and groups and that they can be modified in response to changing conditions.

Although the class reductionist and idealist approaches are in a sense mutually exclusive, analysts outside their prospective frameworks can draw on the insights of both approaches. O'Meara explains broedertwis and the verkrampte verligte struggle within the National Party as an essentially class based struggle. Authors such as Welsh (1989) question this and argue that the split in Afrikanerdom, especially the Conservative Party split cannot be analyzed from an exclusively class based perspective. Ideological factors are also important. Welsh doesn't deny the existence of

a correlation between class and right-wing support, but alerts us to the complexity of the CP's base of support.

Adam and Giliomee (1979:13) claim that class based explanations fail to demonstrate why people are rendered susceptible to movements which may go against the realization of their real, material, class interests. They attempt to elaborate a view which encompasses a conception of ethnicity and psychological "*group-bondedness*". Their discussion of the out-group is extremely useful in terms of understanding such phenomena and will be used in so far as it sheds any light on the matter.

Whilst class factors may have played a significant role in the formation of the contemporary right-wing, other factors such as ideology and notions of ethnicity were also crucial in this regard. Lower income-group whites have traditionally relied on the state to protect their privileged position, but their position was weakened by factors such as rising inflation, the decline of the rate of growth of the GDP in the 1970's/80's and changes in government policy. The state has attempted to narrow the racially based wage gap and has attempted redistributive policies in favour of blacks. Whites have responded by joining political parties, including the right-wing. Jonathan Hyslop (1987:393) argues that the AWB's rise to prominence,

"was the product of a conjunction of features in South Africa's political and economic crisis: the political fragmentation of the NP; government's shift toward a greater element of free market orientation in its policies, resulting in less state protection for the white working and lower middle classes against black economic competition; the deteriorating economic position of the lower white social classes after the collapse of the 1980-81 boom; and the development of mass resistance to the existing social order in the townships."

The influence of fascist ideas in Afrikaner political thought and action has been overlooked, even though a historical understanding of this ideological form is useful in terms of identifying latent fascist tendencies within the present social formation in this country. O'Meara for instance

overviews the main tenets of the fascist analogy as applied to the South African situation, but decides not to use this analogy in his analysis. He concedes that the fascist analogy offers some "comparative insights" even if these do not "compensate for the lack of historical specificity". In his opinion it does not really extend the theoretical understanding of the South African social formation in general and Afrikaner Nationalism in particular.

It is my contention that the fascist movement of the 1940's contributed to the formation of right-wing thought and action and should be incorporated into discussions relating to the historical development of the contemporary right-wing movement. van Rooyen (1992:3) states that,

"although the present-day right wing officially came into existence in 1969 with the founding of the HNP, its origins can be traced back to the mobilization of Afrikaner Nationalism during the 1930's, the fascist Afrikaner movement of the 1940's, and especially to the NP's apartheid policy after 1948."

This is supported by Furlong (1991:xiv) who states that key authors dealing with Afrikaner Nationalism, including O'Meara and Adam and Giliomee fail to take this analogy seriously even though it influenced the form ideology took during the 1930's. In his opinion anti-Semitism and other elements of fascist ideology made inroads into South African political life and thought during the 1930's.(1991:45). The outbreak of the Second World War brought these currents of Afrikaner Nationalist politics that had remained submerged to the surface. Thus the authoritarian transformation of the National Party which had begun in the 1930's was brought into fruition in 1942. Furlong makes a convincing case in support of his claims that fascist ideas came to permeate mainstream Afrikaner political thought more than is commonly realized. Whilst Afrikaner Nationalism cannot be explained entirely in terms of the injection of fascist ideas during the 1930's and the 1940's, this link in the chain of events that contributed to the electoral success and continuance of this ideology must be acknowledged. (This is dealt with in greater detail in Chapters Four and Five).

In this brief overview of existing literature, it has become apparent that each approach contains inherent limitations which constitute obstacles in the path of an overall, all encompassing theoretical paradigm. However, each has its own strengths and should be credited accordingly. The short-comings of existing theoretical frameworks can partially be alleviated through synthesis and eclecticism. Incorporating social-psychological theoretical ideas into this discussion (as has been done in Chapter Five of this thesis) assists in overcoming the inherent short-comings of sociological and political theory in understanding the phenomenon of fascism specifically and reactionary ideas in general.

ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER ONE

- 1 Broedertwis literally means conflict between brothers. In political terms, it refers to schisms within the Afrikaner group.

- 2 *For the purpose of this thesis, the rightwing does not include conservative or reactionary blacks, whether or not they belong to established political groups or conduct vigilante type operations.*

- 3 The "Battle of Ventersdorp" which occurred during August, 1991, crushed some of the illusions rightwingers had about the police. When the AWB attacked black commuters in the town and disrupted an NP meeting, the police didn't hesitate to take action against them. (Sunday Times, 11/08/91).

4. A group known as "The Speelgrond" (The Playground), operates on Tukkies campus and has disrupted several of the left's political meetings. These young white students exemplify the lack of acceptance of change and an intolerance for political opinions contrary to their own.

- 5 *Existing structures like farmers' organizations are being used to mobilize white support, and inflammatory statements and the controversial "Kill the Boer/Kill the farmer" slogan popularized by ANC Youth leader, Peter Mokaba, have provided impetus for these initiatives. (Weekly Mail, April/May, 1993).*

- 6 *A total of approximately 102 town councils in the Transvaal alone are controlled by the CP. (Back to the Laager, 1991:96).*

- 7 *The World Apartheid Movement (WAM) has apparently set-up self-defence training camps and has also contributed to the legal costs of rightwingers on trial. (Weekly Mail, June 1993).*

- 8 *The NGK, one of the biggest Afrikaner Reformed Churches recently decided to admit black Christians into its congregation. Many hardliners were disillusioned when the NGK apologized for the "sins of apartheid".*

- 9 *The CoC denies the existence of a deity and dismisses Christianity as an "evil Jewish fable". A strong neo-Nazi pseudo social-Darwinian inspired notion of the survival of the fittest [white race] is evident. (Weekly Mail, January, 1993).*

- 10 *Its leaders include preachers from the Full Gospel Church, the Rheema Church and a Soweto preacher. (New Nation, 12/01/1989).*

CHAPTER TWO

The previous Chapter provided a profile of the rightwing movement in modern South Africa. This Chapter sets out to trace the **trends, tactics, and strategies** taken by the rightwing movement in the contemporary social and political environment. It is necessary to identify the present nature of rightwing organizations in order to understand the very real threat their existence poses to a peaceful transition to a non-racial society. The existence of these new organizational forms located on the far right of the political spectrum is evidence of the movements propensity to fissure. The types of groups that have emerged are indicative of the movements inclination to resort to violence in the present context. Violence has constituted part of rightwing strategy with increased frequency.

The assumption is that rightwing splinter groups with violence on the agenda are likely to proliferate, and even the more established organizations, like the CP are undergoing constitutional changes and are likely to condone and encourage extra-parliamentary forms of protest. This is not to say that the CP will take up arms and be transformed into a "*liberation movement*", but that the role it has assumed up until now will be altered as it becomes involved in non-parliamentary forms of protest.

The dominant volkstaat component of the rightwing movement need not constitute any major threat, if the rightwing can be included in negotiations and compromise reached on this issue. The CP may be persuaded to accept a smaller volkstaat, as advocated by cultural leaders like Carel

Boshoff. However, it is the smaller militant groups who clearly favour violence who pose the main threat and could hamper the negotiation process and also the transition to a new South Africa.

2.1 NEW TRENDS, TACTICS, STRATEGIES: 1988 to 1993

The rightwing movement in South Africa, like any other political movement, needs to decide on which strategy to employ in order to achieve its policy objectives. Whether it decides to implement **partition** or **secession** to achieve its ultimate aim of self-determination, the rightwing collectively needs to decide whether to enter into negotiations or if it should employ passive resistance and/or violence. The rightwing has had to adopt a wide range of policies and tactics in response to changing reality and not all options considered constitutional and/or legal. At present the rightwing is torn between using constitutional or unconstitutional means of achieving its major objectives. A weakness of the present negotiation process and the legitimacy of the new constitution is reflected in its inability to incorporate the parties of the **Freedom Alliance** who walked out of the talks earlier this year.

During the years 1988 to 1993, the rightwing has engaged in a number of activities ranging from passive forms of resistance, including civil disobedience, hunger-strikes, the bizarre "*suicide in the desert*"¹ incident to more overtly aggressive and destructive behaviour such as bombings and hit-squad type assassinations. The rightwing has also opted to occupying buildings of historical and symbolic significance to voice their dissatisfaction with reform. These activities in a sense represent a departure from previous ones, in that new tactics have been employed for the purposes of entrenching white privileges. The white rightwing has been involved in numerous incidences of violence over the past few years. (see Figure 2). These activities are indicative of the extent of rightwing organizational networks. These activities need to be analysed in terms of the underlying

motives prompting such action (outlined in Chapter Five), in order to try and assess the movements future potential for violence.

Despite apocalyptic warnings and threats of insurrection, the rightwing has also tried to ensure the re-establishment of apartheid structures through "*peaceful*" means. A wide variety of methods has been employed to ensure that racial segregation persists. For instance, the **Separate Amenities Act** was lifted in October 1990 and certain CP controlled town councils have used all kinds of means to try and keep apartheid alive. These include the charging of high entrance and membership fees, the actual closing down of amenities such as swimming-pools in towns like Kuruman and Springs, and the privatization of facilities. More confrontational methods have been employed which include racist and violent incidents at public amenities in towns like De Aar and Olifantshoek (Back to the Laager, 1991:98). However, when "*peaceful*" means failed to keep blacks out of public swimming-pools, violence was used. Whites would forcibly evict black people from amenities or through the use of force and intimidation prevent their entry in the first place. Certain sectors of the white community have decided that public amenities are to be reserved for the exclusive use of whites and any integration at this level will be resisted. As one white respondent put it,

"It's not that I hate blacks No, we must work with them - but, hell we don't have to live and mix with them... to hell with them coming to our swimming-pools; let them build their own - in their own areas." (Welkom, December, 1990)

As mentioned, the rightwing has had to decide whether or not it would enter negotiations. The CP, in particular, has had to take a stance and has repeatedly reiterated its commitment not to negotiate with the "*ANC/SACP alliance*". Pragmatists within the CP, have put pressure on the party to reconsider its stance on entering present talks. (The Argus 18/10/90) Individuals such as Koos van der Merwe and Carel Boshoff of the Afrikaner Volkswag have expressed a willingness to negotiate. Boshoff has made it clear that he will negotiate in order to achieve his

ideal of an Afrikaner Volkstaat. Traditionalists within the party like Ferdi Hartzenberg refuse to negotiate with groups and organizations which have not rejected violence and communism. It seems that Treurnicht was caught up between the two factions, and his primary concern was to prevent a split in the CP. The CP has since had talks with the ANC, but remains unwilling to negotiate a settlement for a future South Africa. The CP is willing to negotiate and even forge alliances with black leaders like Buthelezi and has reached an agreement with IFP president Buthelezi on the basis of similar aims including an "*adherence to Christian principles, rejection of communism, terrorism and domination*". (Cape Times 3/11/90). This attempt at forging an alliance is hardly surprising in the light of both groups' convictions about ethnicity and nationalism.)The implications of such common interests will be dealt with in Chapter Five of this thesis).

Before moving on to a discussion on rightwing violence, it is necessary to provide a summary of the latest developments in rightwing strategy. The white rightwing has attempted to canvass broader support for its policies by "*winning the hearts and minds of the people*". Not only are they preparing for war, they are also trying to canvass popular support for their activities by offering material benefits to impoverished whites. The setting-up of soup kitchens and the distributing of clothing for poor whites and the employing of white labour by rightwing companies and individuals helps to secure support for the rightwing on an everyday level. The AWB in particular have been instrumental in setting up white feeding schemes. The AWB has thus filled the vacuum in working-class white politics, and supporters who include farmers and professionals provide food to be distributed by the "*volkshelpskeme*" (people's help schemes) which have been set up. (Sunday Times, 04/12/1988) The rightwing may, in this way secure support from poor whites who otherwise may not have supported them.

In the words of an unemployed railway worker,

"Who can we turn to, the NP are so busy trying to impress everyone overseas, they forget about their own people. The only ones who will feed and clothe us are the AWB. How then can we not support them. I personally am quite happy living here, I don't want no volkstaat, but I will vote right next time around." (Kimberley, December, 1990).

The implications of support for the rightwing from the poorer white classes are self-explanatory. As the economic plight of the lower echelons of white society worsens, support for rightwing parties which favour white material advancement and State subsidization of whites at the expense of blacks, can only be expected to increase. It is necessary to acknowledge that there is an identifiable class basis for rightwing support, although this is not the concern of this study.

Rightwingers have apparently been preparing for the inevitable conflict, not only by stockpiling weapons and undergoing military training, but have been chopping wood and accumulating water supplies for periods without electricity and the like. Survival camps have been mapped out and armed rightwingers are being mobilized within existing structures like SADF commando structures. (Weekly Mail, October, 1993) It is virtually impossible to obtain confirmation for these allegations, but rightwingers often *"boast"* about the fact that they are preparing for the inevitability of civil war. During my field-work, such claims were often made, but it is hard to gauge whether they are realistic or not.

Recent claims that the a white ultra rightwing group, **Israel Vision**, was training mentally disabled individuals in the use in explosives have been confirmed by the group, who are unashamedly proud of their recruits. The Boereweerstandsbeweging (BWB) are also implicated in the training of these *"specials"* or *"soldiers of Jesus Christ"* as they were

originally termed. Trainers of these units have been used to guard prominent rightwingers like the recently acquitted Gaye Derby-Lewis at public gatherings. (Weekly Mail, October, 1993)

This extremely racist religious sect has gained support from fundamentalist rightwingers looking for a biblical justification for their beliefs. Conservative whites in South Africa, who favour racial segregation have always tried to justify their beliefs in terms of religion, thus it is not surprising that extremists have once again turned to Christianity to obtain legitimation for their cause. Groups who have rejected Christianity, like the CoC are numerically small, and this could, amongst other factors, be related to their inability to provide religious sanction for their beliefs amongst a group of people who have historically relied on the Bible for moral guidance. In other words, their teachings and ideas are relatively alien to white conservatives, who have shaped political beliefs in terms of Calvinist Christian interpretations of reality.

It appears that the white ultra right is gearing up for war, and is trying to obtain support for this change in policy from the white constituencies they represent. They have employed a variety of mechanisms (material and ideological) to achieve this. Violence has become an attractive option and the majority of rightwing organizations view it as unavoidable and justifiable under the present circumstances.

2.2 VIOLENCE AND THE RIGHTWING:

Before discussing the rightwing's propensity for violence, it is necessary to define what constitutes violent activity. van Rooyen (1991:453) suggests that in terms of the rightwing the term non-violent should be accorded a broader understanding than Ghandhi's usage and should include means of resistance like mass protests, marches and the breaking up of NP meetings. The rightwing also considered options such as strikes, the refusal to pay taxes, the refusal to arrive for military service and the like. (ibid:455) The strategies mentioned above, in terms of

this broad definition are essentially "*non-violent*". The breaking up of a political rivals meetings could be seen as a violent action, but for the purpose of this discussion, it will not be viewed in this way.

Political analyst Welsh (1988) believes that present circumstances in South Africa provide favourable conditions for the growth in violence. The rightwing is not exempt from the processes underway in the country and it appears that the strategy of active resistance may become a feasible option for the contemporary rightwing movement. Political violence on the part of the ultra right targeted against the state and also at the left has increased radically since 1989. (see Figure 2). As the ruling National Party prepares for a transition to a more democratic non-racial South Africa, the rightwing has become increasingly dissatisfied and determined to curb this transformation.

Rightwing groups and individuals have publicly declared their willingness to use violence to achieve their ends and in many instances these threats have been carried out. Even the CP has reinterpreted its position and a significant shift in policy regarding violence has taken place. Since February 1990, the CP undertook to resist the government at various levels and their strategy included the formation of "*self-defence*" units in the light of the government's declaration on the irreversibility of reform, the CP had to reassess its position. CP member Koos van der Merwe claimed that,

"although the CP rejected violence and was essentially committed to constitutional methods the government's present action could lead to civil war". (Patriot 25/10/90)

The CP has also attempted to justify violence on moral and biblical grounds and has repeatedly tried to legitimate its increasingly violent stance to the public. Further justification is found in

comparing the position of whites in South Africa to ethnic minorities in Eastern Europe. For example the Baltic republics attempts to obtain independence from the Soviet Union is used as an analogy. (van Rooyen, 1992:478)

Wim Booyse claims that the CP returned to parliament in August 1990 in a more aggressive and militant mood. The CP assisted in the formation of a private army called **Brandwag**. (ibid) The role played by the Conservative Party in terms of supporting the **Blanke Veiligheid** (White Security) organization in Welkom will be discussed in this chapter.

A hardening of attitudes on the part of respondents was apparent, and this is significant since it corresponded with the governments decision to unban the ANC and the SACP and the opening of the NP to all races. The first spate of interviews were conducted prior to February 1990, and several respondents remained unwilling to resort to violence to achieve political goals since these methods were favoured by the "*barbaric enemy*". (interview, November 1988). They felt that since its inception the CP was a parliamentary party which used constitutional means to achieve political ends. However, when interviewed a second time, after de Klerk's speech in February 1990, attitudes had changed. The same individuals expressed a willingness to use violence to obtain goals.

"In the final instance, when all other options have failed (as they have now) violence is necessary." (Kimberley, July 1991)

Respondents who initially were either ambivalent on the issue of violence or who rejected it outright were far more willing to consider the violent option. Apart from the usual vague threats expressed, direct and clearly planned courses of action were emphasized.

A Welkom miner boasted that he,

"had joined a security operation aimed at curbing crime in white areas... and in the process ensuring that blacks were kept in their place once and for all..." (December, 1990)

When further prompted he went into great detail about the setting up of similar units nationwide and offered assistance in setting up a "women's group". This admission of a definite plan of action for "white security" and supremacy was echoed by other respondents.

A CP official who was relatively militant in 1988 was extremely outspoken on the perceived legitimacy of violence in 1990. In 1988 he elaborated that,

"violence was justifiable under the following circumstances: when the government does not obey God and when the government behaves dictatorially". (Kimberley, June, 1988).

When asked the same question in 1990, the respondent answered the question with a simple, "Yes - definitely. Now it's war." Another individual who was rather moderate in 1988, was not as conciliatory in 1990. He stated that

"We Afrikaners must be taken seriously, we are not by nature a violent people, but if we are backed into a corner, as we are now, what choice do we have?" (Cape Town, 1990)

By the end of 1990, all respondents interviewed, with the exception of a church minister who refused to comment, said that violence was justifiable in political action. A significant percentage of those were prepared to engage in violence themselves. This is significant since several respondents were unwilling to do so in 1988.

2.2.1. Para-military rightwing groups:

(a) Self-defence Units:

In the light of increased violence on the part of the rightwing, it is necessary to identify the types of organizations and structures involved in one way or another with promoting violent activities. In both my own empirical investigation and that done by the authors in *Back to the Laager*, (1991), the town Welkom was identified as an area where the white rightwing had made significant inroads in terms of successfully mobilizing whites into forming self-defence units. Welkom was the scene of the most violent and organized rightwing action during 1990. The political dynamics that exist in this town can be found in many other regions, especially the Transvaal and OFS. When conducting interviews in this mining town most people interviewed were either directly involved or strongly sympathized with the aims of these groups. As one respondent put it,

"I mean we don't want the kaffirs singing and dancing on our streets. "
(November, 1990)

Another added,

"if a kaffir so much as tries to rob my house and harm my family, he's dead...we'll find him. " He went on to say, *"we are preparing for war, it's not about politics - its about the kaffir mentality...we've got to shoot it out of them."* (ibid, 1990)

Clearly these statements are shared by significant sectors of the local white population. Whites in Welkom have taken AWB leader Eugene Terre' Blanche's statement seriously: *"History has shown that an unarmed white man in South Africa is a dead man."* According to the SAP in Welkom, during April 1990 alone, 1100 new gun licences were issued. (*Back to the Laager*, 1991:68) As mentioned, Welkom is a predominantly mining town and MWU organizer Arrie Paulus has openly encouraged white miners to arm themselves before going underground. He echoed the call previously made by rightwing political organizations in response to an incident

where a white miner was found dead underground. Clearly this exacerbates an already tense situation in a town rife with racial animosity. (Argus 14/08/90) Arrie Paulus is not the only one encouraging whites to arm themselves, militant organizations like the **Boerestaat Party** and the **Transvaal Separatiste** openly declare their plan to arm 1 million whites within five years. In fact several rightwing groups promote or support a call to arms to achieve an Afrikaner state. Terre' Blanche takes a radical view, *"If they want to take this country by force and violence we will fight for the love of God."* (Argus 4/02/92)

White South Africans generally have easy access to weapons and over the past few years many rightwinger attempts to steal arms from the armed forces have been exposed. Access to explosives in particular has far reaching consequences in terms of the overall stability of this country and could interfere with the 1994 elections. Rightwing bomb blasts have occurred with increased frequency. Both those sympathizers in the armed forces and on the mines have relatively easy access to explosives. Rightwingers have even tried to purchase weapons abroad. Two AWB members were arrested in Britain for attempting to buy arms from an international gun-running syndicate. (Weekly Mail, January, 1993). During the same week, the SAP arrested seven men for stealing weapons from a SADF arsenal in Welkom.(ibid). Such incidents illustrate that rightwing groups are making a concerted effort to stockpile weapons to be used at a later stage in their struggle.

Another factor of reference to this thesis is that during the first set of interviews conducted at the end of 1988, none of the selected respondents mentioned self-defence units. At that stage these structures were relatively unknown and unestablished and were thus not dealt with comprehensively in the question. By the end of 1990 the situation had changed, and everyone interviewed knew of and /or belonged to such units. Para-military structures like these

"neighbourhood watches" mushroomed after February 1990 and this is indicative of white fears and perceptions. Socio-economic factors like increased unemployment and subsequently crime and poverty contributed to their growth. This was reflected in the interviews and is collaborated by the opinions of rightwing observers and analysts.

(b) Other forms of para-military organizations:

Apart from the self-defence units formed in Welkom, the extreme right has established several other para-military type structures and organizations in recent years. These vigilante type self-protection units that patrol the streets of white suburbia by night are a relatively new phenomenon. Escalating crime and violence has heightened their activities. As mentioned access to arms is clearly not a problem, nor is the willingness to take part in such activities. Most white males have experienced some form of military training and thus possess the expertise to conduct programmes of this nature.

Political analyst Wim Booyse warns that we shouldn't see these neighbourhood watches in a vacuum. On the contrary, the creation of such grass-roots organizations could have far-reaching implications and could constitute powerful forces in the future. (The Argus 23/7/90) It is alleged that these "*civil defence units*" are the brainchild of CP member Clive Derby Lewis.² Derby Lewis is also President of the Western Goals Institute (WGI) and according to Andrew Smith, WGI's London leader, these units were formed with the help of professional soldiers and mercenaries. (Argus 5/06/92) It is not only these "*defence-units*" that have obtained a measure of international support. The AWB's **Iron Brigade** has apparently been trained by foreign professionals. The **Iron Brigade** is an elite unit which incorporated the cream of previous **Wenkommando** and **Aquila** units in April 1991. Camps have been set up where the art of covert war is taught, including assassination techniques. Law and order spokesman,

Captain Craig Kotze commented, "*They are to the AWB what the SS was to the Nazi Party.*" (Argus 28/12/91). According to various studies conducted, the Iron Brigade and similar units comprise ex-policemen, foreign elite soldiers and ex-members of the SADF's "*special forces*". Their programme includes partaking in certain rituals, the taking of a vow and vigorous training in combat techniques. The Iron Brigade is but one para-military unit, several others exist such as the **Jakkals** group, the **Boer Kommando** (which broke away from the AWB), the **Afrikaner Bevrydigingsleer**, and all of them are extremely well trained.

AWB units have sprung up in areas around the country wherever there is conflict among the black and white communities such as the clashes in Welkom and regions where squatters have invaded white suburbs. Even the CP, has condoned the formation of "*tuis-wagte*" (home guards) to protect white life and property in the advent of a squatter or other threat. Grobbelaar (1992:105) comments on the fact that the CP has increasingly begun "*to entertain the idea and the rhetoric of violence*". Whilst it is highly unlikely that the CP will abandon its respectable middle class parliamentary character and become a party of "*freedom fighters*", the "*Calvinist right to protest*" may be revised in the wake of further constitutional changes. The CP comprises the bulk of the rightwing and Professor Albert Venter, a political scientist at RAU states that if we look at history we will see the improbability of the CP becoming violent. He alludes to the historical example of Hertzog's National Party, which remained sympathetic to the 1914 rebellion without relinquishing its parliamentary position, unlike the Ossewa Brandwag. Although the CP may not directly take up arms, it is likely to actively encourage and promote the use of non-violent forms of extra-parliamentary protest, and may indirectly condone violence through its rhetoric. (Grobbelaar, 1992:107).

Whilst it may be a consolation that the CP and the bulk of the white ultra right may not become actively involved in armed resistance, we must not lose sight of the fact that splinter groups and individuals may not be deterred. The fanaticism of some groups has been demonstrated on numerous occasions. Lood van Schalkwyk, leader of the **Christen Vryheids Front (CVF)** asked to be interviewed by the *Vrye Weekblad* in order to announce his "*declaration of war against de Klerk*" (Cape Times 24/02/92) He boasted about the amount of blacks he'd killed and warned that several others would face a similar fate in order to prevent "*a kaffir or Jewish government*" taking over the country. He claimed to have links with international Nazi organizations. The incitement to violence on the part of radicals within the movement has triggered of several indiscriminate killings by whites.

The *Afrikaner Bevrydigingsleer* has been singled out by rightwing specialist Dr Wim Booyse, as representative of the "*absolute fanaticism*" prevalent within the rightwing movement as a whole. He speculates that it is still at an infant stage in its development and comprises a single cell of white hardliners. Despite the fact that they are numerically small, he urges that threats made by them should be taken seriously, since small groups like this may constitute a component of the so-called "**Third Force**" and can thus cause irrevocable damage and chaos. The individuals Booyse warns of do not seem to discriminate in selecting victims and their identities are rarely disclosed. People chosen for a "*cell*" will already be armed and trained. (*Vrye Weekblad*, September 1991) The existence of small "*cells*" which are not always centrally controlled and often ill-disciplined exacerbates the problem of trying to contain the rightwing threat. It is extremely difficult to track down newly-formed, organizations comprising a few or a single member. A recent court case against Terre'Blanche in relation to the part he played in attacking and intimidating the Goedgevonden squatters, illustrates this trend. Terre'Blanche denied that he or the AWB were involved and passed the blame onto an

unknown rightwing organization. Passing the blame in this way negates the possibility of tracking down the perpetrators and detracts from Terre'Blanches' role in the incident. The rightwing could conceivably employ this tactic in future in order to escape blame and hence penalties. The Wit Wolwe organization illustrates this tendency to fissure and there is disagreement as to whether such an organization even exists. It could possibly consist of a single individual or simply exist in name as a kind of decoy.

Terre'Blanche puts the issue of small numbers into perspective, "*the boers are at their best when their numbers are few and we won't carry passengers into battle.*" In his view, "*History is made by individuals and small groups of people.*" (Ibid) The level of fragmentation that characterizes the rightwing movement renders it difficult to contain all groupings under a single umbrella-type body which is centrally co-ordinated and controlled. (Recent attempts at forging unity will be discussed later on in Chapter Three of this thesis). Fragmentation also makes it extremely difficult for the rightwing to secure adequate representation in parliament. The size of some of these splinter groups mitigates against them obtaining seats in parliament, which makes the extra-parliamentary path even more attractive.

Several of the more extreme militant groups have been forced to operate "*underground*" in small cells and often outside the parameters of the law. Attitudes expressed and action initiated by small cells or individual right wingers are alarming in the sense that they are more blatantly fascist and overtly violent than their predecessors. Actions taken by individuals like Barend Strydom and cells like the Wit Wolwe, Jakkalse and the recently formed Afrikaner Bevrydigingsleer exemplify this tendency. Strydom's actions were thought to be that of an isolated madman.

Van Rooyen (1992:480) states that;

"the relative lull in rightwing violence which followed this incident, gave credibility to this perception, but a few months later everything had changed for the worse."

By mid-1989, the number of militant rightwing groups in existence had surged as had the number of violent acts committed by them. During 1990 and 1991 several incidences of rightwing violence were reported, most of which was directed against the government, the left and black South Africans.

The AWB and the BSP hold similar views on the issue of violence. They claim they will take action when an ANC government comes into power. In this instance they would fight for the survival of Volk and Vaderland. Piet "Skiet" Rudolph of the Orde Boerevolk has been linked to numerous acts of violence and sabotage. His justification of his willingness to resort to violence is based on this conviction,

"I was involved the day I was born. This is the same struggle that my father and grandfather fought, and which my great grandfathers trekked for. I am fighting for those territories which we lost on the 3rd of May 1902." (Cross Times interview, 1989)

This perceived historical suffering is deep-rooted in the Afrikaner psyche and a historically grounded concern for "eie volk" provides the far right with potential for mobilization. This perceived historical suffering and a belief in a divine sanction for their cause provides powerful moral justification for resorting to violent means to achieve political ends. The CP has been under increasing pressure to revise party policy and justify violence in political action as the "Will of God". If this justification for violence is resolved, a notion of a rightwing Holy War could be developed. The ideological and/or religious justification for armed resistance could go a long way towards providing the white right and its tacit sympathisers with the moral fuel for

persuing this path. Calvinist Christianity espouses the notion of the Elect and the damned, and in terms of this violence against the latter could be biblically justified. Far right splinter groups like the Israelites, who view blacks as inhuman could resort to violence with little ideological justification needed.

Members of the extreme **Order of Death** have been linked to deeds of terror like the murder of a black taxi driver to pledge allegiance to the cause and illustrate their level of commitment. Lottering and Goosen argue that the murder of the taxi driver was defensible on religious grounds and was done in aid of the survival of the volk. Eugene Marais, another member provides a similar defence for the murder of seven blacks. *"Blacks were animals who looked like people...It was therefore not a sin to kill blacks."* (Sunday Times 17/03/91) They have gone so far as to plan the assassination of high profile individuals like cabinet ministers. (Sunday Times 18/11/90) and more recently the murder of ANC Youth leader Peter Mokaba. (Weekly Mail October, 1993)

Other extreme groups include the **Boereweerstandsbeweging** who have their own self-defence structures and intelligence networks. Andrew Ford, the leader, says that the BWB has agents in all branches of the security forces. Another group, the *White Liberation Army* claimed responsibility for a taxi rank blast in July 1990 and have since issued numerous threats, including assassinations. The **Boer Republican Army (BRA)** keep a hit list of enemies and openly express admiration for the IRA. The bombing of a former white school building in Pretoria to be used for the children of ANC returned exiles was bombed by a group called the **Boerkommando**. Gawie Volschenk, the leader claimed:

"We are in the process of preparing ourselves physically and mentally and are working out the finer details of the struggle...we don't appear in public anymore."
(Vrye Weekblad 07/01/1992)

The activities of the **World Apartheid Movement** were somewhat curtailed after members were arrested after a bombing incident in 1990. They too plan assassinations and advocate the use of biological and chemical weapons. They are suspected of forging links with other international rightwing movements like the notorious Klu Klux Klan. (Sunday Times, 9/12/1990)

It is interesting to note that most of the extreme organizations mentioned were either formed or initiated activities after February 1990. There was a marked shift away from peaceful means of protest and violence was increasingly embraced as a feasible option in political activity. At this stage it is necessary to briefly recap the motivations behind heightened militancy and extremism on the part of the white ultra right. It appears that much of the violence committed by the white rightwing in South Africa is motivated by little other than fear and insecurity which translates into racism towards the "*out-group*". Attacks on black civilians have been reported with increased frequency, and the arbitrary and random nature of these attacks are not always indicative of a clear-cut political strategy. These activities range from racial abuse to vandalism, injury and death. During 1990, the rightwing claimed responsibility for several bomb blasts, more than previously recorded and the targets selected and methods employed resembled those used by the state and its agencies. (Back to the Laager, 1992)

Unlike previous arbitrary violence, recent incidents of rightwing violence tend to be overtly political as a planned operation aimed at specific strategic targets. Attacks on journalists at rallies could form part of this strategy. Journalists are perceived to generally be unsympathetic in their reporting of the rightwing and have thus been targeted for attack. Journalists attacked are viewed as enemies of the folk and are dealt with accordingly. (Sweepslag, February, 1993).

Van Rooyen (1992:470) is pessimistic and argues that all indications point to a further conflagration in this area of rightwing activity as the political system continues its transition to a more broadly-based democracy. van Rooyen's predictions are echoed by Welsh (1988) who alludes to Fromm's idea that *"violence, insecurity and a strained economical circumstance bring out the fascist that lurks in each of us."* (Patterns of Prejudice vol 22/4 1988)

The structural conditions conducive to an upsurge in and a support for fascist ideas exist in contemporary South Africa. In an environment of economic recession and political uncertainty, fascist ideas seem extremely attractive to those perceived to be most affected by these conditions. White South Africans are painfully aware of the implications of power-sharing in terms of loss of privilege and a potential loss of ethnic and racial identities, and many have come to identify with political groups who provide reassurances in this regard.

This bleak scenario exists in contemporary South Africa and this pessimism for the short term future is not unwarranted. Racism is fostered by, amongst other things, a deep-rooted, socially inspired fear of the *"out-group"*. In conservative white South African society this *"out-group"* is black and is seen to constitute a threat. White fear has taken on a specifically racial content and the historically created overlap between race and class is brought to the fore. As white material circumstances are threatened, racial animosity intensifies, since the black community becomes a competitor. Fear is a powerful emotion which easily translates into a hatred of the *"out-group"* which may lead to violent attacks on the *"out-group"*.

At this stage, I would just like to locate the allegations of the existence of a **Third Force** in the context of ultra right militancy. Even if the rightwing does not constitute this Third Force, and

even if a Third force doesn't exist at all, the rightwing could conceivably become involved in activities of this nature. For that reason alone, it is necessary to locate Third Force activities in the context of rightwing potential for violence. This is particularly relevant when establishing who gains from Third Force activity.

2.2.2. (a) The Third Force:

A similar war to that previously witnessed in Natal broke out in the Transvaal during July 1990. The ANC claimed that there was involvement and manipulation by an unknown Third Force. Mandela accused agents of the state and military for being responsible for "*black on black*" violence. (Cape Times 12/10/90) It is unclear who or what constitutes this Third Force or whether it even exists. Analysts speculate that it could comprise elements of both the rightwing and the state. Blaming the rightwing, detracts attention from the state. (Back to the Laager, 1991:115) The South African state has historically been engaged in the systematic destabilization of its opponents and it is in this context that contemporary developments should be located.

It is interesting to note that when violence flared on the Rand, it occurred after the ANC had suspended the armed struggle and was attempting to launch branches in the region. The ANC rejected the official government analysis which was supported by the rightwing, that the violence was essentially "*black on black*" ethnic rivalry. They claimed that a Third Force was responsible and its aim was to disrupt the peace process and discredit and subsequently weaken the ANC. Violence flared after the unbanning of the ANC and SACP in February 1990. This is not surprising when considering the consequent hardening of rightwing attitudes after this period. The heightened militancy witnessed on the part of the rightwing occurred during this

time period. If the rightwing was to become involved in such activities, this would be the time to do so.

Reports of white involvement in township violence have been widespread. The Human Rights Commission acknowledged a new trend in violence during 1990 as smaller groups of heavily armed men rather than big impis with traditional weapons were reported. In other words, people wielded AK 47's as opposed to pangas. Suspicions about rightwing involvement in the so-called "*Third Force*" were confirmed in July 1991, when a former member of army's special forces claimed that his unit was involved in the train massacre of September 1990, in which 26 people were killed. (Cape Times 19/07/91). The suspected activities of the CCB's death squads and alleged "*Third Force*" involvement in Natal and the Rand need to be included in an analysis of the incidences of rightwing violence. van Rooyen (1992) and other analysts claim that the activities of rightwing elements within the security forces, especially the Civil Co-operation Bureau (CCB) and its death-squads form an important part of the analysis of rightwing militancy in South Africa. Booyse believes that elements of the CCB were still active during the early part of 1991. An ex-CCB member told the Weekly Mail that SADF members trained an elite unit of Inkatha in the Caprivi Strip. This was confirmed by former Inkatha members, but denied by Buthelezi. He denied having any knowledge of this alleged "*secret Zulu army*". (Back to the Laager, 1991:116)

Rightwingers have been linked to providing military training for blacks opposed to the ANC. Apparently this includes the transformation of traditional Zulu impis into a conventional fighting force. (Weekly Mail, October, 1993). Terre Blanche has publically declared that the Boer and Zulu nations were preparing for war. (Argus, 17/11/93).

The police constantly deny favouring Inkatha in township violence. After numerous train and taxi massacres, the police conceded that the attacks were "*military type operations*" and indicated that they were the work of highly trained people. The Institute of Contextual Theology (1992) claim that the special forces of the SADF like the CCB and of the SAP like the Askaris are the only ones with both the means and motive to execute such attacks. Although individual rightwingers may be involved, special forces like Koevoet possess the ability to kill and destabilize. (ibid)

Further evidence supporting claims of the existence of a Third Force and police impartiality came when prisoners at Leeukop prison claimed that a rightwing "*arms factory*" existed inside the prison. Their claims were verified by two wardens who stated that spears and pangas for use in township violence were produced in the prison's workshop. These "*traditional weapons*" were hidden in an unused cell and some were stockpiled in a nearby veld for use and distribution in Reef townships. The Department of Correctional Services denied this, but are investigating an incident where rightwing wardens were promoting political faction fighting among black inmates of Pietermaritzburg's mens prison. (Weekly Mail, July 1992) After the Boipatong massacre a secret Koevoet base was linked to the hostel where the fighting erupted from. (Weekly Mail, July, 1992).

Further confirmation of a Third Force element operating in townships in the Transvaal was obtained after the death of the "*Vaal Monster*" Victor "*Khetisi*" Kheswa who died in police custody on 10/07/93. The World Preservatist Movement (WPM), formerly the World Apartheid Movement (WAM) confirmed that Kheswa was a member.³ Political analysts (including Wim Booysse) commented that the link between a known black killer and a white supremacist movement was "*sinister*" and provided the first concrete evidence that rightwing

movement were sponsoring and fostering township violence. Kheswa has been linked to several massacres and was also a member of Inkatha. (The Argus 13/7/93)

Third Force type activity has made its presence felt all over the country. Involvement during the "taxi-war" in the Western Cape was also alleged and Third Force elements have been compared to the "balaclavas" who rob shops in Western Cape townships. Vigilante action in the KTC squatter camp in 1986 and present violence in crossroads has been linked to this elusive - Third Force. During an independent investigation conducted in Khayelitsha during 1992, some of these issues were raised. Whilst probing the effect of violence and the taxi-war on informal, small business activity, several residents confirmed suspicions of external involvement in township violence.

2.2.2 (b) Who gains from "Third Force" activity?

Any attempt to uncover the membership of the CCB or other Third Force hit squads needs to address the issue of who benefits from their activities. Activity of this nature serves to widen divisions within communities and also between them. In other words it deepens divisions previously created by apartheid. Lloyd Vogelmann from the Centre for the Study of Violence at Wits University, claims that the government, the far right, Inkatha, ANC and the legacy of apartheid all played a role in Reef violence. In his opinion, the rightwing and Inkatha benefitted the most, as did conservative elements within the government and its structures. He states that,

"with the townships in a state of anarchy, one result would be increased difficulty for the government to continue its reform package." (Back to the Laager, 1991:121)

Fear and insecurity is bred in the townships as a result of continued attacks by unknown assailants. In the process the ANC is often discredited and is seen to represent the interests of a single ethnic group. The ANC is also internally pressurized to resume the armed struggle to

protect members and communities. Whites come to view Inkatha as a potential ally against the ANC. In a sense fighting in the townships is exploited by conservatives within the white community. Despite claims of the police stoking violence, in the final instance violence of this nature *"proves to whites that blacks are unable to govern."* Vogelmann claims that Inkatha's status is elevated in the process. Frightened whites may join rightwing groups in response. The credibility of Inkatha as opposed to the ANC is highly significant when considered in terms of possible alliances between conservatives. It thus appears that continued fighting in the townships indirectly serves the interests of the ruling National Party and its allies, even more than it does the rightwing. The state comes out on top and appears like the voice of reason in the midst of chaos.

Allegations of the state benefitting from the violence and instability that characterizes many townships should be seen in the context of state reaction to these activities. The international press has often mentioned the fact that the highly competent South African Police Force has a poor record of solving political crimes and assassinations (Newsweek; The Guardian) This view is supported by local analysts who note that the rightwing has been charged for fewer crimes than anti-apartheid activists committing similar crimes. When convicted their penalties are considerably lower. (Back to the Laager, 1991:114) claim that,

"the state has not used the repressive laws at its disposal to smash the rightwing in the same way that it tried to destroy progressive organizations. It has failed to use the ordinary criminal laws to act against the rightwing..."

Rightwing *"hit-squads"* have also been linked to a number of assassinations of key activists on the left. Initially these accusations were based purely on speculation, but since the uncovering of the CCB and the confessions of its members this is no longer so. Victims of these attacks include human rights campaigners, anti-apartheid activists and the like. The attacks were well

planned and the assailants were never apprehended. Statistics on politically motivated assassinations lent credibility to the confessions of Coetzee and other CCB members. Newsweek (13/11/89) reports that at least 45 opponents of apartheid had been assassinated by 1989.

These include Rick Turner (1978), Matthew Goniwe (1985) and David Webster (1989). Newsweek commented that only one of these cases was solved in 12 years by the police. Compared to the outstanding success figures of between 50-80% for normal crimes, this is highly suspicious. Despite reformist rhetoric, elements within the state are clearly sympathetic to the rightwing and are unwilling to act against them because the existence of the rightwing and its propensity to violence, serves the medium and long-term interest of the state. Terrorism on the part of the ultra-right adds to the overall climate of fear and violence that characterizes South African society and ultimately serves to strengthen the state's hand in negotiations.

The white ultra right's potential for violence cannot be underestimated. The existence of structures aimed at destabilizing the country, and those intended to protect white interests above all confirms these suspicions. A change in rightwing policy has undoubtedly taken place and violence is increasingly being viewed as inevitable and even morally justifiable. This shift has dire consequences for the entire country and should be taken seriously.

The following Chapter will highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the rightwing, by identifying common themes as well as divergences in opinion within the movement. The rightwing's potential for growth will be assessed. Particular attention will be paid to the role played by the state in failing to recognize and contain the threat posed by the rightwing. The necessity and the ability of the rightwing to forge alliances will be also discussed.

ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER TWO

- 1 Jurgens White and Jurgens Grobbelaar, allegedly committed suicide after being cornered by police in the Northern Cape. Both were fanatical CoC members.
- 2 Derby-Lewis and co-conspirator Januz Walus were found guilty of murdering SACP leader Chris Hani in May 1993.
- 3 This has subsequently been denied.

CHAPTER 3

This chapter focusses on the **divisions** and points of convergence within the rightwing movement. In the light of increased activity on the part of the ultra right in recent years, it is necessary to uncover the **strengths** and **weaknesses** of the movement as a whole. Rightwing activity over the past few years reflects a hardening of white attitudes. A shift in loyalties has occurred, and the National Party is losing a significant measure of support amongst the white electorate. A wide range of people, ranging from the Conservative Party to Zac de Beer of the Democratic Party and political analyst Willem Kleynhans and agree with this prognosis. (Daily Telegraph 31/1/91). van Rooyen (1992) draws similar conclusions and is in disagreement with Swilling and Schlemmer who argue that a "*liberalization of whites*" has taken place.

This alleged liberalization of whites has thus, in their opinion, contributed to the decline in support for the rightwing. The extent to which has taken place is debatable, but Swilling (1987); Schlemmer (1989), and Lipton (1986) are convinced of this. Swilling argues that there has been a swing to the left and not to the right in South African politics since 1982. In terms of his definition, rightwing does not include the ruling NP who has accepted the inevitability of power-sharing and black majority rule.

A "*liberalisation of whites*" may have occurred; people who voted for the DP (or the PFP) may now vote ANC and those who previously voted NP may now vote DP. However it seems unlikely in the light of current socio-economic circumstances that those who previously supported the CP, AWB or HNP are now voting DP or ANC, at most they may vote NP and even this is doubtful.

In my opinion, the liberalization of whites identified by Swilling and Schlemmer is minimal. On the contrary, (as discussed in the previous Chapter of this thesis), the current social and political environment in this country is conducive to a growth in rightwing support. Fieldwork, albeit limited, confirmed the hardening of attitudes argument. A significant shift in attitudes among respondents occurred between 1988 and 1990, which demonstrated the validity of this claim. When interviewed in 1987/8 certain respondents were reluctant to discontinue support for the NP despite policy changes, but by 1990, these views had changed. The same respondents, once loyal to the NP, were now looking to the rightwing for political guidance. Thus, when interviewed a second time in 1990, after the unbanning of the ANC and the SACP, and the opening of the NP to all races, several of them had joined the CP and/or the AWB.

The upsurge in rightwing organizations and activity should be viewed in the context of white needs and interests. As white fears intensify, increasingly numbers of white voters can be expected to identify with rightwing policies which bolster insecurities. In order to assess the potential impact of the rightwing as a social movement, the strengths and weaknesses of the movement need to be determined. This can only be accomplished if the shared attributes, as well as the divergences within the movement are outlined.

3.1. POTENTIAL STRENGTHS OF THE RIGHTWING \ FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO ITS GROWTH:

3.1.1 Points of convergence \ Shared attributes:

Despite the diversity of organizational and ideological forms contained within the rightwing movement, they do share certain socio-political and philosophical perceptions. van Rooyen (1992:72) argues that divisions within the rightwing are not differences as such and should rather

be seen as constituting different expressions of the demand for Afrikaner and white self-determination.

Among these shared perceptions is the recognition that the NP has abandoned them and in this way has deviated from previous political and ideological formations and has "sold-out" to material considerations. The policy of the current government is thus integrally linked to the increase in support for the rightwing. In particular, it is the reform programme of the NP that has contributed to the growth of rightwing parties. de Klerks' reforms encountered resistance from the white right from the outset. According to Dr Dirk Kotze (SA Freedom Review, 1988, vol2(1):47);

"many whites are certain that the NP won't fight for white rights. In their opinion, the NP had become estranged from the ideals and visions of the Afrikaners and other whites."

Rightwingers accuse the government of betraying white workers and of "creating a welfare state for blacks" and blame the government for the current economic recession. (Sweepslag, 1989/91). This attitude was expressed on several occasions during my field-work. A mine-worker interviewed claimed that the NP had sold them out to Anglo American.

"The situation as it stands is like this... blacks are allowed blasting certificates and are moving up in the mines. I mean, now they think they can use our canteens and toilets!. The English in Anglo don't care - they've always been the liberal kaffir-boeties. As long as they make money they're happy; and we have to take the chance of getting AIDS. Us Afrikaners have to stand together to avoid being completely swamped". (Welkom, December, 1990)

This sentiment was echoed by various respondents, including workers, church leaders, rank and file membership of political parties and trade union officials. A train-driver and Spoorbond member summed it up;

"many whites are being replaced by blacks and this makes people afraid of losing their jobs. Before we were sure that being a driver was a white man's job, now it's different. Sometimes I think that they want us out just to put blacks in...the economy would improve if they kept our jobs white...now they have to spend money making the job easier so that they (the blacks) can do it." (Kimberley, December, 1990)

Workers belonging to another white union, **Yster en Staal** expressed similar opinions. The same fears relating to job security were apparent. The situation was no different amongst members of the MWU. Another respondent expressed his fears for the white youth;

"It's the younger ones who are affected... they must compete with blacks, who outnumber them, for work" (Welkom, December, 1990).

A miner claims that;

"the blacks are being pushed in everywhere, once they're in then they're protected wildlife". (Kimberley, December, 1990)

Many of the respondents felt that they had little stake in the future of this country,

"the white man has no future - our kids even less. I won't see the real problems like they will. (Welkom, December, 1990)

CJ Jooste of the Grootraad (Great Council) of the AWB, states that;

"the Afrikaner working man and the farmer and the middle and lower classes generally feel that the government has deserted them. They believe that their work and status relative to blacks (in short their futures) are in jeopardy. They face unemployment and sequestration, have experienced black unionism first-hand and feel at a disadvantage when comparing their own situation to that of black workers." (SA Freedom Review, Vol 2(1), 1988).¹

The ultra right agrees on one thing, the N.P. has compromised itself irrevocably and has in a sense "sold out" to the black, communist onslaught. The pass laws, influx control, job reservation on the mines were all designed to favour and protect the white man in the labour market, hence the scrapping of these laws has led many whites (especially those directly affected, the working-class) to conclude that the NP has forgotten them and that they will no longer be favoured as they were in the past.

Although the lower echelons of white society are extremely threatened by changes in the work-place and in terms of the state's economic policy, these anxieties are not the only ones influencing white opinion. Psychological insecurities are crucial in moulding perceptions. (See Chapter Five). Undoubtedly whites will be adversely affected by black economic advancement and the various affirmative action programmes being implemented, but their fears run much deeper than on a material level. The fear of integration with blacks is not a materially grounded fear, since the sharing of amenities will not threaten the survival of the white population group. It is understandable that those whites who have no skills and formal education are aware of the fact that in the future, it will be difficult for them to compete on the labour market with blacks. However those whites who have secure jobs and experience, education and a high level of skill are also threatened, even though their position is not directly threatened. White fears extend beyond economics and relate to psychological insecurities, which cannot simply be eliminated by material advancement. Many of these whites fear for their physical safety and for their continued existence as a distinct and separate ethnic group.

The notion of **white supremacy** and the "*culture of whiteness*" espoused by the rightwing, have served to entice other like-minded non-Afrikaans speaking whites into the movement. The rightwing has on several occasions expressed its willingness to compromise for the purpose of ensuring other white support and elements of Afrikaner Nationalism may have to sacrificed for this purpose. The issue of white survival has in a sense surpassed Afrikaner Nationalism in terms of importance.

The white rightwing, despite cleavages and differences in policy has similar economic ideals. Most rightwing parties favour some sort of dual-economy and are in favour of protection of minority (white) rights in the work-place. In this way they favour a type of "*apartheid capitalism*" with

welfare benefits for whites. A combination of capitalism and state socialism (not unlike national socialism) is favoured.

At a BBB meeting, Cape Town, 1988, Professor Schabert divulged his organizations beliefs about the causes of the current economic recession. His conclusions were not unlike those drawn by Hitler and the Nazi Party during the Second World War. Members of the audience voiced their opinions in this regard and the general sentiment was that,

"We must root out the Jewish controlled money capital and ensure that the white race group is able to enjoy the privileges it deserves. We cannot let the pro-black communists and the greedy Jewish capitalists control our economy; if they do only the white race will suffer. Our forefathers built this country and contributed to its civilization and if we are to prosper, we need to institute measures to ensure that this is done." (BBB speaker, Cape Town public meeting, 1988).

When a heckler from the audience questioned this apparent contradiction, the speaker and Schabert pointed out that unlike communism, their form of socialism, National Socialism did not foster the economic aspirations of all people, only those deserving and biologically superior. These measures were necessary to ensure that the *"superior races"* survive in the midst of chaos and a huge *"genetically irresponsible"* black population.

Rightwing groups are generally aggressively anti-communist and anyone who disagrees with them is branded a *"communist"*. Since they disapprove of any type of *"foreign meddling"* in the domestic policies of South Africa, foreign investment has to be *"monitored and carefully controlled"*. (Back to the Laager, 1991:41). Rightwingers in this country are very wary of the *"geld-mag"* or the international money powers who are the enemies of nationalism. In terms of black labour, some rightwingers favour a policy of *"guest-workers"*, similar to the situation with Turkish labour in Germany or the migrant labour system in this country before the repeal of the Pass Laws. Others argue that whites must be prepared to do their own work and claim that it is a

"lie that the South African economy is permanently dependent on non-white labour". (BBB publication, 1987/8).²

Most of the rightwing groups in this country support the idea of establishing a "*volkstaat*", even if they do not agree as to where the proposed homeland's boundaries should be drawn. (This will be discussed further on in this Chapter, where divisions within the movement are identified).

Many of the above mentioned factors shared by most of the rightwing groups have indirectly contributed to the strength of the movement as a whole. The rightwing has in this way grown because of the shared perceptions of its supporters to circumstances, both internal and external. Whether or not the rightwing movement is "*united*" in terms of principles and policy objectives is debatable. The white rightwing has made several attempts in recent years to co-ordinate efforts and programmes of action. Membership of the wide variety of rightwing organizations binds supporters together. In order to realize short-term goals, the rightwing may be able to reconcile ideological differences for political purposes. The extent of rightwing unity will be exposed once the TEC is instituted and the new government assumes power. Those who favour "*war*" as opposed to negotiation and reconciliation will be separated from those unwilling to engage in violent confrontation.

Afrikaner Nationalism, despite cleavages, did maintain a sufficient measure of unity at particular stages in history in order to realize particular goals. On a parliamentary level, rightwing parties, the CP and the HNP have not managed to forge such a unity. The AWB attempted to smooth out difference between these two parties, but to little avail. During the 1987 election, the AWB supported the CP, in a "*strategic move to promote [our] parties*". (Zille, 1987:60) This led Terre'

Blanche to conclude that, "*without our support, the CP would not have become the official opposition*". (ibid).

The CP is of the opinion that the ruling NP has no mandate to make decisions on behalf of the whites in this country. The CP regional organizer for the Northern Cape interviewed in December, 1990 claims;

"I would estimate that 70% of whites are anti-reform and anti-communism. The NP do not have a mandate and they only won because they were dishonest. The CP will be voted into power if an election was called today".

Despite exaggerated claims like the above, the rightwing was unable to secure little more than 30% of the total white vote during the 1992 election. The respondent may be correct in assuming that the majority of whites are anti-reform and anti-communism, but it does not follow that they will all necessarily vote for the rightwing parliamentary representatives. Rightwing activities, (outlined in Chapter Two), have generated negative publicity and their credibility has been questioned by many white South Africans, especially those who are yet undecided as who to vote for.

One of the main reasons why the rightwing support has increased in recent years is due to the nature of the environment in which it operates. It is an undisputed fact that whites living in the 1980/90's have much cause for fear and anxiety, since they are;

"materially poorer, less secure in their middle class homes and their manager's offices at work, rejected by the outside world and increasingly without a clear vision of their future". (Indicator SA, 1989:5).

In an environment characterized by unprecedented levels of unemployment, escalating crime and spiralling violence, it is not difficult to see why people are uneasy and feel threatened. Insecurities at work and in society at large; and a fear for the future, were expressed by all the respondents interviewed. White fear and anxiety have played an important part in securing support for the

rightwing. As these sentiments are exacerbated, this support can only be expected to increase, especially since parties situated to the left of the NP, (and to an extent, the NP itself), have failed to address white fears in any meaningful way. Despite reassurances by ANC President Nelson Mandela, very little has been done to contain white fears.

Political groups who feed off the fear of their constituencies can thus be expected to grow. A wide variety of political groups exist, each with their own agenda and favoured strategy. It is important to uncover some of the mechanisms employed and highlight the nature of the appeals made by groups situated on the far right of the political spectrum in order to determine to whom they are attempting to appeal and how successful they will be in this regard. Giliomee (1991:79) claims that the AWB has gained a strong foothold amongst conservative white constituencies by "*exploiting demonologies of race*" and has appealed to whites to "*think with their blood*". The idea of racial purity and the preservation of the white race and culture is intrinsic to rightwing ideology and is expressed by all groups located on this stage of the political divide. The AWB and the BBB have both expressed the view that whites would be "*committing suicide*" if they allowed racial mixing.

According to van Rooyen (1992:351), the most significant finding of research conducted, was that violence was the single most important issue that affected the policies of all political parties. The rightwing blamed reform for the violence and felt that more repression would alleviate the problem.

Throughout the by-elections and the general elections of the 1980\90's, the rightwing used the theme of growing black assertiveness, unrest, crime and violence to canvass white support. The fear of having their farms and properties seized is a real one, and is grounded in the recognition

that at some stage redistribution and possibly a nationalization of assets will take place. It follows that the costs of protecting lives and property has escalated dramatically.³

Whilst it cannot be denied that affluence has led to complacency on the part of the majority of white South Africans, as economic conditions deteriorate, rightwing protectionist policies may become extremely attractive to those most affected by the recession, working-class and unemployed whites. Whether or not whites are prepared to make economic sacrifices for the sake of preserving ethnic differences remains to be seen. Many whites identify reform as the cause of their deteriorating economic position. A railway worker claimed that;

"it was apartheid and separation that caused some of our problems, but integration will, in the long term, prove to be more expensive because of the destabilization and unrest that will follow. African history proves this point. We whites have already made economic sacrifices for the sake of integration, so of course we will make sacrifices for the sake of segregation." (Kimberley, December, 1990).

It thus appears that white perceptions are all important here; and if they believe that unrest which coincides with reform is a result of that reform then it follows that they will be anti this reform, which in the final instance is seen to mitigate against the realization of their interests. When apartheid was alive and well they benefited economically, now that its demise is imminent they are under threat - its not difficult to see why they favour the former policy over reform initiatives. Up until now they have had no reason to develop any kind of "*class consciousness*"; ideologies such as nationalism and notions of ethnicity have been more powerful and as conditions worsen will provide far more security (economic and psychological) for this sector of the white electorate. This is in line with global developments; as economic conditions deteriorate and social institutions breakdown, many people react by joining fundamentalist and extreme reactionary movements to articulate their fears and anxieties. This view is supported by arguments and evidence supplied by

several analysts, including Pierre Hugo (1991), van Rooyen (1992), and is reinforced by the findings of numerous research surveys conducted.

The maintenance of extra-parliamentary links and networks established by the CP will influence the outcome of the 1994 election and also the role played by the rightwing in a future South Africa. The potential effects of these extra-parliamentary strategies have become increasingly apparent. Rightwing activity during the past few years have ushered in a new dimension to political activity, and the full effects thereof will only be realized when white power is finally challenged and undermined.

External factors, like the independence of neighbouring Namibia, has influenced white perceptions. The rightwing assumed that a similar model would be used for South Africa. Other external factors include the continued "*interference*" on the part of the international community and the growth of rightwing movements world-wide, which serves to inspire local rightwingers. The rightwing, like the NP before it has on several occasions used the strategy of referring to "*foreign meddling*" to win support. van Rooyen (1992:364) claims;

"that the philosophy behind this strategy is the laager, a term which denotes a small, but cohesive group of whites with a just cause, facing a hostile and unsympathetic world".⁴

Clearly it is difficult to establish exactly how strong the rightwing is. The proliferation of rightwing organizations makes it problematic to gauge exactly how much support the white right enjoys. Previous election results, opinion polls and expert opinions seem to indicate that a significant percentage of white opinion falls within this category. In other words a significant number of whites favour the re-implementation of apartheid. Whether their motivation is economical, political, ideological or psychological is irrelevant at this stage. What is important, is

that many whites still refuse to accept the inevitability of a non-racial society. The rightwing has made concerted efforts to gain a foothold in these white communities, and a wide variety of strategies have been employed for this purpose. (See Chapter Two). The concentration of military power in white hands and the ready availability of weapons to whites, makes the movement a formidable force to be reckoned with. Clandestine activities embarked on by the rightwing indicate that the white ultra right may be a lot bigger than is commonly realized. The pervasiveness of organizations attempting to protect white privileges in this country is indicative of rightwing strength within certain regions.

In certain geographical regions, the rightwing has made significant inroads and has managed to infiltrate regional councils, agricultural co-operatives and school committees. The strength of movement thus needs to be assessed in light of CP links with grass-roots organizations. Links and networks outside of parliament, extend into broader civil society and increase the potential support base of the CP in particular and the rightwing as a whole.

3.1.2. The necessity and ability of the rightwing to secure alliances:

The rightwing's potential for securing **alliances** is integral to the strength of the movement. The rightwing has reconized that, due to the increasingly precarious position of the social groups it represents, it has to forge alliances and collaborate with groups other than white Afrikaners, if it is to realise its political aspirations. This new trend in rightwing policy needs to be investigated, in the light of the increased threat combined forces pose to the overall stability of the country. Even if one accepts the assumption that on its own, the rightwing poses no major threat to democracy in South Africa, it is crucial to reassess the implications of the rightwing forging alliances with other political groups and players. In conjunction with other reactionary groups, the rightwing represents a potentially dangerous and destabilizing force. Elements within the rightwing have expressed a

willingness to collaborate with conservative whites who are not "*Afrikaners*" and also with conservative blacks.

(a) Alliances with conservative non-Afrikaans speaking whites:

The CP has constantly expressed its eagerness to secure English support. van Rooyen (1992:136) argues that even the English-speakers within rightwing groups agree to the primacy of Afrikaner culture and ideals in their struggle. This is supported by Bekker et al (1989) who believe that English speakers will accept Afrikaner dominance as long as they are rewarded with white prosperity and security. Prominent English member of the CP, Clive Derby-Lewis claims that patriotism should be the main concern, as opposed to a specifically Afrikaner Nationalism. White survival is crucial to both groups and an alliance can be formed on the basis of fostering these common interests. A CP regional organiser interviewed, claimed that;

"the Umlazi by-election was important because it indicates a sway in the attitudes of English voters and the rest of white South Africa for that matter, it is their change in voting pattern that ensured this outcome at the polls." (Kimberley, December 1990)

English support for the rightwing in general has increased in recent years. (Market and Opinion Surveys, 1991). This implies an overall hardening of attitudes and increased conservatism and reluctance to change on the part of white South Africans. Not all rightwing Afrikaners are in favour of incorporating English and other language groups into their organizations. Within the AWB for instance there is disagreement over this issue. Terre' Blanche welcomes English support, whilst Alkmaar Swart (Chairman of the Grootraad) objects to it. He claims that it creates an opportunity for elements "*foreign to our people*" to penetrate the AWB. (SA Freedom Review Vol 2 (1) 1988) Carel Boshoff, believes that "*it is possible to assimilate up to 5% of foreign blood without affecting a nations identity.*" Groups like the BBB, who do not have a specifically pro-

Afrikaner focus, obviously encourage English membership. Professor Scabort talks of racial superiority more than Afrikaner domination. He states,

"We believe in the genetic superiority of the white race and we believe it is the duty of the white race to stop the natural increase and the decadence of the black races from destroying this planet." (In Zille, 1987:61)

The BBB boasts about the fact that it has international links and support and that many of its main financial contributors are not Afrikaners. (meeting, Cape Town, 1988) Whilst several rightwing groups are willing to forge alliances with like-minded whites, not all are as keen to negotiate with conservative blacks. CP organiser interviewed claimed that;

"the English can be politically accommodated. They came from a similar political culture to the Afrikaner, Western Europe civilization. There are thus cultural similarities. It is not a big problem to include the English because unlike the blacks there is no statutory granted English land as opposed to Afrikaner land."

(Kimberley, December 1990)

An alliance of conservative whites is not without complications, but the majority of rightwing parties have recognised the importance of attracting broader white support for their policies. Alliances with English and other non-Afrikaans speaking white conservatives have been actively sought by several rightwing groups in recent years.

As members of the white race, they all share similar fears and dilemmas, (relating to their minority status), and a united effort aimed at maintaining collective white privileges seems probable.

(b) Alliances with Conservative blacks:

Despite the racially exclusive overtone of rightwing political agendas, individuals within the movement have expressed a willingness to collaborate with conservative black organizations, like **Inkatha**. Forging an alliance with conservative blacks, presents another strategy aimed at the goal

of self-determination. At this stage it appears that only a small number of pragmatists within the CP and "*rightwing think-tanks*" favour this approach. (van Rooyen, 1992:501)

The **Afrikaner Volksunie (AVU)** is painfully aware of the fact that it needs the support of other parties at the negotiating table if the goal of self-determination is to be reached. Their chief negotiator Chris de Jager claims that discussions are already underway "*in the Natal area*" and include Buthelezi. (Weekly Mail, February, 1993) **Blanke Veiligheid (BV)** leader in Welkom, Hennie Muller openly admitted to being an Inkatha member. He has on numerous occasions proposed an alliance of conservative black and white South Africans to counteract the communist onslaught. (Back to the Laager, 1991) The way in which racist ideas are to be reconciled with such actions remains to be seen. At this stage, it seems as if elements within the rightwing movement are willing to temporarily shelve racist ideas for the sake of forging political alliances which could prove useful in terms of posing a threat to the state. An alliance of conservative ethnic nationalists, including the white rightwing, Inkatha, homeland leaders and other blacks opposed to the ANC would constitute a formidable force to be reckoned with by the new government.

This sentiment has been echoed by the CP which has campaigned for forging alliances with blacks opposed to the ANC.

It was reported in the Weekly Mail (1990) that both the PAC and the CP have made continuous efforts to "*court Inkatha*." It thus appears that in the long term, the interests of conservative groupings overlap more than they diverge. It is not a far off possibility that conservative whites would, despite racist attitudes, enter alliances with conservative black groups if they felt this would further their aims. (Back to the Laager, 1991:138) As Robert van Tonder, leader of the Boerestaats Party (BSP) put it, "*politics makes strange bed-fellows. For this [boerestaat] aim, we would co-operate with the devil.*" (Indicator, 1989)

Apart from alliances with organizations like Inkatha, other black individuals or groupings could be persuaded to rally behind the conservative banner. Blacks who stand to lose their power bases such as homeland leaders, councillors and vigilantes could be lured into the conservative fold. The formation of **Cosag** should be seen in the light of this. Black homeland leaders have entered into this alliance with elements of the white rightwing in order to protect their interests and maintain the privileges accorded to them during the apartheid era. Homeland and other local armies could be utilised to gain control of specific regions or to create terror and division within designated areas in the advent of a transition to a non-racial society taking place. Networks of this nature will prove crucial to the success of the rightwing over the next few years. In the same vein, the establishment of grass-roots structures will play a key role in defining the rightwing's programme of action in the near future.

Securocrats within the existing state formation could be co-opted and this would further strengthen the position of the rightwing. Militant rightwingers (including those stationed within the armed forces) have the means at their disposal to sabotage key installations and possibly the negotiation process as a whole. (Back to the Laager, 1991) Elements of the rightwing movement have made continuous efforts to secure links with international groups. Van Tonder speaks of a "*contact list*" of overseas people and organizations from whom volkstaat groups will be able to obtain support in the advent of an armed struggle and/or insurrection. A measure of both financial and moral support from rightwing groups globally greatly assist rightwing campaigns. Support from Namibia, South America, Europe, Australia and the USA is forthcoming. Of these groups and organizations supporting the ultra right in SA, a significant sector consists of church and religious movements. (Crisis News, November 1988) (The upsurge in rightwing religious organizations has been discussed in Chapter One.)

The whole world seems to be experiencing a revival of rightwing and fundamentalist ideas, and many of the events currently taking place in this country have been witnessed elsewhere in countries like Algeria and Mozambique. Swilling observes that prior to independence, groups of rightwing militants emerged, consisting of people who felt they were entitled to use violence to maintain the status quo. They had often been "*brutalized by the experience of violence in fighting insurgents*" (Sunday Star 20/11/88)

The strength of the rightwing should not be assessed in terms of numbers or in terms of its ability to win elections. Although the CP didn't fare as well as expected in the previous election, the role it plays in dictating the nature and pace of reform in contemporary South African society cannot be ignored. Analysts like Swilling and Schlemmer refute these assumptions and Schlemmer claims that "*....a dramatic resurgence of extreme rightwing activity is not likely and/or possible at this stage, they are weaker than the media claims.*" (Indicator SA vol 2, July 1984). He goes on to say that organizationally the rightwing is extremely divided and we thus cannot expect an effective conservative influence on our society. Schlemmer's observations are not entirely correct and he has underestimated the potential strengths of the rightwing since he has chosen to ignore the movements potential to secure alliances and engage in de-stabilizing activities.

Professor Janis Grobbelaar of UNISA (1992) states that;

"it is foolish to suggest that the referendum result has shown for once and for all that the ultra rightwing is a negligible force in South African politics",

to do so,

" would be to discount the impressive track record, historical role and resilience of Afrikaner nationalism in South Africa." (Indicator SA vol 9 (3), 1992:17)

Her views are supported by Phillip Frankel who states that

"...observers of the right are not supposed to concentrate on the movements ability to win parliamentary elections, but rather to focus on its deep and intangible successes in penetrating the psychology, symbols and systems of meaning which make up the ethnic ingredient of Afrikanerdom." (SA Freedom Review, Vol 2(1), 1988:42).

Since the 1989 election, tensions within the CP have worsened and division into a "volkstater" and a "restander" camp are visible. In Grobbelaar's opinion, the former rebel camp will split from the core if unable to take control or make headway to realise its goals. If that happens, the party will be damaged and may even "fade away" or decline in importance. Those individuals within the rightwing who are already alienated will be further alienated and those on the fringes would be freed. (ibid) She believes that an increase in militancy and politically destabilising action on the part of the rightwing can be expected. An upsurge in militancy and instability is a direct consequence of the above scenario. Her predictions are echoed by a range of analysts including Giliomee (1991), Booyse (1992), van Rooyen (1991) and Welsh (1988). In the wake of Treurnicht's death, individuals within the rightwing movement have attempted to forge alliances and prevent divisions from tearing the movement apart.

The rightwing has made numerous attempts at establishing a measure of unity in the past few months. Events on the political front like the mass gathering of farmers in Potchefstroom on the 5 May 1993 are indicative of the movements determination to develop and unite. Historically the farming community has supported the NP, which was the torch-bearer of Afrikaner Nationalism. Now that the NP has changed its course of action and the CP has taken over this role, farmer support of the NP has dwindled. Crop failures due to drought and the reduction in state subsidies for farmers have left many disgruntled and they have turned elsewhere for political support. The role played by the white farming community in South African politics was crucial in ensuring the

electoral triumph by the National Party in 1948. Farmers continue to play a significant part in white politics and it appears that a close correlation exists between support for the CP and areas of the worst agrarian disaster. Declining economic conditions thus contribute to support for the rightwing in this instance. (Welsh, 1988). Welsh observes how the rightwing has exploited socio-economic grievances of this nature for political ends.

In addition to this, many farmers are dissatisfied with the failure on the part of the present government to protect them against attacks from Apla and other insurgents. The role to be played by farmers in the near future is crucial, especially in the light of certain inflammatory statements made by both Winnie Mandela and ANC Youth leader Peter Mokaba. The chant "*kill the boer, kill the farmer*" is highly controversial and has along with the recent spate of attacks on farmers played a role in mobilizing this sector of the white population. Farmers have always opted for political groups and opinions that emphasize security, due to their perceived vulnerability to insurgents. The AWB has taken it upon itself to set up "*border patrols*" in regions prone to attack by Apla and other political groups. (SABC news 30/09/1992) Apla attacks motivated many farmers to join self-defence units and the AWB set up a **Reprisal Unit (RU)** after the attacks. The **Israelite Liberation Army (ILA)** was also formed to further this purpose. (Weekly Mail April, 1993)

This historic meeting of the farmers which aimed at mobilizing the rightwing, was preceded by the formation of a "**Committee of Generals**". General Constand Viljoen, a former SADF chief and now a key member of the recently formed "**Committee of Generals**" was the hero of the day at the farmers' meeting. (Sunday Times 9/5/93). The meeting of this committee took place in a building belonging to the **Transvaal Agricultural Union (TAU)**. The outcome and implications of this meeting warrant further discussion. It was inspired by the belief that in times of crisis, Afrikaners have traditionally been led by generals. (Weekly Mail, April, 1993) Their ultimate aim

is to establish a Afrikaner volkstaat. They encourage the rightwing to shift away from parliamentary politics to acts of defiance ranging from passive resistance to armed struggle. These ex-generals head a group known as the **Afrikaner Volksfront (AVF)** which was launched to clinch unity for the rightwing movement as a whole. The AVF is determined to advance toward the goal of Afrikaner self-determination. Differences of opinion as to where the boundaries of the "volkstaat" should be drawn and also as to the role to be played by the ex-generals have yet to be ironed out.³¹ Despite these disagreements, the AVF could still consolidate itself in the near future as a major power bloc situated to the right of the present NP government.

It thus appears that, apart from the obvious destabilization that would occur in the wake of increased levels of violence, extra-parliamentary activity on the part of the rightwing could have far reaching effects. Rightwing activity could affect the outcome of the election as well as the role played by the white ultra right in a future South Africa. The maintenance of extra-parliamentary links and networks established by parliamentary parties like the CP needs to be understood in terms of this. In a sense it is links and operations like these that have allowed the rightwing to partake in illegal activities without too much interference by the state. The proliferation of rightwing activity in recent years has aided their infiltration of the state.

3.1.3. Rightwing infiltration of the state:

The role played by the state in failing to curb rightwing activities has indirectly strengthened the movement. The white rightwing derives much of its ideological in-put from the same source as the NP, and sympathy for the former exists within the present state and its agencies. Splits that have occurred between the rightwing and the ruling National Party, should be viewed in the context of "broedertwis".

At this stage it is necessary to investigate the role played by the South African state in fostering and failing to curb rightwing activities (which do not always fall within the ambit of the law). Anti-apartheid organizations, allied to the ANC, international pressure and heightened militancy on the part of the rightwing have done little to persuade the government to effectively probe rightwing operations. Up until now, no rightwinger has ever been charged with treason, even when publically declaring the intention to launch an insurrection.

Prior to Chris Hani's assassination in April 1993, the government had done little, despite token gestures like banning the BBB after the Strydom Square massacre, to control the rightwing. Hani's murderer and other prominent rightwingers were arrested and have recently been convicted of this crime. Gaye Derby-Lewis was acquitted on all charges. One of the reasons why the state has been reluctant to react could be related to a recognition that the rightwing could provide a potential support base in an election, or that sectors of the white electorate not yet allied to the rightwing may come to support them in the advent of the state clamping down on their operations. Alternatively the state may be reluctant to curb rightwing activities because of the NP's historical determination to prevent further "*broedertwis*". The formation of the CP and the HNP was rather traumatic for Afrikanerdom and exemplified a new phase in "*broedertwis*". The rightwing is like a "*prodigal son*" to the NP and this partly explains why the NP is so affected by the challenge posed by the rightwing, even though the left constitutes a far greater threat to its rule. Adam and Giliomee (1979:70), argue along similar lines, and in their opinion, it is

"the intraethnic structural constraints, more than intellectual rigidity, [that] explain why the National Party leadership is so hypnotized by its rightwing challenge, while it ignores its far stronger liberal opposition."

Conformity pressure is rather intense amongst the Afrikaner group, and dissidents like the ultra right contest the very foundations of the ethnic group. The state's reluctance to take action against

the ultra right should be seen in the light of this. Then there is the more pressing problem of using white armed forces to quell white resistance. Rightwing sympathisers exist within the armed forces and this could prove to be problematic in the advent of white insurrection. Division within the armed forces is the last thing any state wants to contend with and South Africa is no exception.

As mentioned, the *verligte/verkrampte* ideological divisions within the ruling NP have existed from the outset. Certain of these *verkrampte* elements have broken away to form vital political groups like the HNP and the CP, but some have remained within the NP. The assumption that conservative elements exist within the ruling National Party is shared by various analysts (Lipton, 1986); (Giliomee, 1989); (de Klerk, 1989), and (van Rooyen, 1992). It is virtually impossible to assess the scope and extent of these *verkrampte* elements within the NP, although elements within the civil service have been shown to display their conservative leanings. Adam and Moodley (1986) and Lipton (1986) provide evidence for their claim that the civil service and the predominantly white state bureaucracy can indeed play a significant role in obstructing reforms. Civil servants in this country have historically benefited from the apartheid system and the dismantling thereof could jeopardize their once sheltered positions. Civil servants' loyalty to the NP is questionable and Bekker and Grobbelaar (1987) claim that sectors of the civil service support the rightwing. It is difficult to ascertain the extent to which bureaucrats have interfered with reform initiatives, but they are clearly in a position to slow down the process should they so desire.

Apart from rightwing support within the state bureaucracy, the armed forces have also been infiltrated by rightwing sympathizers. Several former and present members of the SAP and SADF are members of rightwing organizations. The government has repeatedly been embarrassed by allegations in the media that senior officers within the armed forces have been involved in

clandestine operations. Former SAP Commissioner General Johan Coetzee was apparently involved in “*death-squad*” activities, most of which were condoned by his colleagues. Only after considerable pressure did President de Klerk appoint Judge Harms to head an independent commission of inquiry to investigate such allegations. The Harms Commission report proved the existence of approximately 140 CCB members who were involved in at least 200 operations against government opponents. The disbanding of the CCB in June 1990 didn’t lead to the end of its activities. (Vrye Weekblad, 17/11/89) This is not to say that the CCB was essentially a rightwing organization, but that the nature of its operations implied that members held sentiments and views of this nature.

The CP has often claimed that the police are one with them and allude to the higher level of support they enjoy within the armed forces. (Zille, 1988) The Guardian newspaper (19/9/89) summed it up, “*Ill disciplined, badly paid and recruited from the lower levels of white society, the police are considerably to the right of the government which is meant to control them.*” Vvan Rooyen (1992:133) claims that:

“...the CP enjoys the support of approximately one third of the Defence Force, a large percentage of the semi-government sector and possibly, by implication, more than half the [white] police force.”

The government itself has expressed concern about members of the armed forces supporting the rightwing. Minister Vlok specifically stipulated that members of the police are not allowed to join political parties. During my research, a policeman interviewed claimed,

“It’s hard to say who the guys support, but many admire the AWB. The AWB protect life and property. In the next election I’ll definitely consider voting CP and so will many others in the force.”

He went on to say,

"Some of the guys still have faith in the NP, but most are unhappy, especially when our lives are endangered every day and we're not allowed to defend ourselves properly."(interview, November 1990)

Another policeman interviewed refused outright to answer any questions relating to his political affiliations. He stated that as a policeman he was not allowed to divulge such information. (ibid)

The issue of rightwing infiltration in the armed forces is undoubtedly a sensitive matter and there is little available information relating to this concern. Whilst analysts agree that rightwing parties and groups do indeed enjoy support they doubt whether a coup d'état is possible. This view is echoed by General Bob Rogers a former Air-Force Chief who acknowledges support for the CP, but doubts whether a coup could be considered. In his opinion support is too scattered and in the advent of such action, only a few officers would participate. (van Rooyen, 1992:497) Clearly the rightwing must wield some influence within the armed forces, since it was these "contacts" that enabled the notorious Piet "Skiet" Rudolph to steal a vast assortment of weapons from a Pretoria air-force base over the Easter weekend in 1990. Respondents interviewed admitted (although they may have been "boasting") to stealing explosives, tear-gas and weapons from their work-place, the armed forces or the mines. One miner claimed,

"Every day I remove a little bit of this and a little bit of that, and at the end of the month, I have quite a lot of stuff". (interview, November 1990)

It must also be borne in mind that especially in small towns and rural areas, the criminal justice system, the police, the courts and civil defence structures work closely together. It is not unlikely that elements from each may socialize together and thus be reluctant to act against one another. When conducting research in small towns, this issue came to the fore. Several respondents made reference to the fact that they knew policemen and people in legal office. Most seemed certain that

local police would not take action against them in the advent of protest action on their part. A miner claimed that *"they (the police) are one of us. We are the white race group and stick together in times of trouble."* (Welkom, November, 1990) This optimism is shared by many rightwingers who believe that the security forces would stand by them in times of need. They feel certain that the police will not shoot them. The Battle of Ventersdorp in August 1991 shattered some of these illusions as the police reacted against rightwing demonstrators. The rightwing do enjoy a measure of support from the armed forces, but do tend to exaggerate the extent of it. (van Rooyen, 1992:498)

The ANC has repeatedly expressed its concern about the *"broadening network of rightwing involvement."* (Argus 24/04/93). ANC spokesman Carl Niehaus stated that the arrest of Januz Walus,

"has serious implications, since it cannot any longer be said that only a fringe element of the rightwing is involved. It is clearly a central part of the rightwing establishment."

He added that the government must take some responsibility since they created a climate in which the rightwing felt it could act with impunity. (ibid) The total lack of police reaction when rightwingers burst into the World Trade Centre on 25 June, 1993 in a deliberate attempt to disrupt talks underway further illustrated the State's reluctance to control rightwing activities. The State justified the lack of police action, by saying that they *"were trying to avert a bloodbath."* Mandela threatened that if de Klerk did not react against the rightwing he would be forced to send armed members of Umkhonto we Sizwe to the World Trade Centre. (Argus 25/6/93)

Another issue which may blur the distinctions between friend and foe is due to the fact that many whites who were once firmly ensconced within the State, now operate outside of it, though they

may still wield some power within the state. These include ex-servicemen, ex-policemen and retired government personnel. The recently formed **Committee of Generals** set up under the auspices of former SADF chief General Constant Viljoen exemplifies this. Rightwing sources have boasted that up to 12 senior policemen (high ranking and strategically placed) identify with their struggle and will in the near future declare their allegiance to Viljoen's **Afrikaner Volksfront (AVF)**. This public announcement has been delayed for "*strategic reasons*". (Weekly Mail, October, 1993). These high-ranking supporters have either retired recently or will be doing so in the near future. They will pass on inside information to the rightwing intelligence networks and will, in so doing, aid the rightwing struggle.

Apart from the support enjoyed from the armed forces, certain key individuals in strategic positions of power strengthen the rightwing's position. Over the years, numerous conservative magistrates, judges, civil servants and the like have been promoted into powerful positions due to Broederbond tactics. Securocrats within the existing state formation, have the necessary skills, resources and access to intelligence to help co-ordinate a potential programme of de-stabilization. It is no longer far fetched to talk of a carefully planned and orchestrated programme of de-stabilization that would ultimately not only serve rightwing interests, but those of the state as well. It is in this context that the spate of so-called "*black on black*" violence should be seen and the "*Third Force*" activities should be contextualised. (See Chapter Two). The state thus has a poor record of acting against rightwing violence and in a sense this type of violence follows in the tradition of apartheid policy and previous state action. It is in accordance with the policy of "*divide and rule*". Ultimately black and white reactionary violence strengthens the hand of the government which appears rational and moderate in comparison.

Rightwing influence within existing state structures are a source of strength for the movement. As discussed, there are other factors bolstering the movement. At this stage it is necessary to turn to those factors which serve to weaken the impact of the righting movement.

3.2 DISAGREEMENT, DIVISIONS AND WEAKNESSES \ FACTORS INHIBITING THE GROWTH OF THE RIGHTWING:

Despite the fact that rightwing support has increased in recent years, certain factors mitigate against such support. These include the lack of consensus on key issues and general **ideological differences**, the **economic risk** associated with implementing policy proposals, the **lack of funds** for campaigns and finally the **unworkability** of certain policies. The impracticality of realizing policy aims, such as the establishment of a **volkstaat** in particular could severely debilitate the rightwing cause. Another divisive factor is related to **leadership** struggles and conflicts. The contemporary rightwing movement remains divided on contentious issues relating to strategy; whether to employ partition or secession, violence or non-violence. Other considerations relate to the question of whether to include non-Afrikaner whites into their struggle.

In terms of **ideological differences**, it appears that the cultural and intellectual components of the movement have become inclined to question the morality of apartheid. This contradicts previous dominant ideological assumptions that apartheid was in fact God-given and thus condoned by the ultimate moral authority, the Christian church. Disagreement as to whether to negotiate continue to exist, with elements of the rightwing refusing to be pragmatic and reconsider their position. The activities of the recently formed Freedom Alliance are crucial here. This alliance of conservatives has reiterated its position and continues to refuse to negotiate the future of this country, despite attempts on the part of all other political groups to include them.

The overall costs of maintaining the apartheid system has in a sense weakened the rightwing cause; since pragmatists have counted the costs and on the basis of these calculations recognized the unfeasibility of retaining a system of separate development. Domestic reactions to segregation policies in the form of organized consumer boycotts as well as other aspects of "*mass action*" have taken their toll on the financial coffers of both the state and industry.

By 1988 black consumers represented half the country's buying power. (Newsweek 12/12/88) This meant that the interests of this huge sector of the market had to be accommodated. In towns where CP controlled city councils attempted to reintroduce petty apartheid measures, consumer boycotts cut into profit margins. For instance, in Boksburg, retail food-chain, Checkers reported a 50% reduction in business during the boycott. (Sunday Tribune 7/5/89).

Van Rooyen (1992) conducted a case study to illustrate the effect such boycotts had on businesses: his study indicated that consumer boycotts of this nature had dire consequences which had a potentially devastating effect on targeted businesses. He quotes Boksburg businessmen, who claim that they are willing to make sacrifices of an economic nature in order to ensure the survival of the white community. Subsequent surveys conducted in Boksburg reflected a shift away from the CP after the effects of the consumer boycott were fully realized by the white residents in the town. It appeared that racial segregation was an unaffordable expense. The lesson of Boksburg was not learned by white inhabitants of towns like Nigel; Mossel Bay; Warrenton; Bloemhof and Villiers. (van Rooyen, 1991:377).

A white businessman interviewed in Kimberley (December, 1990), who also owned a business in Warrenton, initially expressed a willingness to suffer economic losses for the purpose of white survival, but when interviewed at a later stage he seemed unsure of his previous conviction. He

claimed that he was unsure of what to do, since his livelihood depended on the small store he operated and doubted whether political organizations would be able to assist him in the advent of bankruptcy. He stated that;

"they [the CP] cannot take responsibility for everyone whose business fails because of the blacks...they're a political party, not an economic support group."
(Kimberley, December, 1990)

The issue of **funding** is crucial, since an inability to secure financial support for its policies could hamper the progress of the rightwing in realizing its policy aims. Attempts have been made to obtain financial support from overseas, but little is known about the success of these fund-raising missions. Terre' Blanche recently went on a fund-raising trip to Britain and Belgium. He was not entirely successful and the National Front (England) suggested that the AWB take a course in public relations. (Weekly Mail, February 1993). The visit formed part of a campaign to solicit funds from rightwing organizations in Europe. Since last year the AWB has corresponded with more than 200 overseas bodies in an attempt to obtain funding, with seemingly little success. However on the local scene AWB coffers seem to be filling up, since the organization has grown at a rate faster than ever since 1988. (ibid) Recent action by farmers and their increased organization may aid this process, as farmers decide to contribute financially in order to promote security. (SABC News, 5/5/93) The recently launched rightwing radio station, Radio Pretoria may accrue advertising money, which may revive ailing rightwing financial coffers.

Another factor mitigating against the growth of the rightwing as a social movement, is the **unworkability** and impracticality of many of their proposed policies and programmes of action. Some of the policies aimed at structuring the volkstaat are virtually impossible to implement. Proposals range from offering financial incentives to "volksvreemdes" (aliens\blacks), to their forced removal and repatriation to designated homelands. Separate Development has historically

proved unfeasible to implement and maintain, and any attempt to re-institute it in the future is doomed to failure. Even if rightwingers are able to recognize the inherent weaknesses in the system, they will become increasingly apparent in the future.

Whilst the rightwing as a whole is broadly committed to the creation of a *volkstaat*, there is little agreement to the proposed boundaries, geographical location and constitutional policy for this white homeland.⁵ Another issue is whether the *volkstaat* should be obtained via peaceful means or not. Boshoff favours the peaceful option, whilst the AWB and others see violence as inevitable. The CP's "*hardliners*" under the leadership of Ferdi Hartzenberg are determined to ensure that the size of this proposed white homeland be in accordance with Verwoerd's grand plan. (van Rooyen, 1992:437). (see Figure 1) It seems that negotiating for a much reduced *volkstaat* has acquired increased support within the CP. (Weekly Mail, July/August, 1992). It appears that the rightwing's territorial demands have had to be reduced and made more realistic, since the government and other significant parties involved in negotiations have failed to take them seriously. So, although there is much dispute as to where this fatherland should be situated and who will be allowed residence, most rightwing groups share this common objective. The demand for such a homeland or *volkstaat* must be placed on the agenda of the negotiation process, since failure to do so could have far-reaching potentially destabilizing implications for a future South Africa. The *volkstaat* component of the white right need not constitute a serious threat to stability, as long as compromise can be reached and their demands can be met. This view is supported by analysts Wim Booyse (1992) and BM du Toit (1991), Grobbelaar (1992), van Rooyen (1992).

The most significant factor inhibiting the growth and apparent strength of the righting movement is related to the lack of unity and also leadership divisions in the movement. Factionalism, cleavages and a lack of leadership in the wake of ex-CP leader Andries Treurnicht's death

indicates the extent of the lack of unity. A crisis in leadership in the AWB was also experienced and Terre' Blanche's reputation was somewhat tarnished after the Jani Allen affair. Terre' Blanche was not a key player in the formation of the Committee of Generals or the recently formed, but highly significant Freedom Alliance. The AWB realises that despite these setbacks, the organization still needs Terre'Blanche as a drawcard. (Weekly Mail, February 1993). Cultural and political leaders have both claimed the right to lead the Afrikaner Nationalist cause. Grobbelaar (1992:110) states that,

"traditionally, Afrikaner Nationalism has been characterized by extreme tensions between culture and politics...these historical tensions are perhaps best reflected in the growing strain between Treurnicht and Boshoff."

Disunity among rightwing organizations has occurred mainly at electoral level between the CP and the HNP, and this rivalry has cost the rightwing as a whole, a number of seats.

This Chapter has shown that, despite divisions within the rightwing movement, certain common themes can be traced. Rightwing groups in some way or another espouse and promote a "culture of whiteness" and are overly concerned about "white survival" in a future non-racial society. The rightwing has become far less passive and there has been a proliferation of rightwing organizations. Common perceptions about the innocuous nature of rightwing groups need to be reassessed in the light of these developments. This Chapter attempted to outline both the strengths and weaknesses of the movement in contemporary South Africa. The next Chapter sets out to discuss the historical and ideological roots of the present rightwing movement.

ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER THREE

- 1 Increasing numbers of whites, specifically though not exclusively the working-class are feeling threatened by black economic advancement. Even white university graduates are finding themselves in adverse economic circumstances and are bearing the brunt of affirmative action policies. (Weekly Mail, September, 1993).
- 2 Volkstaat pioneers in both Orania and Morgenzon have tried to reduce their dependency on black labour with differing measures of success.
- 3 The rapid increase in gun sales and the growth of the security industry in general illustrates this.
- 4 *The symbolic significance of the laager, which is evoked in times of uncertainty and crisis is discussed in Chapter Five of this thesis.*
- 5 The volkstaat issue remains unresolved. Despite consensus that the volk needs its own place in the sun if it is to survive, dispute rages as to which land is to be the destined homeland. The Afrikaner Volkswag, the Blanke Bevrydigingsbeweging and the Vereniging van Oranjewerkers want to inconvenience as few people as possible, and opt for desolate parts of the country, like Orania in the Northern Cape to establish this proposed homeland.

CHAPTER FOUR

4.1 HISTORICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE CONTEMPORARY RIGHTWING MOVEMENT:

The previous Chapter exposed the potential strengths and the inherent weaknesses of the rightwing movement in contemporary South Africa. A profile of the rightwing has been provided, and the extent of their support and the changing nature of groups and strategies in the present context identified. In order to understand the why the rightwing has taken on new forms of struggle and has undergone shifts in ideology, a historical analysis is needed. The existence of the rightwing movement in modern South African society can be traced to two sources; **Afrikaner Nationalism** and **European fascism**. Rightwing discourse in contemporary South Africa comprises a fusion of these two ideological forms, Afrikaner Nationalism which emphasizes ethnicity and group solidarity and fascist discourse which broadens linguistic boundaries so as to include all whites. Comparative insights can be gained by using the fascist analogy and this will extend the theoretical understanding of contemporary South African society as a whole and the contemporary rightwing movement in particular.

During the post 1934 period, the Afrikaner Broederbond played an important role in mobilizing the volk and ultimately ensuring the electoral victory of 1948. The ideological orientation, class basis and organizational structure of the Afrikaner Nationalist doctrine after 1934 differed slightly from its predecessor. The NP split into "*smelters*" and "*gesuiwerdes*" and it was during this post 1934 period, that Afrikaner identity was actively defined and sought. The foundations for these

sentiments, were built in the years following colonization and the attitudes of both Africans and the English served to reinforce exclusivist Nationalist ideas.

4.1.1. The development and appeal of Afrikaner Nationalism during the Apartheid period:

The first Purified and then Reunited National Party won the general election of 1948 with a small majority. Mediation by the Bond produced a shaky "*hereniging*" of the followers of Hertzog and Malan into the **Herenigde Nasionale Party (HNP)**. (O'Meara, 1983:122). This unexpected triumph at the polls has been hailed as a number of things: Moodie (1975) viewed it as a "*triumph for volkseenheid and the civil religion of Afrikanerdom*," for O'Meara (1983) "*it represented the victory of a class alliance organized for the purposes of securing electoral victory*". Malan, the newly elected Prime Minister saw this as "*evident proof of God's role as the independent variable in South African history and the protector of the chosen volk*." (Rand Daily Mail, 2/6/48).

The most widely held viewpoint at the time was one that claimed that the political slogan of Apartheid ensured the Nationalist victory. In a sense all these sentiments and observations were correct, although none of the factors mentioned are mutually exclusive. It was a culmination of political, historical, economic, cultural, ideological and psychological determinants which made the 1948 electoral victory possible. The power of the civil religion promoted by the Nationalist ideology and the direct practical intervention of the Bond played a major role in ensuring victory at the polls.

"The roots of the NP victory thus extended back into the final years of the war, when the Broederbonders in the party, in churches, in cultural organizations, began to heal the disastrous schism of 1941 by lending their energies to common goals."
(Moodie, 1975:256)

Afrikaner Nationalism was successful in its overtures, because, like other nationalisms, it met the psychological needs of its target audience. The need to escape the total isolation and aloneness that

characterizes the modern social system is addressed by nationalism in its various guises. Afrikaner Nationalism effectively dealt with the psychological needs of the Afrikaner people during a particular period in history, when their position was threatened and when they were feeling alien in their own country. All nationalisms purport to unite people on the basis of culture, shared history and language, and in so doing inject meaning into the lives of adherents. Afrikaner Nationalism represents an attempt, not only to achieve material rewards for the volk [although these were advanced], but to meet their psychological and existential needs as well. The development of ethnic consciousness depended on "*favourable*" social conditions in which people could be persuaded to shelve individual or class differences for the sake of group mobilizations.

Afrikaner Nationalism grew out of the dissatisfaction of the Afrikaner people brought about by British colonialism. The Afrikaners were discriminated against and they evolved an appropriate response to their position, that of national self-awareness. A belief in their divinely ordained specific purpose provided the rationalization for perceived "*suffering*". In an environment characterized by uncertainty, the nationalist myth makers were able to obtain support for their cause. They drew on several ideological sources to formulate the doctrine of Afrikaner Nationalism. (One of these is fascism, which is discussed in this Chapter). Civil religion provided the basis for the religious dimension of the state. Apartheid represented the most lasting effect of the civil faith and in the post 1948 period heralded the start of a new Afrikaner revolution in South Africa. (Moodie, 1975:259).

Moodie observes that once the Afrikaner had won power,

"the civil religion came to lose its bite... was blunted by pragmatic priorities and the development of a bureaucratic party machine, these pragmatic priorities included the perceived need on the part of the ruling bloc to broaden its support base."(ibid)

In a sense 1948 represented a turning point in the development of Afrikaner Nationalism. Social and political conflict on all levels in ensuing years, led to a situation where it became unavoidable to collaborate with capital and the rival English group. It was only once their political domination became firmly entrenched, that Afrikaner feelings of inferiority vis a vis the English subsided. It was not until the NP had been in power for a while, not until Afrikaner business had developed a measure of economic strength, that it became psychologically possible for them to encourage English support and collaboration. The concept of a Republic had the effect of bringing together whites of different language groups, which in turn affected the composition, structure and policies of the ruling NP. Verwoerd favoured establishing a Republic in which the interests of all whites would be promoted. Elements within Afrikanerdom recognized the necessity of broadening its attitudes regarding politics, religion and most of all, business.

The 1960's were characterized by economic boom and was also marked by widespread and intensive social and political unrest. After the Sharpeville massacre, it became increasingly apparent, that to ensure white domination, the collaboration with other white ethnic groups was needed to counteract the threat posed by the heightened militancy of the disenfranchised black majority. Verwoerd came to agree with Hertzog that *"all whites must stick together."* To preserve capitalist domination and ensure white hegemony, it was essential to collaborate and find common ground with the one time arch enemy, the English. The despised *"Hoggenheimers"*¹ were needed and this collaboration once again prompted realignments with the dominant bloc.

A situation developed where the dictates of capital accumulation came to override the interests of white workers and agricultural capital (whose support was crucial in ensuring the 1948 victory). The NP had come to power by fostering the interests of agricultural capital, but it soon came to favour industry. In a climate of political and social instability, it became part of a wider security strategy to ensure the permanence of a stable black proletariat. The sustained economic boom which continued until the early 1970's, created favourable conditions for political and economic expansion. Capitalist co-operation and English/Afrikaner collaboration was to give rise to a whole new set of problems which resulted in further splits and realignments. Afrikanerdom was never a monolithic bloc, but it managed to secure sufficient unity to enable it to win the 1948 election. The splits and fissures became increasingly apparent in the decades that followed.

Afrikaner Nationalist ideology was not immune from these developments and the splits which ensued had profound effects on subsequent political movements. The *verligte* element encouraged English support, capitalist development and an overall pragmatic approach to all affairs, including racial issues. In the next two decades, these realignments took shape and the division between the two camps within the ruling hegemonic Afrikaner bloc widened and eventually became irreconcilable.

The changing politics of the NP have to a large extent been responsible for fuelling the fires of white revolt. This view is echoed by several authors including van Rooyen, (1992); Back to the Laager, (1991); Indicator (1987). The scrapping of Job Reservation, the repeal of the Group Areas Act and increased unemployment amongst whites, coupled with the reduction of state support for social services and agriculture undoubtedly influenced the growth of the right-wing. On the whole the political and the economic position of whites has declined and much dissatisfaction has

accompanied it. Increased struggles within the Nationalist alliance led to a "*failure of volkseenheid*."

Divisions within the party in terms of verligte and verkrampte elements came to a head and the latter broke away in 1969 to form a new party based on "*pure Afrikaner principles*" of the old Gesuiwerde Party. These elements desired the old party principles which favoured the white working-class and agricultural capital as opposed to industry.(O'Meara, 1983). The verligtes on the other hand pushed for policy reforms and for the easing of restrictions of the use and flow of labour and for the limiting of state control over the economy. Volkseenheid withered away in favour of industrial development. Afrikaner business emerged as the dominant force in the alliance and this indicated a transformation of both the ideological and class basis of Afrikaner Nationalism. The sacred history and ethno-cultural consciousness was underplayed in favour of this nascent predominantly bourgeois class consciousness.

Moodie (1975) argues that class interest alone doesn't, account for the extent to which the principles of separate development are rooted in the Afrikaner's own struggle for ethnic equality vis-a-vis the English. Even if class alliances are re-arranged and rendered obsolete, notions of ethnic exclusivity and dominance remain. These ideas are not dependent upon class boundaries for their existence. On the contrary they are rooted in the consciousness of many white South Africans regardless of class position.

These cultural and ethnic beliefs did not disappear entirely and elements were retained for future mobilizations. The **growth of revivalist movements** in contemporary South Africa can be partly explained in terms of this. The ideas provided the foundation for the revival of pro-Afrikaner racially exclusive programmes of action in modern day South Africa. A revival of ethnic ideas in

the modern context has taken place, and this helps explain why rightwing politics have become popular amongst significant sectors of the white population.

The NP has changed in terms of its class base and language composition. Ideological shifts have taken place and at present the NP is the vanguard of the reformist or *verligte* wing of the broader Afrikaner Nationalist movement. de Klerk's reform initiatives has served to widen the gulf between reformists and reactionaries (*verligtes* and *verkrampes*) within the NP in particular and within white politics in general. (Griffin, 1991:160) The most traumatic experiences for Afrikanerdom were the splits within the NP which culminated in the formation of the HNP in 1969 and the CP in 1982, which subsequently divided the Bond as well. (The political, social / psychological and ideological determinants which gave rise to the formation of rightwing political parties warrant investigation, and will be dealt with at length in the next Chapter.)

It is necessary to discuss the other ideological form which made an impact on white nationalist discourse in South Africa. An understanding of Afrikaner Nationalism can only be advanced, if all its influences are taken into account. Fascism entered the mainstream of Afrikaner Nationalist thought and action during the 1930's and the 1940's and this has had a profound effect on the nature of ethnic nationalism in the modern era.

4.2 WHAT IS FASCISM?

At this stage it is imperative to discuss fascist ideas which penetrated mainstream Afrikaner Nationalist thought. In order to do this, a definition for the term is needed, so that it may become apparent which particular usage of the term is employed for this discussion and so that the analogy can be effectively applied. As with most political concepts the term "*fascist*" is difficult to define. Laclau (1979) comments on the deficiency in the literature relating to fascism which remains for

the most part "*empirico-descriptive*" or else an understanding of the term is reduced to a relatively simple contradiction.

An analysis of fascism is essential to an analysis of social movements in this country situated to the right of the present NP government. This can only be achieved if a psychological/subjective dimension is added to socio-economic and political thought. In terms of such a definition, fascism is a consequence of human alienation in a modern world and is a channel through which people express their fears and anxieties. Fromm's claim that authoritarianism was part of the search for secondary bonds to replace primary bonds which have been lost through modernization needs to be combined with political and economic categories of analysis. (Kitchen, 1976:15)

Kitchen argues that explaining fascism in terms of psychology alone serves to obscure its true roots and makes it difficult to learn from history. (ibid:16) He states that there are objective reasons for fascist policies and an understanding of them will help in understanding the dynamics of prejudice.(ibid:21) Kitchen defines fascism as a phenomenon of developed industrial states that is triggered off by severe socio-economic crises which bring about fear and anxiety. Fascism is a modern political ideology which appears to desire to impose uniformity on the population within a nation-state under the auspices of a powerful leader figure. Individual rights are compromised in favour of dedication to the aims of the state personified by the leader. A strong state apparatus is favoured which protects the "*unity*" of the nation. The mythical, anti-intellectual character of certain political ideologies is enthusiastically embraced.(ibid).

According to Kitchen, the social function of fascism is to stabilize and strengthen capitalism, and in this sense is comparable to conservatism. The use of ideology to deliberately manipulate and divert the frustrations and anxieties of the masses away from their objective source is

central.(ibid:87) Kitchen is concerned about the term "*fascist*" being used merely as a form of abuse. He argues that fascism is not produced by the

"peculiarities of national character, it is not simply the manifestation of the activities of sinister plotters or sexual deviants; instead it is a social product which potentially blocks the development of freedom of humanity as a whole".(1976:10).

In my opinion, Kitchen's view of fascism is rather limited in that he ties it to a particular mode of production, capitalism, and ignores the fact that fascism, like any other political ideology can mutate and exist in different forms. Changes in circumstances are likely to produce changes within fascist movements and a type of **neo-fascism** may develop. Furlong (1991:239) applies this to South Africa,

"the apartheid state would not, however be a pale imitation of an imported fascist model, but would draw on the lifeblood of a much older, indigenous tradition, that of Krugerism. The new state would be both republican and autocratic, both populist and despotic, both radically modern-indeed revolutionary in its massive social engineering - yet incorrigibly, even passionately reactionary in its determination to re-create the simple world of the old Boer republics."

The apartheid state did not replicate fascist models from industrialized Europe; instead elements of the fascist doctrine were borrowed, re-interpreted and finally harnessed to the Afrikaner Nationalist movement in South Africa. To deny the fascist influence is to lose sight of the complexity of modern rightwing thought and action and obscures the historical basis for its development. Whilst it is inappropriate to simply apply the European model of fascism in its original form, it is equally inappropriate to reject it completely.

Griffin (1991:26) attempts to provide a concise definition of fascism, and states that;

"fascism is a genus of political ideology whose mythic core in its various permutations is a palingenetic form of populist nationalism".

Griffin elaborates that by combining the term **palingenetic** with **ultra-nationalism** a new genus of political activity is created, one whose,

"mobilizing vision is that of the national community rising phoenix-like after a period of encroaching decadence which all but destroyed it". (1991:38).

Rightwingers believe that in the South African context rival political ideologies of a decadent nature exist, and can only be eradicated by resorting to organized violence. These decadent ideologies include non-racialism, class consciousness, materialism etc. The rightwing in this country has clearly been inspired by fascist ideas since much of their energies are focussed on salvaging the remnants of the [white] "*nation*" from the decadence into which it has fallen. In order to combat rival political ideologies and the decadence they allegedly host, fascist activists develop programmes of action aimed at rooting them out. The recourse to organized violence as both necessary and healthy. (Griffin, 1991:44). The fascist mentality is characterized by the sense of living through an imminent turning-point in contemporary history. In the words of Griffin,

"when the dominance of the allegedly bankrupt or degenerate forces of conservatism, individualistic liberalism and materialist socialism finally give way to a new era in which vitalistic nationalism will triumph." (1991:44).

The decadent features of modernity are being attacked in order to outline the prospect of a totally different type of society.

The opinions of O'Meara and Adam (who reject the fascist analogy in relation to contemporary rightwing groups in this country) are dated and in the light of new groups emerging, like the **Church of the Creator (CoC)**, the **Blanke Bevrydigingsbeweging (BBB)**, the **Afrikaner Nasionaal-Sosialiste (ANS)**, and the **Israelites (Israel Vision Sect)** their assumptions need to be reassessed. The growth of rightwing church movements in South Africa, is indicative of the infiltration of fascist type ideas amongst sectors of the rightwing movement in this country.

Britain's anti-racism watchdog, "*Searchlight*" is of the opinion that the CoC is nothing more than a pseudo-Christian front for a Nazi inspired organisation. (Weekend Argus, July 17/8, 1993). The BBB and other neo-fascist sects, like the CoC are open about their international links and their neo-fascist agenda. One of their most significant links is with the **Swedish White Rebel Group**, which is notorious for publicising its unrelenting hatred of Jews and blacks. (ibid). Both the BBB and the ANS openly declare their admiration for Hitler and his policies.

I feel that valuable insights can be gained by using this analogy. Adam argues that the differences between contemporary South Africa and fascist Germany for instance far outweigh the similarities.(1979:25) Both Adam and O'Meara believe that this analogy fails to shed any light on the matter and may even obscure a proper understanding of the South African system. Adam acknowledges on the one hand that a strong affinity existed between National Socialism and sectors of Afrikanerdom during the Second World War, culminating in the Ossewa Brandwag activities, but on the other hand claims that fascism has been so discredited that it no longer influences policy. He adds that "*only lunatic fringe groups can now afford to adhere to fascist ideologies.*" (ibid:28) Perhaps it is these "*fringe lunatic groups*" that have resuscitated fascist tendencies in contemporary South Africa. Adam's claim is dangerous because this label suggests that certain extremist groups are ineffectual and harmless, when in fact they may constitute a threat to peace and stability in this country. Both the BBB and the CoC may conceivably fall within the ambit of this definition.²

It is important to realize that fascism has the capacity for adaptation to its environment. The argument that fascism has been so discredited as to render it impotent as a political force, ignores "*its almost Darwinian capacity for adaptation to its environment*". (Griffin, 1991:146).

Griffin warns that,

"despite the failure and inhumanity associated with Fascism and Nazism, mimetic and new varieties of palingenetic ultra-nationalism continue to be cultivated in highly marginalized but vigorous sub-cultures in Europe and the United States and still play an active role in South African politics." (ibid:45).

The strain of fascism which is prevalent amongst local rightwing groups has modified and mutated in accordance with social conditions. It is unreasonable to expect fascism to exist in its original form, as witnessed in Second World War Europe. It cannot simply be equated with the regimes of Hitler and Mussolini. The unique ethnic and political situation in South Africa has influenced the form in which fascist ideas permeate rightwing organisations.

Fascism is thus not intrinsically a European phenomenon, nor did the fascist era end in 1945. Ultra nationalism can draw on a number of sources, local or imported, religious or secular. (Griffin, 1991:156) The *"seed-bed which South Africa provides for fascism has become more, not less fertile since 1945"*. (ibid:158). South Africa is seen as a potential home for many migrating rightwingers and for fascists and racists the world over, this country is seen as the frontline of conflict between *"healthy"* nationalism and the forces undermining it. (Griffin, 1991:160).

A strain of fascism, dating back to the 1930's had been resuscitated in modern South Africa and negates any real need to import European fascism. In other words South Africa has an indigenous ultra nationalism which was historically reflected in the **Broederbond** and the **Ossewa Brandwag**. South Africa has historically proved permeable to fascist ideas, and the ideological dynamics of fascism were revealed in the activities of the Ossewa Brandwag. The OBB was one of the most important groups to surface in inter-war South Africa and drew heavily on indigenous ultra-nationalism. (Griffin, 1991:159).

Bunting (1969:58) refers to Hertzog Prime Minister between 1925-29, who became increasingly convinced that Nazism was

"suited to the moral and religious outlook of the Afrikaner" and that a "new world order was on the way".

The Afrikaner version of volks nationalism was incorporated into the law of the state by means of a political party, the National Party, which shifted to the right under the influence of the Afrikaner Broederbond and the Ossewa Brandwag. It is interesting to note that both Prime Ministers Botha and Vorster were members of both these organizations and after the Second World War, the Nazi inspired greyhairs merged with the NP. (Griffin, 1991:159)

Griffin argues that the **Society of Orange Workers** who pledge to salvage the Afrikaner nation by establishing a whites only homeland, **Orania**, exemplify the purest expression of Afrikaner fascism.³ The idea of establishing a whites only "*homeland*" within the borders of the country, in which the decadence of the rest of the country could be eliminated, gives practical expression to fascist ideals. He notes that the more familiar guise of Afrikaner fascism is expressed in the activities of the AWB, in which fundamentalist Christian Socialism is laced with imitations of Nazism especially in relation to its anti-Semitism and ritual. It is no coincidence that the 777 insignia adopted by the AWB resembles the swastika. In his opinion the AWB is the best known product of post World War Two fascism. (ibid:160) Griffin's notion of populist ultra nationalism describes the particular variant of fascism manifest in South Africa. Jonathan Hyslop argues along similar lines; in his view the AWB,

"displays distinctively fascist political characteristics, placing it in the tradition of politics descended from the Ossewa Brandwag" (1987:399).

He adds that;

"the AWB bears a strong resemblance to movements such as the National Front in France or the MSI in Italy, which managed to translate a message from the 1930's into a revival of the ultra-right in contemporary style." (ibid)

At this stage it is necessary to note that the persistence and intensification of the same structural contradictions, the same economic, social, cultural, political and psychological conditions which nurtured this ideological form during the Second World War has led to a situation in which these ideas have continued to exist as a significant force in South African politics. Once again this reflects the readiness of fascism to mutate and keep in step with the times.

An example of how fascist ideas have been modified to keep in step with the times and take a stand on contemporary issues in this country is illustrated by the extreme rightwings attitude towards AIDS and AIDS sufferers. In the minds of rightwingers, AIDS typifies the decadence and moral decay that has come to characterize modern South African society. Political movements overly concerned with salvaging the last remnants of "purity" for the purposes of constructing a new social order have targeted this modern disease as an enemy of and a threat to the survival of the white race. A key slogan of the BBB states that "we'll all die of old-aids" [if racial mixing is allowed to continue]. AIDS is seen as God-given, it shows God's disapproval of the blacks and of inter-racial sexual relations. In this sense it is believed that the blacks are responsible for the spread of AIDS. A drawing in the *Cape Rebel* (published by the BBB, Volume 2(1), September, 1988) is headed "Rise above decay" and a skull with AIDS written above it features alongside other images, including a black man and a white woman kissing on a television screen representing the SABC. Opinions expressed in the publication also reflect this condemnation of AIDS and its victims.⁴

"The government has nearly destroyed the white nation by making deals with the communists and the blacks. The NP has let the Jews, like Oppenheimer take control of our economy. The liberals have caused AIDS to spread by sleeping with the

blacks; this will destroy us and our culture, unless we do something about it. That is why every white person in this country should join the AWB and go for military training; if we don't we will be wiped out completely." (interview, Welkom, 1990).

Fascism has shown its tenacity and resilience and also its ability to adapt in response to changing circumstances and we thus need to take the fascist analogy, (despite its weaknesses) seriously.

Although it is problematic to establish the class basis of fascism, there is agreement that it draws a large measure of support from the lower and working-classes. [Kitchen, (1976); Fromm, (1964); Wilkinson, (1987)]. Fascism is not synonymous with racism or anti-Semitism, although both these ideological forms often feature prominently in fascist thought and programmes of action.

4.2.1. The Fascist influence:

It was thus during the post 1934 period that fascist ideas became popular amongst certain sectors of Afrikanerdom. These ideas permeated mainstream Afrikaner political thought and have made a lasting impact upon it. The 1930's and early 1940's saw the emergence of groups, like the various shirt movements which influenced Afrikaner Nationalism. (Furlong, 1991:16). In Furlong's opinion Nationalists did on some occasions enter alliances with self-identified fascists. (1991:45)⁵ For instance, elements within the nascent Nationalist movement who were sympathetic toward Germany during the Second World War strongly identified with fascist ideology. Fascism clearly made inroads into South Africa and influenced the political life and thought peculiar to this country. Similarities between European fascism and the South African variant which penetrated the Afrikaner Nationalist movement can be identified.

Patrick Furlong (1991:47) notes that during the 1930's, Jews came to be regarded as a threat to the economic well-being of the poor white classes. Furlong claims that the "*Hoggenheimer*"

caricature symbolized these anti-Semitic sentiments. He goes on to argue that, in the years that followed, anti-capitalism faded almost imperceptibly into anti-Semitism, particularly in the new ideological climate. Furlong (1991:54) gives numerous examples of anti-Jewish sentiment which followed Jewish immigration. In a sense these years saw the birth of concerted efforts on the part of elements within the white group to contain the expansion of Jewish interests. These attitudes and ideas were carried through into the next decade and translated into virulent anti-Semitism which found expression in the various shirt movements. Furlong claims that in the years (1937-39) a rapid assimilation of open anti-Semitism into mainstream Nationalist policies was witnessed and this led to co-operation between the NP and the shirt movements. During the 1930's there were clear indications that fascism had made significant inroads into other areas of Nationalist political life and thought in South Africa.

According to Griffin (1991:218), South Africa is one of four countries where fascism briefly grew into a significant opposition movement within a liberal democracy in a vulnerable transitional state in the years 1939-43. He notes that 1945 did not mark the *"effective end of fascism as a significant force in South African politics."* The reasons for this are attributable to the persistence and more recently the intensification of the same structural conditions which nurtured it in the inter-war period. (1991:160). Furlong (1991:100) notes that;

"the linking of Swartgevaar politics to anti-Semitism provides an important clue to the nature of the atmosphere in right-wing South African politics at the time. Jews, Communists, Liberals and Blacks were regarded as a single web of interlinked conspirators against the volk, a treaty strikingly reminiscent of theories then prevalent in European fascist order."

The *"one world"* ideology put forward by Marxists is considered to be a force undermining *"healthy nationalism"*. The *"subversive"* liberal, Jewish and communist web of conspirators fuel

the dissatisfactions of the oppressed black majority and tolerance of them mitigates against the realization of the interests of the "*chosen volk*".

It is my contention that fascist ideas penetrated and irrevocably altered the nature of Afrikaner politics. Furlong (1991:136) states that the outbreak of World War Two was instrumental in bringing to the surface currents of Afrikaner Nationalist politics that had remained submerged.

The dramatic growth of the largest pro-fascist Afrikaner group in South African history, the **Ossewa Brandwag**, provided evidence for the claim that fascist ideas were prevalent amongst Afrikaner groups at the time. Furlong (143) claims that;

"the Ossewa Brandwag was a South African symptom of a universal tendency in the 1930/40's to distrust professional politicians and parliaments, as was expressed in the varieties of fascism and semi-fascism in Europe and Latin America."

The doctrines of the European radical right made far reaching inroads into Afrikaner Nationalist values and this impact further reduced the chances for democracy in an already troubled society.(ibid:180) Fascism was able to make an inroad into South African politics as it was able to build on the presence of an existing native tradition. Afrikaner Nationalism in South Africa provided a ready-made foreign example on which to model the ideological programme, organization, style and tactics of the local variant. (Griffin, 1991:219). In other words the necessary pre-conditions and building-blocks upon which to construct fascism already existed in South Africa.

Furlong compares the German attempt at **social engineering** in terms of rooting out undesirables to save the "*pure*" Aryan race to the policy of Apartheid. This analogy has been criticized on the basis that the historical specificity of the South African social formation doesn't simply fit into a

model of fascism. In my opinion, the doctrine of Apartheid is comparable to fascist models of social engineering since they both attempt to restructure the world according to some "*Grand Plan*" and both attempt to root out the "*undesirables*" within their respective societies. However, these two ideological forms are not identical, huge differences between them exist.

The modern mentality has spawned a number of ideological and political forms aimed at establishing firm boundaries between nations and nation-states and the events in Nazi Germany are not unique although they represent an extreme manifestation of this tendency. In the case of Nazi Germany the Jews were scapegoated by the anti-modernist movement because of their incongruent location. (Bauman, 1991:40) In the words of Hannah Arendt, the Jews were "*a non-national element in a world of growing or existing nations.*" (in Baumann, 1991:48) The Jews were the "*opacity of the world fighting for clarity, the ambiguity of the world lusting for certainty*" (*ibid*)

Apartheid in South Africa exemplified the modernity of racism and the attempt to reorganize a society in terms of absolute categories; in this case the damned and the elect, the *in-group* and the undesirable *out-group* or more simply put the Whites and the Blacks. Modernity threatened the solidity of old boundaries and the counter reaction was to try and re-establish those "*boundaries*". According to Bauman, "*under the conditions of modernity, segregation required a modern method of boundary-building*". (1991:59)

Racism was instrumental in the mobilization of anti-modernist sentiments and anxieties. In this sense modernity made racism, as we know it today, possible. The Nazi Grand Plan and the Apartheid system (despite considerable differences) can both be viewed in the context of modernity and its accompanying racism. Goldberg (1993:6) in his review of Bauman's book compares the Apartheid "*Grand Plan*" to that of the holocaust.

In his words,

"Bauman forces us to reconsider the nature of Apartheid, its architecture - redesigning the social order, the dehumanization of its victims, the deployment of the bureaucratic machinery driven by instrumental rationality in pursuit of Apartheid's goals, the distancing between individuals planning the new society from those implementing it and those subject to Apartheid's policies, and the divorce of rationality and ethics."(ibid).

In the case of both, racism can be seen as a type of "social engineering". Modern racism and anti-Semitism is part of the history of modernity in general and the modern state in particular. The modern mentality and modern social organization have fostered the development of extremely anti-social political and ideological responses to the insecurity and anxiety that has been brought about by modern social conditions. Racism and anti-Semitism can only be understood if they are located within a framework of analysis that deals with their modern source.

The negative aspect of modern society, the unintended consequences of the pursuit of reason and rationality have manifest themselves in the various social and political movements popular during the 20th Century. The growth of ultra-nationalism and its more extreme forms, fascism and Naziism can only be understood in the context of the modern era. At this stage it must be noted that some strands of fascism seem to embrace modern technology are anti-traditionalist and are not essentially anti-urban and this may cause confusion. In this instance it is not the modern world as such that is being attacked, but rather the "decadent" features of modernity.

Fascism in this sense represents an alternative modernism. It intends to restructure the world in accordance with this proposed alternative, and in this way can be revolutionary. The restructuring of the existing racially stratified South African society in terms of the Apartheid Grand Plan exemplifies the tendency to "modernize" society. Whilst it may appear that the implementation of the Apartheid doctrine represented a revival of antiquated ideas, quite the reverse was true.

Apartheid and the policy of separate development was revolutionary in that it restructured South African society according to this Grand Plan, even though it drew on existing and essentially conservative ideologies. The political energies of the nation, including the conservative and capitalist ones were co-ordinated by the ideologues. A new social formation with a new ethos was born by drawing on existing patterns and restructuring these into a revolutionary programme of action. This is not to say that the Apartheid pioneers were "*fascists*" as such, although they represented a form of "*ultra-nationalism*"

Permutations of fascist thought can be located within several rightwing political parties in contemporary South African society. The origin of this strain of ideology dates back to the 1930's and the 1940's; the same formative period when Afrikaner Nationalist ideas became prominent within the South African social formation. These two forms of political thought form part of the discourse of the rightwing movement in this country. An understanding of both these ideological forms will serve to improve our understanding of the nature of rightwing groups and could also assist in assessing why these groups have grown and whether they will continue to grow.

The structural conditions and circumstances which fostered both these ideologies in the past are persisting and will thus continue to promote the spread of these ideas in the future. Even though Afrikaner Nationalism has in some instances been diluted in order to achieve a measure of "*white*" unity, elements of this doctrine continue to exist. They only do so because in some ways they constitute an appropriate response to present circumstances on the part of this sector of the white electorate.

In the same way, neo-fascist ideas have resurfaced, and in some instances have increased in popularity. Fascist inspired ideas of this nature, can only be expected to increase in prominence as

we move toward a new non-racial social order. de Klerk's attempts to remove the structural contradictions which have characterized this society historically, could serve as the catalyst responsible for reviving and resuscitating fascism in this country.

As more reforms take place anti-reform lobbies will react accordingly and this could result in the transformation of what presently constitutes a minority within white politics to a mass movement. This is not to suggest that a potential white "*mass movement*" could achieve its long-term goals, but rather that it could become a formidable force obstructing a smooth transition to a non-racial society.

The next Chapter will outline the nature of ideology in general and nationalism in particular, in order to understand the appeal of such ideologies. The appeal of an ideology is directly linked to its ability to provide "*meaning*" for the people to whom it is addressed. The extent to which it can provide security and address the needs and fears of its target audience, ultimately determines its success in obtaining support. In order to assess the appeal of Afrikaner Nationalism and other ideological forms, embraced by the white ultra rightwing in contemporary South Africa, white fears need to be identified. The use of symbols to mobilize support is crucial, and the symbols of the white right will be discussed in the light of this.

ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER FOUR

- 1 Hoggenheimer was the anti-Semitic caricature of Die Burgers' cartoons. It was the symbol of monopoly capitalism in all its guises, and was thus also used to refer to English capital.
- 2 The BBB re-emerged as the Blanke Nasionale Beweging (White National Movement) after it was banned in 1988. Professor Schabert, ex-BBB leader has since joined the CP as a "scientific advisor".
- 3 Orania is situated in the Northern Cape and forms part of the great scheme to create an Afrikaner\white homeland. It was previously owned by the Department of Water Affairs and is presently owned by the Afrikaner Volkswag.
- 4 This attitude was expressed in the movie, "The Leader, the Driver and the Driver's Wife" (1989), where rightwingers shared racist jokes about the spread of AIDS by blacks.
- 5 Furlong (1991) provides a convincing argument in support of his claims. He is concerned about the tendency to reject the fascist analogy in much of the literature dealing with Afrikaner Nationalism.

CHAPTER 5

In order to understand why rightwing parties emerged in South Africa, it is necessary to uncover the social, political, ideological and psychological determinants that prompted the formation of these parties. The previous Chapter set out to outline the link between two distinct ideological forms, **fascism** and **Afrikaner Nationalism**, both of which were instrumental in shaping the doctrine of apartheid or "*separate development*". Mutations of both these ideological forms can be detected within contemporary rightwing organizations. An understanding of the appeal of these ideological forms assists in uncovering the motivation behind rightwing ideas and sentiments in modern South Africa. Ideas are popular to the extent that they provide "*meaning*" for the people to whom they are addressed. Rightwing politics feed on the **fears** of supporters and in the process offers them hope and security. These fears are not always material or even rational. This Chapter sets out to uncover the nature of these white fears. White fears are extensive and relate to a perceived loss of power and economic privilege as well as a **loss of identity** in a post-apartheid South Africa. These widespread fears underlie the opinions of whites identifying with rightwing policies and programmes of action. In order to understand why a particular type of ideology is favoured by the white rightwing, these fears need to be investigated.

The Chapter also discusses the concept of **ideology** and sets out to understand why rightwing ideology is favoured in South Africa. Why was the ideology of Afrikaner Nationalism appealing? In order to answer this question the *nature of the ideology* and the needs and anxieties of the group to whom it appeals needs to be uncovered. Afrikaner Nationalism has historically been influenced by fascist ideology (see Chapter Four) and is integrally linked to the apartheid system of

government. An understanding of fascist ideology and the socio-economic, political, psychological appeal of apartheid helps in understanding the appeal of contemporary rightwing ideology.

The **symbols of the rightwing** need to be identified, since it is often through the manipulation of these symbols that individuals are inspired and mobilized into action. Many of the symbols used by the rightwing today have their origins in Afrikaner myth and folklore and form part of the civil religion. The extent to which they appeal to conservative white South Africans in the modern era varies. Most of these symbols have more meaning for the Afrikaners than the English, and thus if the latter are to be incorporated into the rightwing, a revision and reinterpretation of these symbols may be necessary. For the moment, it appears that the rightwing is content to continue using symbols, with clear Afrikaner roots for the purpose of white/ethnic mobilization.

5.1 WHAT IS IDEOLOGY?

At this stage it is imperative to briefly summarize the particular conception of ideology assumed in this dissertation. Psychological mechanisms in some instances closely resemble ideological phenomena and an understanding of psychology can thus contribute to an overall understanding of the nature of ideology. Larrain (1979:4) in his discussion on the nature of ideology notes that,

"it is possible to understand individual psychological mechanisms as having a collective impact which could be crucial for the production of ideology."

Although psychological mechanisms operate predominantly on an individual level, they can nevertheless have a collective impact which could prove crucial for the production of ideology.

Jung argued that the;

"neurosis of the individual can become the neurosis of society." (1964)

Authors such as Reich,(1970); Fromm,(1942); Adorno et al,(1969) have attempted to explain the emergence of political ideologies such as fascism in terms of psychological processes and have tried to integrate such an understanding with certain tenets of the materially grounded Marxian doctrine. Faber, (1987) attempts to do something similar in regard to the ideology of Afrikaner Nationalism. In his opinion,

"there is a relationship between ideology and psychological functioning", and...Jungian theory in particular is relevant to the understanding of collective socio-political phenomena, mainly because of the role of transpersonal, archetypal factors in structuring human experience." (1987:48).

Despite crucial methodological and theoretical differences, they agree that the determinations of the material structure of society are not sufficient to provide an adequate understanding of ideology. Ideology not only reflects the economic processes in society, but has also imprinted upon it the psychic structure of individuals. Ideology thus becomes an active force, a material power in humanity; it becomes the character structure of human beings, and the basic traits of that character are formed in early childhood (Reich, 1970). It reflects the material processes corresponding to the childhood experiences of people and becomes identified with the human psychic structure.

The same connections between psychological mechanisms and social institutions which have a bearing on the concept of ideology operate in the realm of religion.¹ Religion is viewed as an attempt on the part of humanity to overcome feelings of helplessness and alienation and in this way it performs a similar function to that of ideology. Ideology cannot simply be overcome by changes in the material conditions of existence, since its roots extend deep into the human psyche. No change in society based exclusively on material considerations can ensure the demise of ideology.

In order to understand the operations of the social process; both the *conscious* and *unconscious* forces that shape it need to be considered. A dialectical relationship exists between subjective and

objective reality. History is not purely a result of psychological forces which are not socially conditioned. Psychological changes cannot be reduced to an adaptation of cultural patterns, a dynamic active dimension is at play and this warrants consideration.

There is no fixed human nature, although there are limits to its adaptations. Human nature is a product of human evolution and contains inherent mechanisms and laws. Once these are understood, only then can the implications of ideological phenomena as manifest by social movements such as nationalism be understood.

Fromm (1942) argues that irrational, violent, sadistic impulses are an example of humanity's dynamic adaptation to social conditions which are in a state of flux. This type of adaptation occurs even though it is essentially harmful to the overall development of the human species and jeopardizes the attainment of human happiness and spiritual development. Once these traits, which initially developed as an adaptation to social reality become entrenched in the character structure of a particular group, they don't easily disappear. Human needs comprise both a physiological and a psychological dimension. In Fromm's words (1942:15),

"to feel completely alone and isolated leads to mental disintegration, just as physical starvation leads to death."

Religion, nationalism, customs and beliefs all serve to connect humans with one another and provide a refuge from humanity's greatest fear, total isolation.

This view elaborated for the purposes of this dissertation is grounded on the assumption that the basis of all ideology is located in the psychological drive to find a sense of belonging. According to Griffin (1991:194) this drive is fulfilled through the medium of **myths** which provide an experience of self-transcendence which immunizes people from the sense of isolation and

absurdity that otherwise engulfs them. In modern (secularized and pluralistic) culture there no longer exists any central all-pervasive source of transcendent myth. The individuals need for self-transcendent myth under favorable historic circumstances is satisfied by a mythical form centred upon the reborn nation. (ibid) If the appeal of secular ideologies such as **nationalism** are to be understood, the socio-economic, political, cultural and also the psychological determinants need to be investigated.

5.2 THE CURRENT APPEAL OF AFRIKANER NATIONALIST IDEOLOGY:

The appeal of the ideology of Afrikaner Nationalism needs to be assessed, if its success in modern South African society is to be determined. Leonard Thompson (1985) comments on the extraordinary flexibility of Afrikaner Nationalist myth makers and questions whether today's Nationalist mythology can adapt and be further modified into one that legitimates a policy of **white survival**, since this issue is paramount under the present circumstances.² Rightwing groups have redefined traditional ethnic exclusive boundaries and encourage other white language groups to join them in the battle to ensure the survival of the white race. The extent to which they will be successful, depends largely on their ability to provide a sense of security for white South Africans who are finding their culture, identity and hence their "*survival*" threatened by reform and integration.

The political and ideological realignment which has characterized contemporary South African society has led to a situation where the state is finding it increasingly difficult to capture broad based support. The "*civil theology*", an ideology which was popular for a significant period in modern South African history, can no longer fulfil the task it had previously. (Adam and Giliomee, 1979:128). The exclusivist symbols of the past and the corresponding "*civil theology*" are too narrow to provide the ideological framework for a broader **white survival politics**.

The language of pragmatism, reform and realism was developed by the ruling National Party to replace apartheid ideology, but this new discourse has alienated the sector of the white population selected for this study. Bozzoli (1987) views these new ideological overtures as an attempt by the state to refurbish ruling ideology in order to fill the "*intellectual vacuum*" left by the failure of old-style Afrikaner Nationalism (civil religion) to sustain any kind of legitimacy in times of "*reform*". The new ideology cannot completely substitute for Afrikaner Nationalism and the corresponding apartheid system of government. The language of technocratic reform does not constitute an effective ideological form and groups situated to the right of the government have continued to attach importance to traditional symbols.

The "*new language of legitimation*"³ based primarily on rationally motivated concerns fails to incorporate the subjective component of human experience into its discourse. This "*new language of legitimacy*" has not been entirely successful and Verwoerdian discourse has, in many instances demonstrated its tenacity. (Posel, 1987). It is difficult for the new legitimation ideology to draw on identity-shaping factors, such as a shared culture, language or national origin, since there is no common South African "*culture*" (as manifest through religion, language or race) to draw on. Political culture in this country, has historically emphasized factors which serve to divide people on the basis of ethnic differences. Ideologies which emphasize ethnic differences are thus more attractive to many whites in this country, especially those overly concerned with preserving their separate ethnic identities.

The growth of what Bozzoli (1987) terms "*revivalist religion*" amongst sectors of the white population needs to be contextualized historically and is indicative of the determination of conservative whites to incorporate traditional beliefs and symbols into modern discourse. The

rightwing has continued to use these ideological remnants in the modern context and have managed to attract a measure of white support in this way. Symbols of the past have been harnessed to the rightwing cause and have enjoyed a measure of success within these constituencies despite being virtually obsolete. They have been successful partly because they have been re-interpreted and redefined and fused with broader ethnic ideas.

The appeal of Afrikaner Nationalism, like any ideology, depends on favourable socio-economic and political circumstances, which render the ideology able to provide meaning for its target audience. Afrikaner Nationalism in modern South Africa needs to provide security for whites and address their needs and reassure their fears in order to be successful in its overtures. Exclusivist ethnic nationalism and pragmatic reformism are both competing for white support, and the success of either depends on their ability to address security issues. It is questionable whether either can lobby white support in the long-term, but the former has demonstrated both its tenacity and appropriateness in terms of addressing white needs and fears. In order to deal effectively with current demands, this ideological form needs to adapt to changing social reality. This purist, exclusionist culture which is contending for hegemony, needs to be revised if it is to play a role in promoting the interests of those sectors of the white population who favour segregation. The extent to which it will be successful in their overtures depends on its ability to provide "*meaning*" for people, to cater for their needs and reassure their fears.

Ideologies generally, through sets of symbols and practices enter and transform individual consciousness and in so doing secure legitimacy for the state. The current ideological discourse espoused by the ruling National Party concentrates purely on rational considerations and in so doing fails to take into account the irrational dimension of the human psyche. For this reason it is unable to broaden its support base to include white South Africans who favour more

fundamentalist emotive political organizations. Talk of integration and a non-racial society evokes fear on the part of the rightwing who favour separation and a racially stratified society. This fear is not entirely objectively grounded and will thus not be contained unless prescriptive political ideologies recognize the unconscious source of it. Ideological changes on the part of the NP foster insecurities among those sectors of the white population who require social and cultural separation in order to attain a measure of security. The perceived political and economic insecurity of whites has cost the NP a considerable number of votes.

Several of the respondents alluded to the lack of security provided for whites by the government. (These insecurities were diverse and will be dealt with at length further on in this Chapter). One respondent explained:

"how can we [whites] be expected to vote for a party [the NP] which caters for black aspirations? We can't even feel safe in our homes, or at work, nor can we be sure that our childrens' futures will be any better.

They [the rightwing] assure us that the security we knew in the past can be experienced in the future. It's obvious to us who looks after our interests"
(Welkom, 1990)

All ideologies must to some degree, provide a measure of security (material, emotional/psychological) for its supporters if they are to internalize it. In order to understand under which conditions collectives of people come together under the banner of one ideology or another, it is necessary to unravel and demystify the symbols and meanings peculiar to that particular ideological form and also the processes whereby this is rendered acceptable by its target audience. The use of ideology to deliberately manipulate and divert the frustrations and anxieties of social groups away from their objective source, is central to both Conservatism and Fascism. (Kitchen, 1976) In times of socio-economic crisis, which bring about fear on the part of sectors of the population, ideological overtures of this nature are often successful in capturing popular support. In

a sense the same structural conditions that nurtured the development of exclusivist white nationalism, and even fascism during the 1930's\40's, are present in contemporary South Africa.

The ideology of Afrikaner Nationalism which emphasized the unique and special destiny of the Elect was embraced because (amongst other things), it met the specific needs of the Afrikaner people. Likewise the injection of fascist ideas into mainstream Afrikaner thought during the 1930's and the 1940's was facilitated by commonly held perceptions that the white race group was superior and the interests of this group had to advanced at the expense of those who did not qualify for membership.

Afrikaner Nationalism was designed to salvage the remnants of the nation and mobilize the nation into action in order to "*rise phoenix-like*" in the wake of decadence. This decadence related to growing urbanization and the racial integration that came with it. Similarly fascism contains a vision of the new nation growing out of the destruction of the old order. This vision captures the imagination of those who are dissatisfied with the old system. Ideologies which have an emotional matrix are seductive, since they provide reassurances and outlets for those fears and anxieties, which develop as society is subject to change. The notion of the reborn nation can, in the "*right*" historical circumstances satisfy the universal human need for self-transcendent myth. (Griffin, 1991:196). In contemporary South African society, a revival of ethnic nationalism is taking place in the midst of integration initiatives and in a sense constitutes a reaction against "*modernization*". (Adam and Giliomee, 1979:34).

Several academics, including Fromm,(1942); Jung,(1969); Reich,(1977); Griffin,(1991), agree that psychological mechanisms, whether healthy or not continue to operate just under the surface of modern consciousness to supply the affecting vitality and dynamics of all political cultures,

however rational or progressive they might seem. The high level of secularization and fragmentation that the modern world generates has brought about waves of collective commitment to ideology in which some individuals get caught up in a kind of group mentality.

The decay of religion and the rise of science has not resulted in all human beings enjoying a more rational, integrated relationship with society, on the contrary, in certain instances quite the opposite has occurred. An overemphasis on rationalism and individualism which is characteristic of secular culture has rendered modern human beings vulnerable to epidemics of psychic energy channelled no longer into religious, but into secular cults based on cultural and political ideology or what Jung simply called "*isms*". (Griffin, 1991:189). In Jung's words, "*our fearsome Gods have only changed their names, now they rhyme with "ism"*". (Jung, 1988:81) Jung explained the rise of ideologies such as Nazism specifically in terms of the mobilization of irrational drives that had once been channelled into religion, but which have been dangerously repressed by the forces of rationalism and individualism. He was concerned about the susceptibility of modern human beings to archaic mythic forces, he claimed that;

"when the mass psyche feels threatened, psychic inflation takes place." (ibid).

The collective psyche of the white rightwing in South Africa is currently feeling extremely threatened, due to attempts at integrating society. Those political ideologies which provide security and reassurances for these fears will obtain support. Integration and non-racialism symbolize the "*decadence*" from which the group/nation must transcend. Rightwing parties are constantly issuing dire warnings about the proposed new order and fuel white fears associated with the perceived "*loss of identity*" that will take place. Those groups desiring to preserve their identity and survive as a separate nation, are attracted to political parties and organizations which

emphasize ethnic concerns and who provide reassurances for their widespread fears and insecurities.

The “*marriage*” of exclusivist nationalism and neo-fascism in modern South African society can only be understood in the context of the needs both these ideological forms meet. These needs are contained within the specific “*character structure*” of the Afrikaner people in particular and the white race group as a whole. Despite the resurgence of Afrikaner Nationalist sentiments, the fears common to all whites has paved the way for a collective white effort. Exclusively Afrikaner concerns may have to be compromised in favour of a broader unity of interests focussing on white survival and identity.

A significant sector of the white population in contemporary South Africa are virtually consumed by fear and are increasingly looking to parties who provide reassurances for those fears for support. The growth of rightwing parties must be seen in the context of these fears and anxieties. In the midst of uncertainty, modern myth makers are drawing on a number of sources for ideological input, in order to mobilize people on the basis of those insecurities. Favourable conditions exist for the growth of nationalist-type ideas in modern South African society and the increase in support for rightwing organizations must be understood in the context of white fears and anxieties.⁴ Zille (1987:76) claims that “*fear is the driving force of white politics*”.

5.3 THE NATURE OF WHITE FEARS:

The fears, needs and anxieties of white (and in particular Afrikaans speaking South Africans, who are most under threat), need to be identified to understand why certain ideologies are favoured above others. Cultural and ideological factors play an important role in shaping responses and material interests can be realized in the process of securing cultural and ethnic identities. Apartheid

was the concrete manifestation of Afrikaner fears in particular, and white fears in general. Whites in this country have historically felt threatened because they constituted a minority group, and the demise of apartheid has once again brought about these anxieties. Feelings of isolation, doubt and powerlessness prevail and ideologies and political doctrines that address these concerns have popular appeal among these groups. Undeniably the rightwing in South Africa have some very real fears based primarily on anticipated **sacrifices of a political and economic nature**, but underlying these are fears and anxieties of a psychological nature, relating to anticipated loss of identity.

White images of black people are often negative and the widespread notion of the impending "*swart-gevaar*" (black danger/peril) is fuelled by the media, which thrives on reporting on violent deeds perpetrated by black South Africans. This is inscribed into the collective psyche of whites and feeds their fears. "*Swartgevaar*" (black peril/danger) contains negative imagery pertaining to black people who are seen as "*terrorists*" or "*communists*". White South Africans who are overly fearful that they will lose their identity when apartheid laws are scrapped view blacks in an unfavorable light.

The psychological mechanism, "*projection*" helps in our understanding of the relationship between the in and the out-groups and helps explain why the latter is so feared and despised. In the case of the "*in-group*", frustration brings about aggression, which can be repressed or projected onto the "*out-group*". In this way, the undesirable qualities in one's own character structure are ignored and projected onto members of the "*out-group*" instead. Whites in this country, who in terms of their definitions, constitute the "*in-group*" are perpetually frustrated by the dissolution of the apartheid system. This frustration, coupled with anxiety translates into aggression. White aggression is evident, but some of this aggression is projected onto blacks.

In an environment of extreme confusion and uncertainty many white South Africans, who have been alienated by the States new approach have flocked to organizations situated to the right of the government, in search of old-style segregationist ideas which bolster not only political and economic security, but also psychological security. Psychological security is obtained by ensuring clear boundaries between the "*in-group*" and the "*out-group*", in the case of South Africa, the drawing up of clear boundaries between blacks and whites bolsters the psychological security of the latter. "*Segregation*" and "*separateness*" is synonymous with "*survival*" and hence security.

Apartheid legislation like the **Mixed Marriages Act (1949)**, the **Immorality Act (1950)**, the **Population Registration Act(1950)** and the **Group Areas Act (1950)** were specifically designed to ensure segregation between black and white South African at all levels and in so doing ensure the survival of the white race and Christian values and civilization. Faber, like van Rooyen (1992), albeit for different reasons, claims that apartheid and Afrikaner Nationalism are inextricably linked. Faber draws this link on the basis that segregation implied the continued existence and preservation of the Afrikaner volk.

The rightwing in contemporary South Africa have refused to abolish apartheid, since this would, in their minds imply self-destruction.⁵ The contemporary rightwing movement is thus continuing with the struggle to maintain separate ethnic identities and establish separate social and cultural boundaries for the South African population in general, and for whites in particular.

White fears are vast; they fear not only for their **loss of minority privileges**, but also their **physical safety and group survival**. (Manyoni, Indicator 10(4), 1993). Whites fear that blacks will take

revenge for years of suffering. According to Patriot (17/08/90), many blacks saw crimes against whites, not as crimes, but as acts of revenge."

Manyoni notes that these white fears are;

"now being given impetus by the random but sporadic slaughter of whites by elusive terror gangs in both rural and urban areas." (ibid).⁶

Studies conducted by political analyst Pierre Hugo over the past ten years point to the fact that two main types of fears are prevalent amongst white South Africans, fears related to a loss of **privileges, assets and identity** and these related to **violence** and corresponding horror scenarios strongly reminiscent of images conjured up by experiences in other parts of Africa like the Mau Mau uprising. Hugo's 1987 study indicated that 79% of Afrikaners and 70% of English speakers believed that their **physical safety** would be threatened under black rule; 85% and 60% respectively agreed that **white women** would be molested by blacks and 84% and 73% did not think law and order could or would be upheld in the advent of majority rule. (Giliomee, 1991:80)

During my field-work, similar findings were made; all respondents indicated that they felt the present NP government could not ensure the maintenance of "*law and order*" in this country. All of them were concerned about their safety in the future. Some of the respondents feared the worst, that their homes and properties would automatically be nationalized under an ANC government and that they would lose their jobs to blacks. They felt that their physical safety would increasingly come under threat, and the majority had already, or were in the process of undergoing military and self-defence training. With the exception of two people, all respondents already owned fire-arms. When first interviewed in 1988, only half the respondents owned fire-arms. A significant increase in ownership of guns occurred between 1988-1990 among respondents. This reflected a hardening of attitudes, brought about by heightened fear and anxiety about reform and their increasingly

precarious position. Similar findings were made regarding support of or membership of self-defence units and neighbourhood watches.

Rightwingers often express their desire to protect white women from the evils of non-racialism, they claim that they won't tolerate any interference on the part of blacks towards white women. Their threats allude to instances of black men socializing with white women and Lottering of the notorious "Order of Death" was especially horrified by the fact that black taxis were allowed to transport white girls. (Argus 29\8\91)

"In the course of 1990, the far right sent out a message that if white women were attacked during a public march, the moment would arrive for massive indiscriminate retribution." (Giliomee; 1991:82)

An independent poll conducted by the American based Joint Centre for Economic Studies, as part of the South African election support project, found that the majority of whites were fearful about the aftermath of the election. Whilst blacks were generally optimistic and felt that their lives would improve after the 1994 elections, whites were less enthusiastic. (SABC TV1 News 06/11/93).

Whites feel that their culture and way of life would cease to exist once the ANC was in power. Several respondents indicated that they feared the demise of their right to religious worship after the transition to a new South Africa.

A miner claimed that,

"once they [the ANC] are in power, we [whites] can forget about going to church...next thing we'll all be dancing around fires and consulting sangomas". (Carltonville, 1990)

Another added;

"We cannot allow the liberals and foreigners among us to dictate to us, we must continue to live in accordance with God's law. We must stand our ground and resist (in whatever way necessary) the attempts to dismantle apartheid. Failure to

curb this tendency will spell disaster and will mean the end of the white race and Christian values". (Kimberley, 1990).

Fear is integral component of the socio-psychological make-up of rightwing ethno-nationalists. Fears relating to the domination and suppression of whites under a new black government are widespread. White South Africans are extremely anxious about the future and in some instances they feel that their very survival is at stake. The white right has taken it upon itself to provide reassurances for these whites on the basis of such widespread fears. The popularity of rightwing groups and parties must thus be understood in the context of the fears and anxieties that spawned them.

5.4 THE SYMBOLS OF THE RIGHTWING:

In order to understand why there has been an upsurge in rightwing activity and an increase in support for the many rightwing groups in this country, it is necessary to uncover the **symbols** evoked for this purpose. An understanding of the symbolic meaning of apartheid and separate development is useful, since similar symbols used by the contemporary rightwing movement were evoked by Afrikaner Nationalist ideologues during the apartheid era. Apartheid and Afrikaner Nationalism are integrally linked, and central to this is Calvinist Christianity. The apartheid doctrine which emanated from the Afrikaner Nationalist struggle was central to the whole process of ensuring ideological hegemony. Apartheid and separate development can be understood politically, socially and economically, but most of all it can also be understood ideologically and **symbolically**.

Separation and survival are synonymous and through division and isolation will it be possible to maintain one's group identity. The blurring of boundaries implies a loss of identity and constitutes a threat to survival. Segregation in South Africa is seen to be a necessary measure to ensure the

"*survival*" of the white race, Christian values and Western civilization. (Faber, 1989:54). The Afrikaner (and to a certain extent the white) struggle is aimed at ensuring these objectives. Interaction with blacks for Afrikaner Nationalists and also contemporary rightwingers has a profound **symbolic meaning**. In order for whites to survive, it is deemed necessary to dissociate from their black counterparts.

The notion of negative connotations attached to "*blackness*" is supported by several authors, Cirlot, (1952); Jung, (1938); Neumann, (1963); Campbell, (1956\9); von Franz, (1972). In the Western European mythological traditions, the colour black has often been accorded inferior connotations as opposed to white. ⁷ Myth, folk-lore and fairy-tales often lead to a type of projection where white comes to be associated with categories such as good, light, holy, superior, above/heaven, masculine, aggressive and symbolized by the sun. The moon on the other hand lights the way for man during darkness and is said to be synonymous with the emotional, irrational, feminine, evil, dark, passive components of reality.

In the case of white Afrikaners, the availability of myth making material, and a history rich with imagery and folklore, aided this process. Nationalism in this instance serves as a basis for connecting people in ways they would not otherwise be connected. A sense of *community* develops and this aids the nationalist cause. This sense of belonging to a community is developed consciously and unconsciously. Self-conscious groups and individuals "*deliberately create*" communities and feelings of belonging to a group and identifying with it also develop naturally, independent of the actions of community creators.

Gellner (1983) claims that "*nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness; it invents nations where they do not exist*". Self-conscious groups thus try to deliberately "*create*

communities" and a corresponding community spirit and ethos. Anderson (1983) notes that these communities may become imbued with emotional connotations which serve to mobilize people. Ethnic identities are often reinvented, manipulated and mobilized in order to serve political ends. Ethnicity helps people identify with a collective plight, on the basis of the emotional connotations attached to the group. Apartheid represents an attempt to deliberately engineer society on the basis of ethnicity. Members of the elect ethnic group are encouraged to believe in their uniqueness and distinctiveness, and this depends on the existence of an opposing group. The opposing group is essential in order for the elect group to distinguish itself from it.

Community creation takes place both deliberately and spontaneously through both conscious and unconscious determinants and as a result of both innate and derived ideas. Human beings are not "*intellectual blank slates*" receptive to all overtures of intellectuals, nor do they possess "*false consciousness*." They possess a complex set of inherent ideas. Rude' (in Anderson, 1983:79) sums it up,

"this inherent, traditional element is a sort of mothers-milk ideology, based on direct experience, oral tradition or folk memory and is not learnt by listening to sermons or reading books."

Derived ideas are combined with inherent ideas in order to evoke certain responses. The unconscious component of the human psyche responds more readily to emotional situations and on this level symbols operate effectively since they are able to evoke emotional responses based on a recognition of its meaning rooted deep in the unconscious memory. This "*psychic blue-print*" basically amounts to a common awareness shared by the human species as a whole or elements thereof. Notwithstanding the universality of many psychic processes and symbols, material originating in the deep archetypal realm and emptying into consciousness will shape itself

according to the culture in which it operates. Myths and symbols are thus appropriate to history, family lineage, national roots, etc.

The success of a national movement is inextricably linked to its ability to evoke responses on a shared unconscious level through the skillful manipulation of certain shared symbols. Leaders are not always consciously aware of the efficacy of their techniques and do not always realize how certain symbols, once evoked, are capable of stirring the deepest reaches of human emotion. The rightwing movement in contemporary South Africa, has to an extent recognized that certain symbols are effective in mobilizing people since they evoke emotional responses which have roots deep within the unconscious realm of the human psyche. Symbols are effective in the context of ethnic conflict because,

"[they] clothe ethnic claims in ideas and associations that have acknowledged moral force beyond the particular conflict, thereby masking that would otherwise be controversial". (Horowitz, quoted in van Rooyen, 1985:218)

In terms of the Afrikaners, symbols of their past shared by ancestry, history and shaped by experience have their source located in the realm of the psyche where symbols form and are housed, the unconscious. When evoked, they permeate consciousness and the particular form in which they manifest themselves is influenced and shaped by factors mentioned above. Although certain symbols are cross-cultural and universal, culture, nationalism and socio-economic circumstances all affect the form a particular symbol takes.

Afrikaner "*sacred symbols*" were intended to inspire the volk and capture the imagination of its target audience.

Many of these symbols are used by the contemporary rightwing movement. The average individual is not consciously aware of why a particular symbol is able to evoke feelings of a mystical nature.

Political leaders are sometimes aware of the effect symbols have on the human psyche and may try to shape symbols in accordance with national or cultural heritage to evoke desired emotive responses. For example, the use of the *swastika* by Hitler's Nazi Party.⁸ Modern day neo-fascist and rightwing groups use the swastika or similar derivatives for political purposes. (See Figure 3). Colour imagery often follows that of the Nazi/fascist parties, for example, red and black drapery at meetings. Terre' Blanches greeting of the volk is alarmingly similar to Hitlers salute. He also relies on poetic, emotional speeches and his personal charisma is central to the entire operation.

Rightwingers and political observers often claim that Terre'Blanche's oratory style contributes to the overall success of the organization and he is often compared to Hitler. (du Toit, BM 1991:646).

Ivor Powell in the Weekly Mail, February 1990 states,

"his style of blood and iron oratory, his appeal to divinely ordained racial destinies, his Wagnerian poetry, is what the rightwing wants and needs to hear. It is not inconceivable that the man, despite the rhetoric, may be rehabilitated and lead his volk into greater and more irrational militancy".

According to Jonathan Hyslop,

"Terre 'Blanche taps directly into such [symbolic] thinking. The AWB banner comprises three 7's which counters the biblical number of the beast viz, 666." (SA review IV, 1987:399),

The psychological strivings of the target audience are evoked to elicit support. Symbolic meanings are attributed to many components of the ideology in question and since supporters are prone to operating on an emotional level, they react on the basis of these symbols. Although the AWB flag looks like a swastika, they insist that it is in fact biblical and pro-Christ. (du Toit, BM; 1991:646). Regardless of the origin of this insignia, it resembles the symbols historically used by fascists, and is used precisely because of its efficacy in evoking emotional responses on the part of its target audience.

It must be recognized that history and folklore are not enough to sustain the emotional fervor and moral cohesiveness required by a group in transit, thus symbols and the re-enactment of culturally and historically significant events take on that function. As Durkheim (1965:465) put it,

"moral remaking cannot be achieved except by the means of reunions, assemblies and meetings where the individuals, being collectively united with one another, reaffirm their common sentiments..."

The Afrikaner Nationalist pioneers and contemporary rightwing movements are aware of this and often rely on mass meetings, emotional memorial services and the like to reaffirm their allegiance to the cause. Numerous shrines and monuments have been erected in order to pay tribute to their "*sacred past*" and the ritual re-enactment of the Great Trek and pilgrimages to historically significant sites all serve this purpose. Rituals unite social groups and reaffirm the individuals sense of belonging and emphasize their distinctiveness and separateness from others in a given society. So although these civil rituals may fulfil certain "*positive*" functions, such as uniting groups on the basis of a common identity, the flip-side to such nationalist strivings is not always conducive to harmonious social relations. The "*in-group*" "*out-group*" dichotomy is widened.

The ritual re-enactment of significant events in Afrikaner history thus reaffirms beliefs and ensures their efficacy. The "*holy*" **Day of the Covenant** is piously celebrated on December 16 every year to remind white (and especially Afrikaner) South Africans of their victory over the forces of darkness. Prayers on this day are aimed at thanking the patriarchal Father-God for saving the volk from their black enemy. On this day, pilgrimages are made to historic sites such as the "**Voortrekker Monument**" in Pretoria. The 64 encircling ox-wagons form a protective laager, which have historically shielded the volk from attack and subsequent annihilation.

The **laager** is a common symbol evoked by several Afrikaner Nationalist rightwing groups. Historically the formation of the laager, by means of ox-wagons served to protect them and hence ensure their survival as a separate nation. It is hardly surprising, that when threatened by outsiders, the retreat to the laager is advocated. Rightwing secessionist policies are devised for this purpose. The creation of a protected volkstaat is aimed at ensuring the separateness and survival of the threatened volk. It is no wonder that in times of reform, when integration is promoted, those most threatened by this, call for a retreat to the laager or volkstaat. Jung (1967) notes that;

"such symbols of centrality, order and containment often appear in conditions of great psychic turmoil and chaos, where they function as a compensation for a crisis of individuation."

In situations where the "out-group" increasingly poses a threat to the security of the designated "in-group", anxiety and fear can easily translate into anger and hatred. Anger and hatred in turn are extremely powerful emotions which contribute to destructive and anti-social behavior by those who experience these emotions.

"In times of crisis or in critical situations people become suggestible to slogans and symbols which are short-cut rationalizations which fire the imagination..." (BM du Toit, 1991:639).

Erich Fromm (1942) advances a similar explanation; in his opinion, periods of crisis make it psychologically vital for people to take refuge in a higher order of reality in which they are relieved of the pain of being themselves in a mythless, private time.

Modern secularized culture no longer contains any central all pervasive sources of transcendent myth. Nationalism and related ideological forms satisfy the need for self-transcendent myth under suitable historical circumstances.

In the *Fear of Freedom*, (1960), Fromm argues that humans possess a built-in dread of isolation and have an overwhelming need to belong. Sadomasochistic relations with the outside world may develop in order for them to be absolved from the personal responsibility of their acts and they may identify with an authoritarian-type leader whose orders they willingly obey. Periods of crisis make it psychologically vital to find refuge in the illusion of a higher order of reality.

Koestler sums it up;

"religious wars were superseded by patriotic, then by ideological wars, fought with the same self-immolating loyalty and fervor. The opium of revealed religions was replaced by the heroin of secular religions, which commanded the same bemused surrender of the individuality to their doctrines, and the same worshipful love offered by their prophets. The devils and succubi were replaced by a new demonology: sub-human Jews plotting world dominions; bourgeois capitalists promoting starvation..." (1970, 273).

In the South African context, the "devils" in terms of rightwing white perceptions, are blacks who pose a threat to the existence of whites. The new war is defined in terms of the new enemy, but ultimately the same fear of losing an identity and being forced to merge with that which is rendered undesirable, provides the impetus for mobilization against the enemy.

The symbolic forms that characterize "*Afrikaner myth*" and depict emotional strivings is inherent in their character structure. The notion that Africa is a dark, primitive continent in which whites have to fight in order to preserve civilization has infiltrated the consciousness of many white South Africans and subsequently has had a profound effect on both their attitudes towards and relationships with black people. (Insig, July 1989). Powerful symbolism is abundant even in school text books and according to Insig, the major symbols can be identified as ;

- (i) the importance attached to: obeying and not questioning established **authority structures** such as the father, ordained leaders, God etc. Along with this comes an intolerance of criticism which is seen as mitigating against the group as a whole,
- (ii) comparing the Afrikaners strife and ordeal to that of **Israel** and their "*special*" relationship with God. The Bible and the Sabbath being totally revered.⁹
- (iii) the imagery of being a "*boerevolk*" and corresponding notions of South Africa being essentially an agricultural land. Despite urbanization and declining numbers of people being farmers, "*boer*" has a special meaning for the Afrikaner people. (The individual can only realize his/her full potential on a farm, the city is alien and tests one's faith).
- (iv) along with this goes the imagery of **suffering and hardship** in a "*strawwe*" or harsh land. Geographical and climatic factors such as water shortages and droughts are exaggerated to depict the suffering that goes along with trying to subsist in South Africa. Unlike their English counterparts the Afrikaners are "*tough*" and can withstand great toil and pain because they are used to suffering.
- (v) isolation, geographical, psychological and political exacerbates these perceptions. The Afrikaner is viewed as an "*independent, isolated person who is physically strong and traditional...*" (*ibid*). The pioneer in the wilderness image is apparent here and for South Africans (and the Afrikaner in particular) isolation is seen as a source of strength and can be used to justify minority rule and racism.
- (vi) the Afrikaner is perceived to have been (and in certain instances still are) very **threatened**, by the land itself, the black inhabitants, the English enemy, immigrants, urbanization, poverty, rinderpest, overseas pressures, the communist onslaught and the future.

According to Dr H du Preez (ibid), these “*master symbols*” are so deeply entrenched in the value system of the individuals who come to view them as constituting objective facts. These “*master symbols*” permeate the various facets of school life, ranging from history to youth preparedness and cadets. The rightwing movement in contemporary South Africa has taken it upon themselves to try and protect and uphold these “*traditional*” values. According to du Preez, like the unemployed in Hitler’s Germany they often look for security in meetings where these twisted symbols are elevated to an untouchable/sacred level.

In this type of emotive setting, it is easy to understand how someone like Barend Strydom did what he did. Du Preez implies that because of this, all Afrikaners are partly responsible for this heinous crime. Strydom allegedly belonged to an organization known as the “*Wit Wolwe*”. The AWB’s military elite, Aquila is represented by an eagle and it is no coincidence that both images or animal motifs are hunters.

According to Jung (1969), the animal motif is normally symbolic of the human being’s primitive instinctual nature. Humans often use animal symbols in times of crisis and may react by resorting to offerings/rituals or sacrifices (“*bloed-geoffer*”). In a sense the Strydom Square massacre can be viewed as such an offering. Our animal instincts can be the cause of our self-destruction. If we are not aware of them and fail to integrate them into our overall psyche. If we suppress these instincts, they can control or even destroy humanity, says Jung. (ibid). It is up to the Afrikaner volk to question whether they are nurturing a “*wolf-pup*” in their collective unconscious. du Preez believes that we need to question whether there are factors in South Africa that will awaken a “*wolf*” or “*tiger*” in the Afrikaner. (Insig, July 1989). In terms of an incident such as the Strydom square killings, the Afrikaner community may be guilty for helping to foster such a situation. (ibid)

The history of the 20th Century has shown that such archetypes can permeate the consciousness of people and self-destruction may follow. Humans are able to control their instincts to an extent by simply suppressing them. In so doing they wound themselves, and as with any animal, are most dangerous when wounded. So long as the "*animal*" is projected onto others and not realized and integrated into our consciousness, it cannot effectively be dealt with or contained - the ego may weaken and the individual is ripe for the influence of the collective unconscious - the realm where archetypes with their corresponding symbols and often destructive images prosper. Under such conditions the emergence of a "*Wit-Wolf*" becomes a real possibility. History has shown how the visions of an individual can become part of the collective unconscious of a nation as well as visa versa.

Certain authors, van der Spuy, (1978); Lambley, (1980); Manyoni, (1981) attempt to address the psychological bases and consequences of apartheid. They fail however, to present a balanced picture which doesn't simply condemn the Afrikaners and integrate a socio-economic analysis into their discussion. The other extreme is the structuralist paradigm which focuses primarily on the material determinants. Racial animosity, destructive urges and the like are not solely dependent upon material conditions for their existence, although material reality may well affect the manifestations of such phenomena once they have become part of consciousness. As previously mentioned, the psychology of apartheid has often been neglected and according to Faber (1990:47) this tendency may be related to the widely held assumption that psychology primarily studies individuals and is thus not relevant to an analysis of collective socio-political phenomena and that this corresponds to the traditional positivist distinction between "*values*" and "*science*".

This area of ideology, in which:

"individual consciousness interacts with supra-personal structures to produce mass mobilizing causes to fight for, however irrational they may seem to an outsider" has repeatedly demonstrated its resilience. (Griffin, 1991:182).

The craving for authority as irrational as it may seem, has a long history which the advent of fascism has highlighted. Nationalism is essentially a consequence of modernity and has illustrated enormous tenacity. It is one of the pervasive ideological forces in the shaping of modern history, and if anything its virulence shows every sign of increasing rather than diminishing. (Griffin, 1991:36). It is the historical failure of materialist ideologies such as Marxism and in Reich's words,

"Marx failed to take into account the character of the masses and the social effect of mysticism..." (1970: 39).

Fascism and other forms of ultra nationalism are often appealing precisely because they offer a "mystical unity" with the group or nation. The ideology of every social formation has the function, not only of reflecting the economic processes of society, but embedding this economic process in the psychic structure of the people constituting that society. Psychic structures may lag behind the changing social conditions from which they are derived and may well come into conflict with new ways of life. The contradiction between the old and the new social formation exists and doesn't always disappear as readily as we might hope.

At this stage it must be noted that the emergence of a movement such as fascism is not solely rooted in individual psychological structures but also in the social, economic, cultural and political circumstances which fostered it. In other words certain factors external to the individual are conducive to the establishment of particular ideological structures. The contemporary relevance of understanding the dynamics of fascism is exacerbated by the fact that it shows no sign of becoming

extinct. The ongoing need to keep fascism in any of its permutations under surveillance means that it is still crucial in contemporary reality to establish the factors which produce it. (Griffin, 1991:182). South Africa illustrates the tendency of elements within a society to revert to older traditional modes of existence and belief which have long since been rendered obsolete. Any attempt to understand or contain the threats posed by such contradictions needs to address the importance of irrational factors in the social process and specifically in the realm of ideas. Similarly any attempt to espouse a broader integrative South Africanism needs to come to terms with the unconscious levels at which people operate. All current national symbols embody more meaning for the Afrikaner people and allude to historical events pertinent to Afrikaner identity and are part and parcel of their so-called "*sacred past*". All symbols fulfil certain needs within the human psyche and it is imperative to ensure that the symbols selected for a post-Apartheid South Africa are integrative and not divisive as they have been in the past.

On the political and cultural front a battle is being waged on two fronts; on the one hand the move toward non-racialism is competing with separatist and exclusivist racially inspired movements and both are attempting to achieve a measure of ideological legitimacy. In terms of the former, Calvinist Christianity has historically been of profound importance in providing legitimacy for secular ideology. The contemporary rightwing has harnessed similar Christian-inspired beliefs to their cause, and in some instances reinterpreted Christianity to provide justification for changes in policy.

5.5 THE ROLE OF CHRISTIAN RELIGIOUS IDEAS IN PROVIDING LEGITIMATION FOR RACIAL SUPERIORITY AND SEPARATION:

Christian religious symbols and ideas have historically been used to provide justification for white racial superiority and segregation. Rightwing ideology, like the exclusivist nationalism that

preceded it, reserves a special place and fate for the "*chosen people*". (van Jaarsveld, 1964; de Klerk, 1975; Moodie, 1975). Manyoni, (Indicator, 10(3),1993) states that;

"an ideologized theology also helped to underpin a self-defined identity of biblical pretensions as a chosen-people and a community of the Elect."

The suffering endured by the "*chosen people*" is rationalized so that it is understood to be entirely due to unchangeable circumstances or fate.

The role played by **Christian religious forms** in legitimizing notions of ethnic superiority and forging ethnic identities warrants further discussion. Whether the "*chosen people*" include only the Afrikaners or members from other language groups within the white race, their destiny has been pre-ordained and their separate identity (defined in terms of culture, language, shared history or other variables) must be conserved and promoted. This notion of divine intervention in the fate of nations embodies the Nationalist mythology. In the words of O'Meara (1983:4)

"like the prophets of Israel, the ideologists have elevated Afrikanerdom to the special instrument in Africa of their Calvinist God. Divine Will explains Afrikaner history".

The notion of Divine Will assumes a new meaning in the modern context, especially in relation to the use of violence to achieve political ends. Grobbelaar states that;

"crossing the threshold to violence, and justifying the action as the will of God, would immediately take the CP out of the constitutional arena and give it the guise of a liberation movement engaged in a holy war." (1992:107)

Religious legitimation for the use of violence could have far-reaching implications for the society as a whole. Historically Calvinist Christianity has been used to provide legitimation for the policies and actions of the minority white state, and the resolution to this is thus not without precedent. If religion is used to condone violence, which it can be, the security of the entire society is under threat. Christian symbols fused with exclusivist ethnicity have provided a powerful impetus for the

upsurge of nationalism, and could conceivably continue to provide a rich breeding ground for these sentiments in the future. The potential to use Christianity once again to legitimate political action exists, and the activities and policies of the rightwing should be understood in the light of this.

This Chapter outlined the nature of ideology and assessed the potential appeal of Afrikaner Nationalism in contemporary South Africa. In order to accomplish this, the factors motivating allegiance to exclusivist nationalist causes and the symbols peculiar to the social group under investigation were identified. It is only through an understanding of the symbols meaningful to a particular ethnic group or nation, that the appeal of an ideology can be gauged. Ideologies which evoke symbols that are meaningful to the white right, in terms of history, territory or culture, which trigger emotional responses on the basis of shared experiences and beliefs, are the ones that can be expected to increase in popularity.

ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER FIVE

- 1 Religion can function to create a sense of solidarity and social cohesion.
- 2 Survival could conceivably mean aligning with non-Afrikaans speaking whites, or even blacks. For the purpose of this study, alliances with blacks will only be discussed in so far as they contribute to the development of rightwing groups and policies in South Africa.
- 3 The emergence of a "new language of legitimation" is attributable to historical circumstances, and represents an attempt on the part of the state to capture a wider audience, without sacrificing its economic aspirations. (Posel, 1987).
- 4 Although there has been an increase in the growth of black nationalist and ethnically-based groups and parties, this does not fall within the scope of this study.
- 5 This is a state of mind that is not based on objective reality, since the scrapping of these laws will in no way mitigate against the survival of the volk or the white race as a whole. Similarly, the maintenance of this legislation cannot guarantee their survival in the way they desire.
- 6 *The attack on white homes outside the FNB stadium during Chris Hani's funeral, April 1993, reinforced these types of perceptions whites have blacks. The various Apla attacks, the Saint James church massacre and the murder of American exchange student Amy Biehl, brought home the reality to most whites. Events of this nature have had a profound effect and have imprinted on the collective psyche of white South Africans.*
- 7 The same stereo-types used for blacks are sometimes used for women. Both are seen to be child-like, incapable of logical thought and rational descision-making, and lacking in intelligence.
- 8 The swastika predates Naziism and its origin can be traced to ancient teutonic myth. (See Figure 3).
- 9 Historically the Afrikaners have compared their plight to that of the Jews. Both were selected by God to preform a specific function. Contemporary rightwing groups continue to make this comparison and one extremist sect even calls itself the Israelites.

CONCLUSION

This thesis attempted to identify and discuss the key developments within rightwing politics, with special attention paid to the 1988-1993 period. A profile of the rightwing was presented and the nature and dimensions of rightwing organization outlined. In contrast to many explanations that dismiss the rightwing as the "lunatic fringe", I have argued that the rightwing in its present form is a formidable force that poses a significant threat to national unity and peaceful transition. Its strength lies in the increase and diversity of its membership. Its position is enhanced by the fact that the majority of whites either own or have relatively easy access to weapons and have undergone some form of military training. The strategic location of supporters within state structures and the high level of emotional intensity underpinning the movement increases its potency as a potentially disruptive force.

The rightwing invasion of the World Trade Centre, and various other incidents of rightwing confrontation illustrated that it was time get to rid off the misconception that the rightwing is a easily containable force. Although militant rightwing groups may be viewed as "paper tigers", their existence is indicative of a symbolic hardening of attitudes. This assumption was confirmed by the empirical findings of this study, which is essentially a comparative one. The sentiments and attitudes of targeted respondents were compared over a period of time. The first spate of interviews took place before "Rooi Vrydag", 2 February 1990, and the second thereafter.

Responses confirm that a hardening of attitudes has taken place, and this is in line with the opinions and empirical investigations of several rightwing analysts and observers. Events that have

taken place during the past few years, following "Rooi Vrydag" provide further confirmation for this claim.

It is in terms of this that the threat posed by the rightwing should be seen. The rightwing has become increasingly organized and has shown a marked propensity for violence. It must be noted that many of the threats made by the rightwing are based on certain assumptions. For instance, Terre' Blanche states that the AWB will take direct action once certain events transpire: an ANC government comes into power and immediately nationalize white property.

Zille (1987:94) claims that,

"it is only when white power is directly threatened that we will be able to elaborate an accurate assessment of the rightwing's capacity for violent resistance. As the country prepares for a general election, rightwing potential will reveal itself".

Whilst a military coup or seizure of power through legislative means on the part of the rightwing is unlikely, secession cannot be ruled out as a possibility. On the basis of existing information, there is broad consensus that "rogue-army units" supporting localized attempts at secession in certain regions is unlikely. (van Rooyen, 1992:499). It is in the light of this that alliances with conservative blacks should be seen. Homeland armies could aid secessionist initiatives. Major "Tienie" Groenewald warns of the possibility of a rightwing secession in the near future backed by an army of approximately 500 000 white servicemen. He adds that if white security forces were called in to curb the rise of a white Afrikaner state, they would refuse. "I dont think that the South African security forces will fight against their own". (Argus 5\5\93).

The white right will continue to commit isolated acts of violence and terrorism against blacks in this country. The high level of fragmentation that characterizes the movement exacerbates an

already tense and volatile situation, as supporters may act in their individual capacity, without the sanction of leadership. However this is a temporary situation, as the rightwing becomes more marginalized, it will become more tightly controlled and centrally co-ordinated. Events of the past few months have reflected a tendency toward more organized methods of resistance.

Although extremist splinter groups remain small and autonomous, Booyse argues they are "well organized and worked in cells of 2-4 members". He estimates that about 57 such cell exist. (1990). Smaller grass-roots organizations, like neighbourhood watches provide the basis for a broader organizational framework for a possible social movement. Booyse speculates that "strategists" keeping a low profile have the skills and expertise to provide superb organization and logistics. (Back to the Laager, 1991:53). He speaks of an "unknown rightwing entity", comprising ex-CCB members. The Afrikaner Bevrydigingsleer could conceivably constitute a Third Force component.

This leadership could unite the rightwing into a powerful force in the future and these grass-roots organizations could be activated at a later stage. (Ibid). Factors such the potential for an alliance of conservatives is further cause for concern. Observers from broad spectrum of political organizations regard possibility of white right forming a reactionary rebel army as plausible. South newspaper, November 1991, observed that rightwing attacks in 1980/90's far more sophisticated and large-scale than before and reflect more than rudimentary knowledge of explosives on the part of perpetrators. Giliomee states that a "small number of ruthless and determined men can create havoc" (1991:80) He alludes to the IRA whose armed operations are carried out by at most 250 activists. This is supported by Welsh, who says that;

"obviously a thwarted frustrated right, who are prepared to take up arms could do untold damage" (Sunday Times 20\12\90).

He also compares the future form rightwing groups operating "underground" could take, to the IRA. Hyslop (SAR 4, 1987:401) echoes these sentiments and refers to, "the case of the OAS in Algeria, which demonstrates how a small core of reactionaries can slow down the end of the old order and make it far more costly in terms of lives".

It is thus the level of emotional intensity, determination and allegiance to the cause that determines the strength of a political movement, not simply the number of people supporting it. Cross Times journalist Lesley Fordred, who has written several articles on the rightwing, remarked that;

"we should not measure strength in terms of figures, but the level of emotional intensity. Highly charged meetings reflect this combination of anger, fear and belief in the divine inspiration of the cause, which is one of the strongest forces in history."

Contemporary South African society is conducive to the resurgence of reactionary ideas. In a context of racial polarization, economic recession, extreme intolerance and spiralling violence, social dysfunctions can be expected to continue to exist. The uncertainty brought about during periods of social transformation, unleashes a conservative backlash.

Although this does not fall within the scope of this study, a class base for support of rightwing can be identified. Frankel (SA Freedom Review, 1988), identified the "downwardly mobile" as the social power base of the right. The working-class in South Africa is a permanent feature and transition to non-racial society will not be able to stabilize until it learns to talk a political language to which white workers can respond (Hyslop, SAR 4, 1987:401). Van Rooyen (1992:508) agrees that a strong-working class support for the rightwing is discernable, and that the implications thereof were obvious; as state subsidization of whites decreases and the number of poor whites increases, support for the rightwing can only be expected to grow.

Failure to incorporate white right in negotiation process and reach settlement will have dire consequences for country as a whole. Giliomee (1991:82), puts it simply,

"given the country's divided state, nothing less than a government of national unity comprised of leaders of all the majority parties will suffice."

Any new government will have to find ways to incorporate politically, the majority of whites. This will involve, "detaching the social base of the far right from the hard-core of neo-Nazis and terrorists."

Dissension within the ranks of the CP may lead to a situation, where unless "rebels" or volkstaters who favour negotiation, are unable to take control or make headway, they will be forced to leave the CP fold. This will alienate many on the right and CP will be rendered incapable of providing the necessary framework to keep things together. (Grobelaar, 1992).

Rightwingers on the "fringes" may in advent of CP disintegrating, become even more militant. Thus a failure to secure their participation in talks, will result in increased alienation and their retreat "underground". This will serve to polarize white politics even further. In order to comprehend and hence contain the threat posed by of the rightwing, a certain level of responsibility must assumed. The greatest responsibility lies with the state, who refuses to accept its "prodigal son". The attitudes of the general South African public needs to be moderated and only media sensibility and responsibility will ensure this. In his review of the publication, *Back to the Laager*, Hyslop (1991), states that academic responsibility is crucial and it is not satisfactory to simply condemn and enumerate crimes. It is necessary to try and gain insight into the-psyche of supporters. This can only be accomplished through the conducting of interviews, surveys, observations at meetings, and an analysis of publications.

It is imperative to uncover the motivations behind rightwing action, and for this purpose it is imperative to include a psychological understanding. Rightwing ideology remains popular because

it fulfils a fundamental human need (the need to belong and identify with a specific group), is appropriate to socio-economic circumstances and is able to effectively utilize emotionally-laden myths and symbols to mobilize supporters. In contemporary South Africa, the success of an ideology amongst whites depends on its ability to address white fears. The rightwing has realized that a counter-ideology which draws heavily on the past can provide powerful mobilizing force.

The powerful and emotional nature of ethnicity, has been witnessed once again in modern South Africa. The white right has placed ethnicity firmly on the agenda. The dynamic inherent in ethnicity overpowers rational (political and economic) interests. Material interests are in this instance rendered sub-ordinate to issues of "identity". Bozzolli (1987:36), argues that at all times the forces promoting non-class forms of ideology more powerful than those promoting class awareness. In the case of conservative white South Africans, this is definitely true. The white rightwing appeals to a "culture of whiteness", and this new formula based on the notion of the survival of the white race, strikes a chord with many whites, under threat from black advancement.

Adam and Giliomee (1986:133)

Despite its impracticality, the notion of a volkstaat has become increasingly popular. However this component of rightwing strategy poses the least threat, assuming compromise on this demand can be reached. A Weekly Mail editorial, 14 May 1993, sums it up;

"the dominant rightwing view of the moment is support for a volkstaat - an idea so impractical that it is difficult to take it seriously. It is impossible to see how you can mobilize farmers to sell their precious land and move to a precarious homeland, - which is why their proposed homeland borders differ according to the location of the farm of the person who draws them. The real potential for disruption lies in small groups with a penchant for violence, assassination and Third Force type activity. There are hundreds of individuals whom the government has allowed to leave the intelligence community, with skills in violence and dirty tricks and access to resources, who are willing to involve themselves in incidents like the Hani assassination...this is the enemy we need to know."

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APPENDIX A

METHODOLOGICAL CONCERNS:

Sociological research is in one way or another concerned with the study of social behaviour from a particular perspective or focus. Research of this nature often purports to be "*scientific*" in its method. (Phillips, 1971:101) Although, "*value-free*" social science is neither possible or even desirable, an attempt should be made to eradicate some of the pitfalls associated with subjective research methods.

The perceptions, prejudices and personal values of the researcher should be checked and eliminated wherever possible so that the research understanding can constitute more than simply a personal statement. (ibid)

Any discussion relating to the reliability or validity of a particular research undertaking warrants a discussion of sociological knowledge; the means employed in gathering it as well as the ever present hazard of "*errors*". Phillips (1971:53) sums it up,

"what we know about social behaviour is dependent upon our methods for studying it, while our methods for studying it are dependent upon what we know about social behaviour."

Social scientists are confronted with a serious methodological problem precisely because of the nature of social reality with which they are concerned. They focus on observing behaviour and the conclusions reached and generalization made are based on information obtained by asking people to reveal their feelings, beliefs and attitudes regarding certain issues and events. In other words, the information is **secondary** and is usually about **past** happenings. The researcher is not concerned with the responses so much as with the implications these have on past or future actions. Research interests constantly change and as social situations change, the researcher needs to acknowledge the validity of alternative approaches.

It is not my intention to produce tangible uncontested "*facts*" and scientifically testable hypotheses, although certain economic indicators and statistics will be used to back up claims and arguments. Through the combined use of theory and select research methods, I will attempt to explain and provide an analysis of the culture, consciousness and ideology peculiar to a sector of the white population in South Africa.

This extreme ultra-right sector of the population will be investigated by focusing on the attitudes expressed and activities initiated by the group through the mechanism of various affiliated and sympathetic organizations and also individual initiatives. For this purpose, I made use of interviews, questionnaires and a participant observation exercise, during my fieldwork.

ACTUAL METHODS USED AND PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED:

Since all research methods contain inherent short-comings, researchers cannot limit themselves to a single approach. This may impinge upon the reliability, validity and overall quality of their research. With this in mind questionnaires were drawn up and a conscious effort was made to ensure that the questions were as unambiguous as possible.

The next step was to distribute questionnaires among the "*target-group*". They were posted, delivered personally by hand or through key "*contacts*" to several right-wing organizations (and individuals), ranging from Trade Unions to cultural and religious groups. The initial response was rather unenthusiastic, but in the end persistence paid off. Initially I distributed 150 questionnaires, of which only a single response was received. A second batch was distributed and finally more responses were received. These responses generated interviews and a wealth of relevant information. Interviews were set up with the assistance of previously established "*contacts*" and these helped generate further information through questionnaires. A total of 25 in-depth interviews were conducted, and 35 completed questionnaires were returned. (This excludes informal discussions, during which a wealth of information was obtained).

Selecting a target group was problematic since the groups and individuals who were, in my mind key political players like AWB leader Eugene Terre'Blanche were not always willing to cooperate and grant interviews. The same problem was experienced when trying to interview MWU officials. Rank and file members however, were far more cooperative.

From the outset, I was painfully aware that interviewee access would be a problem. Consequently I had to interview anyone who was prepared to co-operate. As a result, my sample is unrepresentative. This is understandable since the initial attempt to select a representative sample proved impossible to meet in the light of the difficulties encountered. In spite of this, the actual sample included a significant portion of white respondents representing a range of white attitudes in contemporary South Africa during the 1988-1992 period.

This study is a **comparative time-based** one, since the majority of respondents selected were interviewed more than once. The first set of interviews took place towards the end of 1988. The next set of interviews were scheduled for the period following the 2nd of February 1990. This day, dubbed "**Black Friday**" by the right-wing, was a significant one in this country's history.

Undeniably the research undertaking is limited in scope, but this was compensated by lengthy interviews. Interviews were "*in-depth*" and a number of individuals agreed to be interviewed more than once. They were often willing to engage in telephone conversations when clarification of certain issues was sought. This was thus a **qualitative** and not a quantitative study. A quantitative study would not have been feasible in terms of time and other constraints. It was also felt that it was necessary to "*get to know*" the respondents, to gain insight into their beliefs and mind-sets. To accomplish this it was necessary to establish a good rapport and build a measure of trust. This could only be done through in-depth interviews. Questions related to the respondents opinions on the use of violence in political action, the feasibility and desirability of establishing a volkstaat and the willingness to make economic sacrifices to realize goals. Fears relating to a wide range of concerns were also probed.

The study was concentrated in certain **geographical regions** and focussed on particular organizations and communities. Most of the empirical research was conducted in traditionally conservative communities in the Transvaal (Stilfontein, Carltonville, Johannesburg and Pretoria), the OFS, (Welkom) and my home-town, Kimberley, in the Northern Cape. In the case of the latter, access was easier and "*contacts*" helped secure interviews in Welkom and other mining towns. I desperately tried to speak to officials at the **Mine Workers Union (MWU)** headquarters in the Transvaal, but they failed to respond to my letters and incessant phone-calls. Fortunately, I was able to speak to Mine Workers Union officials and rank and file members of the union in other mining towns such as Kimberley, Welkom, Carltonville and Stilfontein.

Another white union, **Yster en Staal** was far more willing to co-operate and in both Cape Town and Pretoria I was able to conduct interviews with the leadership and ordinary members. They assisted with the distribution and completion of questionnaires. I had previously made contact with **Spoorbond** (during my Honours thesis) and I was once again able to interview officials and members in Kimberley and Pretoria.

Relevant information obtained during my Honours, and contacts made during 1987 were beneficial in terms of rescheduling interviews in 1988 and again in 1990.

Church groups, specifically the **Afrikaanse Protestantse Kerk (APK)** and cultural organizations were included in the sample.

A few **ex-Broederbonders** were encountered along the way. These ranged from teachers to a school-master and businessmen and they were willing to be interviewed. People not specifically affiliated to organizations, were met at meetings and rallies and their views solicited.

Political groups such as the **Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB)**, the **Blanke Bevrydigingsbeweging (BBB)** and the **Nuwe AWB** were extremely evasive, but I managed to track down a few willing regional co-ordinators and members. Assistance was received from journalist friends who through their media connections managed to interview the leadership. They lent me their recordings and other useful information. The **Conservative Party (CP)** was willing to be interviewed and officials in Kimberley and Welkom assisted me enormously.

There is a strong male bias in my research, and this poses certain problems. Virtually no women are in positions of authority in organizations and unions and it was made quite clear by the respondents that they would have taken offence had I spoken to their wives. I interviewed mainly white predominantly Christian and Afrikaans speaking white males.

Respondents were drawn from the working and lower middle classes and some were unemployed, although this was not deliberately intended. Those who worked were employed in the civil service and other government agencies and also miners and railway workers. Unfortunately I was unable to select the sample according to the proportion of employed to unemployed respondents. This was largely due to the issue of access since I was forced to interview anyone who would speak to me. The same holds true for questionnaires returned. Most of the respondents were literate and had obtained some formal education. Both the leadership and rank and file members of the various selected organizations were interviewed. Respondents also included policeman Inkatha members Broederbond members and church ministers. Several of the respondents were young, under 25.

I did conduct a **pilot** study, but the response was rather apathetic. It did however prepare me for the road ahead and prompted me to send out a substantial number of questionnaires and follow up all available leads. Once the interview had been agreed to and a measure of rapport established people were basically co-operative. However, enthusiasm soon petered out and suspicion prevented further contact. It took quite a lot of reassuring before any meaningful exchange occurred. Once a first interview had been granted, the respondents were generally willing to be interviewed a second time. The white right-wing is constantly defensive and favours conspiratorial theories when dealing with relative outsiders. Not all their suspicions are completely unfounded or devoid of truth.

Throughout my research, one study, by Crapanzano, was frequently mentioned. The right is not very popular amongst the rest of the country's population and they are conscious of this. Since the rightwing is overly concerned about their opinions not been taken seriously and their ideas being misquoted or misrepresented, once interviews were agreed to, they were keen to vent their frustrations and articulate their political aims and policies. Respondents often seemed willing to talk because they felt that they have been neglected and ignored.

Introducing myself as an English UCT student didn't help and I had to rely on the fact that I was a fully bilingual female to obtain interview access. My background assisted me since it curbed any preconceived notions of Afrikaners and from the outset I was familiar with the language, customs and life-styles of my respondents. This definitely made communication easier.

The process of seeking information is essentially a subjective experience and scientific methods cannot provide us with an adequate understanding of the world since they can not capture or explain subjective experiences.

Science and reason can only give us a relative and fragmented knowledge and intuitive understanding needs to supplement one's overall approach. This crucial ingredient is fostered by an understanding of the people under investigation from the outset. My experience was that it is

initially very difficult to get conservative right-wing respondents to speak openly and frankly about their experiences. Crapanzano (1987:59) attributes this to their "*Calvinist upbringing*". Whether or not this is the case, the current environment of suspicion and deception doesn't exactly improve the situation.

After initial interviews, respondents opened up somewhat and in many instances were extremely frank about their opinions and sentiments. Admittedly I did not ask many questions of a personal nature, since these responses were not fundamental to my investigation. If I had decided to question respondents about issues pertaining to sexuality etc, I would have anticipated little response. Respondents were rather outspoken in terms of their political views, yet were reluctant to address personal issues in the same manner.

This was not entirely unexpected, and since the study is not aimed at uncovering the personal lives of individual respondents, they were not probed. By phrasing questions indirectly, I was able to obtain most of this information I needed.

The use of a tape-recorder inhibited responses, especially regarding controversial, subjective issues. When I was requested to turn off the tape-recorder I complied and frantically took down notes.

This proved successful as I probably obtained more information than I would have by not complying with the respondents' wishes. Responses have been quoted verbatim as far as possible, and I have translated them into English where necessary. Names have generally been kept confidential, especially where respondents requested this.

In addition to actual methodological problems and concerns relating to the validity and reliability of the research, other problems were encountered. Although these difficulties may appear to be of a personal nature, they nevertheless mitigate against the gathering of information. As usual, the issue of finances and funding of the exercise cropped up. This is a universal problem encountered all too often by prospective researchers. Unfortunately bursaries and the like were unable to cover both living and research expenses. I attempted to apply for additional funds and grants, but to little avail. The efficacy of the research has to an extent been hampered by the lack of resources available to me.

ADDITIONAL SOURCES OF INFORMATION:


I would have like to have spent more time "*in the field*" conducting empirical research, but I was in a sense forced to rely quite heavily on other sources of information.

I made it policy to regularly attend meetings and gatherings, both official and unofficial. These ranged from mass meetings, to church services and informal visits to pubs and other social events. The information gained and the contacts secured in this way contributed enormously to my research. Often more was learned during informal conversation than during structured interviews. By visiting historical sites I was able to comprehend the more subtle aspects of the culture under investigation.

Historical documents and official statistics were also used to extract information relevant to the research. Information was also obtained from pamphlets, periodicals and newsletters distributed by the various right wing organizations. Research conducted by journalists and academics alike contributed to my overall findings. Certain individuals assisted me by making their data available to me.

FIGURE 1:

Courtesy of the *Weekly Mail*



The Afrikaner Volksunie is going for a much smaller, more consolidated volkstaat




FIGURE 2:

Source: *Back to the Laager* (1992)

NUMBER OF INCIDENTS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE JULY TO DECEMBER

1990

| | Police and/or SADF actions | Vigilante and related actions | Hit squad actions | Right-wing actions |
|--------------|---------------------------------------|--|------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| JULY | 147 | 72 | 10 | 20 |
| AUGUST | 102 | 90 | 3 | 15 |
| SEPTEMBER | 69 | 72 | 5 | 4 |
| OCTOBER | 44 | 55 | 11 | 11 |
| NOVEMBER | 54 | 70 | 11 | 6 |
| DECEMBER | 37 | 57 | 5 | 4 |
| TOTAL | 453 | 416 | 45 | 60 |

NUMBER OF PEOPLE INJURED IN POLITICAL VIOLENCE JULY TO DECEMBER

1990

| | Police and/or SADF actions | Vigilante and related actions | Hit squad actions | Right-wing actions |
|--------------|---------------------------------------|--|------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| JULY | 652 | 158 + | 2 | 59 |
| AUGUST | 666 | 1 641 | 3 | 24 |
| SEPTEMBER | 158 | 345 | 1 | 0 |
| OCTOBER | 156 | 119 | 1 | 37 |
| NOVEMBER | 221 | 99 | 8 | 10 |
| DECEMBER | 56 | 451 | 1 | 3 |
| TOTAL | 1 899 | 2 813 + | 16 | 133 |


NUMBER OF PEOPLE KILLED IN POLITICAL VIOLENCE JULY TO DECEMBER

1990


| | Police and/or SADF actions | Vigilante and related actions | Hit squad actions | Right-wing actions |
|--------------|---------------------------------------|--|------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| JULY | 20 | 111 | 4 | 9 |
| AUGUST | 65 | 639 | 1 | 4 |
| SEPTEMBER | 33 | 336 | 0 | 0 |
| OCTOBER | 16 | 74 | 9 | 7 |
| NOVEMBER | 34 | 170 | 3 | 5 |
| DECEMBER | 10 | 259 | 1 | 1 |
| TOTAL | 178 | 1 589 | 18 | 26 |

FIGURE 3:

Symbols of Right Wing groups



BOERE BEVRYDINGS BEWEGING



NAZI PARTY



AFRIKANER WEERSTANDSBEWEGING